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CONSUMER PERCEPTIONS AND HEALTH INSURANCE DECISIONS 
WEI HUANG 
Boston University School of Public Health, 2015 
Major Professor: James F. Burgess, Ph.D., Professor of Health Policy and Management 
 
ABSTRACT 
 Numerous studies have shown that consumers react imperfectly to changes in 
health insurance coverage. To justify consumer valuation in health insurance decision-
making, I use Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data and conduct three studies 
to examine consumer’s private information in health insurance decision-making under a 
conceptual framework of consumer perception, which potentially is informative about 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) Health Insurance Marketplace consumer behavior. 
 
 In the first study, I examine the joint role of individual preferences and health risk 
in two types of insurance decision-making: the probability of being insured and the 
probability of employment-based insurance if insured. Using logistic regression, I find 
that the healthier and wealthier consumers tend to have more positive attitudes towards 
health insurance and thus are more likely to be insured. The effects of health risk 
measures vary largely in insurance decisions conditional on different preference measures 
and preference levels.  
 
 In the second study, I investigate insurance coverage bundle choices with multi-
dimensional private information in an artificially created market setting. I adapt the 
  
 viii 
approach developed by Lokshin and Ravallion (2005) and conduct logistic regression 
modeling to estimate the reduced forms for coverage bundle choice and consumer 
attitude respectively. Predicted linear indices for consumer attitude and coverage bundle 
choices are calculated separately, then their correlation coefficients are compared. In this 
study I find that consumer attitude plays a dominating role in health insurance decision-
making, suggesting that risk preferences may internalize health risks and influence 
insurance purchasing decisions. 
 
 To further explore consumer perceptions within an individual’s personal system 
of decision rules, in the third study, I construct coverage bundle choices in an order from 
the least complete to the most complete, and examine the effect of consumer perceived 
plan quality to coverage bundle choice decisions. I use the generalized ordered logit 
method and a Bayesian learning process for the analysis. I find that coverage bundle 
choice decisions are value-based, for which perceived plan quality plays a significant and 
persistent role.  
 
 The study results also have important policy implications to enhancing consumer 
engagement and optimizing health insurance management to provide high quality care to 
health insurance beneficiaries.  
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CHAPTER ONE 
 
An Introduction to Consumer Perceptions and Health Insurance Decisions 
 
 
I.1 Asymmetric Information and Private Information  
 
 The first welfare theorem 1  states that in a competitive economy with no 
externalities, prices will adjust so that the allocation of resources is optimal in the Pareto 
sense, which is to say that no agent can be made better off without at least one agent 
being made worse off. A key assumption for the theorem to hold is that the characteristics 
of a product traded in the market can be observed by all agents. When this assumption 
fails to hold, such as when information is asymmetric, prices can be distorted and the 
allocation of resources may not achieve Pareto Optimality.  
 
 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) analyzes the insurance market in which private 
information exists on the demand side such that heterogeneous buyers are better aware of 
their risk type or purchasing motivations than the insurers. When these buyers and sellers 
are about to agree on a trade, and one of the parties has private information that the other 
party does not have, this situation is referred to as adverse selection.  
 
                                                        
1 An environment is competitive, when the action of one single agent does not affect prices. 
There is an externality in the economy, when the action of one single agent directly affects the 
welfare of other agents. Finally, an allocation is said to be Pareto optimal, if there does not exist 
any other allocation that makes at least one individual strictly better-off without affecting the 
welfare of other agents in the economy. 
  
 
2
 As opposed to adverse selection, a different incentive problem with informational 
asymmetry can arise when the agents were offered a menu of contracts, and one agent 
can take an action that is unobservable by the other agent (the “principal”) (Grossman 
and Hart, 1983; Mirrlees, 1975). This situation is referred to as moral hazard: it implies 
that the agent increases the cost of an insurance contract from the principal, either by 
changing the probability of a costly outcome (avoiding prevention, for instance) or 
changing the level of spending conditional on a state of the world (using more care when 
insured than uninsured, for instance.   
 
 Adverse selection and moral hazard have different policy implications. Adverse 
selection addresses the ex-ante private information about risk type, while moral hazard 
addresses the ex-post private information about risk type. Insurance mandates can 
potentially reduce adverse selection, but do not address the inefficiencies caused by 
moral hazard.  
 
I.2 Multidimensional Private Information 
 
 In studies of information asymmetry, a positive correlation between buyer’s 
private information about risk type and the demand of insurance is commonly 
hypothesized. However, in recent decades, researchers have found results that differ from 
this hypothesis.  This new line of empirical research often finds that enrollee risk type is 
not the only component of private information in determining the demand for insurance, 
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and other forms of preference heterogeneity may be quantitatively more important than 
private information about risk type in some insurance markets (Cohen and Einav, 2005).   
 
 Cohen and Einav (2005) estimate risk preferences on deductible choices in auto 
insurance contracts. They account for preference-based explanations that are unrelated to 
financial risk and make inference about risk aversion difficult. They find that unobserved 
heterogeneity in risk aversion is greater and more important than risk heterogeneity. They 
also find that unobserved risk has a strong positive correlation with unobserved risk 
aversion.  
 
 Finkelstein and Poterba (2006) examine the role of private information about risk 
type and risk preference jointly in the U.K. annuity market. Their study results support 
the positive hypothesis between an annuitant’s private information and the amount of 
insurance he purchases on average. In another study in the U.S. Medigap insurance 
market, Fang et al. (2008) fail to support the positive hypothesis that, conditional on 
individual’s socioeconomic characteristics as well as cognitive ability, those who spend 
more on healthcare are more likely to purchase Medigap.  
 
 Focusing on the discrepancy between theory and reality, Cutler, Finkelstein, and 
McGarry (2008) examine the relationship between risky behaviors, insurance purchases, 
and risk occurrence in five different insurance markets: life insurance, acute health 
insurance, annuities, long-term care insurance, and Medicare supplemental insurance 
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(Medigap). Their findings suggest preference heterogeneity may help explain the 
differences in demand in different insurance market. Their results have important 
implications for concerns regarding classic, unidimensional adverse selection models.      
 In studies involving risk preference, individual’s socioeconomic characteristics, 
such as age and income (wealth), are often assumed to be related to risk tolerance and 
thus used as the proxy for risk preference (Finkelstein and MGarry, 2006). Other 
socioeconomic status variables such as geographic location that are related to insurance 
decisions but not used in pricing are considered as risk preference measures (Finkelstein 
and Poterba, 2006). Nevertheless, direct measures on private information about risk 
preference are rarely examined. It is difficult to measure risk preference. Answers to 
survey questions about risk preferences may not reflect actual behavior and thus may be 
biased both from challenges in question design and in answers to the questions.  
Therefore, to understand the multidimensional private information in present in 
determining the demand for health insurance, obtaining appropriate measures for risk 
preference becomes critical. It requires researchers to understand how individuals collect 
information, form expectations, and make decisions based on the collective information.  
 
I.3 Private Information Concepts Extended to Consumer Perception Theory  
 While the neoclassical model remains the benchmark for most economic 
applications, behavioral economics stir the debate in questioning the foundational 
assumptions of neoclassical economics. Starting with Simon (1955), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), and Thaler (1980), a large body of research has incorporated insights 
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from psychology such as risk aversion, present bias, and inattention into economic 
models. Researchers increasingly have realized that behavioral economics can contribute 
to public policy by offering new policy tools, improving predictions about the effects of 
existing policies, and generating new welfare implications (Chatty, 2015). In light of 
behavioral economics insights, behavioral features such as consumer perceptions and 
valuations should be incorporated into the conceptual decision-making process to answer 
the related research questions about the demand for health insurance.   
 Consumer perception theory commonly is used to develop marketing and 
advertising strategies intended to retain current customers and attract new ones 2 . In 
studies of marketing, consumer perception theory attempts to explain how individuals 
develop an understanding of the motivations behind their own behavior (Andrews, 
Netemeyer, and Burton, 1998) An important aspect of consumer perception theory is that 
perception by consumers relates to how values and motivations form expectations and 
preferences that drive buying behavior (Scott, 1978). Research on self-perception stresses 
that the internal states potentially altered by self-perception processes are causally linked 
to individuals' consumption priorities (Allen, 1983; Scott, 1978).  
 
 In her classic work of “Consumer perceptions of price, quality, and value,” 
Zeithaml (1988) posits that consumers collect information at various levels of abstraction 
ranging from simple product attributes to personal values, then make overall judgments 
                                                        
2 Business Dictionary: Customer Perception. 
http://www.businessdictionary.com/definition/customer-perception.html 
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with the personalized formulation weighting the information items differentially. Foster 
et al.  (2010) also suggest that consumer health decisions involve highly subjective 
assessments that are made within personal systems of decision rules. 
 Applying consumer perception theory in studies of information asymmetry in 
health insurance markets not only provides a more specific measure of private 
information about risk preference and tests its relationship with other relevant concepts; it 
also enriches the dimensions of private information about consumer valuations and 
motivations in explaining the demand for health insurance.  
 
 Private information extended to consumer perceptions has more straightforward 
policy implications for issues in policy efforts expanding health insurance coverage, 
especially for health insurance mandates. Under the conceptual framework of consumer 
perceptions, both ex-ante and ex-post private information can be obtained with specific 
measures.   
 
I.4 Measuring Private Information about Risk Type and Risk Preference  
 
 This dissertation research uses the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) 
data and takes advantages of the rich private information collected from consumers to 
study consumer insurance decisions.    
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I.4.1 Risk Type  
 
 The theoretical concept of risk type is often described as health status in empirical 
studies of private information in health insurance markets. Health status measures an 
individual’s relative level of wellness and illness, taking into account the presence of 
biological or psychological dysfunction, symptoms, and functional impairment. This 
dissertation distinguishes three alternative measures of risk status: “perceived health 
status” which captures the consumer’s own self-reported health status, “any diagnosed 
long-term conditions” and “healthcare expenditures.” Any conditions indicating a higher 
risk of health may be factors in motivating individuals to buy health insurance. 
 
I.4.2 Risk Preference 
 
 Health insurance is an important element in determining access to care and 
protection against the risk of costly and unforeseen medical events. In addition to the 
socioeconomic status and risk type that distinguish individuals with coverage from those 
who are uninsured, attitudes among consumers toward the need for and cost of health 
insurance may also affect coverage decisions (Cohen, 2014). Given the potential for 
individuals' health care preferences to influence health behaviors, it is important to 
measure the population's attitudes towards health insurance coverage.   
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 The MEPS data captures consumer attitudinal information (Adult Self-
Administered Questionnaire) by asking adults age 18 and over whether they strongly 
agree, agree, are uncertain, disagree, or strongly disagree with the following statements: 
“Health insurance is not worth the money it costs;” “I’m healthy enough that I really 
don’t need health insurance;” “I’m more likely to take risks than the average person.”  
 
 I employ these three attitudinal measures as preferences for health insurance. 
They potentially represent the levels of consumer preference in health investment. 
Consumers that disagreed with these statements indicate they prefer to make health 
investment with health insurance and are considered risk averse, thus they are assumed 
more likely to be insured. Consumers that agreed with the statements are considered to be 
risk tolerant, and they are assumed less likely to be insured.  
 
I.4.3 Consumer Satisfaction  
 
 MEPS data also contain comparative and descriptive information on the 
individual experiences with his or her enrolled plan. The survey asks each individual to 
rate their experiences with the plan from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst health plan possible 
and 10 is the best health plan possible. I group the rating scores into three categories 
representing the consumer’s satisfaction level with their health insurance: poor (0–4), 
fair/good (5–7), and excellent (8–10). Consumers that are more satisfied with their health 
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plans are assumed to be more inclined to purchase more comprehensive health insurance 
coverage in the next enrollment period. 
 
 Whether specific health services such as prescription drugs, vision care and dental 
care were covered by the individual health plans. The questions asked are: (1) “Were 
prescription drugs covered under this health plan?” (2) “Which of the services listed were 
covered by this plan?” The services listed include chiropractic care, vision care, and 
dental care. Answers to these questions are “Yes” or “No.”  
 
 In the study sample of the privately insured individuals, 96% took prescription 
drug coverage, 71% took dental care, and 60% took vision care. These three types of 
coverage are the most prevalently purchased and have the most available information in 
MEPS. Therefore, the health insurance decisions also are constructed in ordinal bundles 
including all three options, any two of the three options, or any one of the three options.   
 
I.5 Study Overview  
 
 Figure 1 shows the logic flow for health insurance decisions implemented with 
the theory of consumer perceptions. Table 1 presents a comparative overview including 
study sample, study design, study methods, and variables for each study. In Chapter II, I 
identify two-dimensional private information (risk preference and risk status) and 
examine their joint associations with the demand of health insurance. Binary health 
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insurance decisions are studied: the general health insurance decision and the employer-
sponsored health insurance decision. In Chapter III, I study private health insurance 
decision focusing on the role of consumer attitude towards health insurance as a risk 
preference measure. Health insurance decisions are the constructed coverage bundles and 
organized as binary choices: more comprehensive bundle choice versus less 
comprehensive bundle choice. In Chapter IV, I examine a subjective quality measure – 
consumer satisfaction with health insurance and its role within personal systems of 
decision-making, for which the ordinal bundle choices of coverage options are studied.  
 
 An array of logistic regression models with binary insurance decision are 
estimated in chapters II and III. The study results reveal that consumers may internalize 
private risk information to form personalized risk preference and in turn influence 
individual health insurance decision. Chapter IV uses the generalized ordered logit model 
incorporating the Bayesian learning process to study the ordinal coverage bundle choices. 
The study results in chapter IV find that the subjective quality measure has strong 
indications to consumer’s choice decisions.   
 
 In following chapters, I present my studies of private information extended to 
consumer perceptions for different health insurance decisions in chapters II, III, and IV. 
Chapter V concludes. 
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Table I.1 Study overview 
 
Chapter 
II 
  
Chapter 
III 
  
Chapter 
IV 
N  66,040 16,101 10,492 
  
Data  
MEPS (2002–2009) ✔ ✔ ✔ 
  
Study design  
Pooled, cross-sectional ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Temporal ✔ 
  
Method  
Logistic regression ✔ ✔  
The predicted linear indices ✔  
The generalized ordered logit model ✔ 
The Bayesian learning process  ✔ 
  
Insurance Decisions  
The probability of insured (binary) ✔  
The probability of choosing employment-
based insurance if insured (binary) 
✔  
The probability of choosing comprehensive 
coverage bundle (binary) 
✔  
The probability of choosing comprehensive 
coverage bundle (ordinal) 
✔ 
  
Plan characteristics  
Monthly OOP ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Premium is shared ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Given plan choices ✔ ✔ 
  
Individual characteristics  
Age ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Sex ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Race/ethnicity ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Marital status ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Education ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Income ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Region ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Employment status ✔ ✔ ✔ 
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Union membership ✔  
Dependents ✔ ✔ ✔ 
Risk behavior ✔ ✔  
  
Consumer perceptions (Private information)  
Self-reported health status  
        Perceived health status ✔ ✔  
        Diagnosed comorbidities ✔ ✔  
        Healthcare expenditures ✔ ✔  
Risk preference  
        “I’m healthy enough that I really don’t 
need health insurance” 
✔  
        “Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs”  
✔ ✔  
        “I’m more likely to take risks than the 
average person”  
✔  
Consumer satisfaction with health insurance  
          Subjective plan rating         ✔ 
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CHAPTER TWO 
The joint role of risk preference and risk status in health insurance decisions 
 
II.1 Introduction 
 
 The Affordable Care Act (ACA) introduces mechanisms of mandates, subsidies 
and state-based insurance exchanges that aim to promote the quality and affordability of 
health insurance, lower the uninsured rate by expanding public and private insurance 
coverage, and reduce the costs of healthcare for individuals and the government. The law 
requires insurance companies to cover all applicants within new minimum standards and 
offer the same rates regardless of pre-existing conditions or sex. However, consumer 
response to the insurance expansion initiative may be limited and varies by states as state 
implementations have varied.  
 Buettgens et al. (2011) use the Urban Institute’s Health Insurance Policy 
Simulation Model to estimate the effects of the ACA and the individual mandate as if 
they were fully implemented in 2011. In their article, as of 2014, the national rate of 
nonelderly uninsured is estimated to have dropped from 18.9% to 8.7%. The projected 
rate of uninsured nonelderly vary regionally from 4.6 percent in New England (1.1 
percent in Massachusetts), to 11.4 percent in the West South Central region, and to the 
highest rate of 12.8 percent in Texas (Buettgens, 2011). 
 However, a survey conducted by Gallup reports that, as of April 2015, the 
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uninsured rate among 18-to-64-year olds dropped to 14.5%3, which is still not reaching 
the expected rate at 8.7% (Blumenthal and Collins, 2014). 
 In fact, policy initiatives to expand health insurance coverage for the uninsured 
have been made in various settings and states throughout the last two decades. The results 
of these initiatives were found to be either temporary, associated with substantial costs, or 
just simply lacked consumer responsiveness (Bilheimer, 2001; Chernew, 1997; J. Gruber 
and Levitt, 2000; Marquis, 1995; McLaughlin, 1992; Selden, Banthin, and Cohen, 1998; 
Thorpe, Hendricks, Garnick, Donelan, and Newhouse, 1992). Gruber (2008) argues that 
there are externalities associated with underinsurance. For example, the uninsured people 
are less likely to receive vaccinations and care for communicable disease, which may 
cause the prevalence of rare diseases. There is also financial externality imposed by the 
uninsured. When the uninsured don’t pay their medical bills, those costs are passed on to 
the insured, triggers high medical costs.  
 Researchers and policymakers increasingly have recognized that the issue might 
be related to the nature of health insurance as a “merit good.” In the market supplying 
merit goods, social planners need as many people as possible to be insured and healthy so 
that all individuals can receive the maximum external benefit. However, there is a 
significant level of information failure resulting from consumption of merit goods. For 
example, there is likely to be considerable information failure in terms of an individual 
valuing the benefit (to themselves and to the public) of regular health checks, eye tests, or 
                                                        
3 In U.S., Uninsured Rate Dips to 11.9% in First Quarter. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/182348/uninsured-rate-dips-first-quarter.aspx 
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dental visits. There also may be considerable time lags in deriving the benefit from 
consuming a merit good, where consumers may not be aware of or otherwise value the 
benefits that will occur in the future. Therefore, when viewing health insurance as a 
“merit good” in pursuing equal distribution, it is important to justify the provision of 
health care or health insurance benefits based on individual needs, perceptions, and 
valuations.  
 
 Recognizing that the ACA mandates insurers and employers to accept all 
applicants regardless of health status, insurers may attract consumers based on consumer 
valuation to achieve the efficient allocation of insurance. It has two implications to 
initiating a study of consumer valuation. First, individual perceptions and valuation of 
health insurance indicating heterogeneous preferences are fundamental for understanding 
health insurance enrollment decisions. In their article, Remler et al. (2001) suggest that 
consumers may not value health insurance as much as policymakers have interest in them 
possessing it. Peterson (2004) notes that due to failure to understand consumer valuation 
of health insurance, the policy efforts for expanding insurance coverage “does not 
translate into people accepting it.” Bilheimer (2001) also acknowledges that 
understanding consumer valuation can help in enhancing consumer engagement in health 
insurance decisions. Summers (1989) posits that consumer valuation of health insurance 
has important implications for insurance mandates that make it more efficient than tax-
based incentives to engage enrollment; however, it also may lead to welfare losses from 
pooling individuals with heterogeneous preferences.  
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 Second, the standard empirical study for asymmetric information assumes that 
individuals have private information about their risks alone, and the positive correlation 
between risk status and the demand of health insurance is hypothesized (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz, 1976). Underlying the demand for health insurance in the standard model, 
individual preferences commonly are required to be held as constant in order to obtain 
unbiased estimates of price and income effects. However, studies in this tradition are 
found inconclusive. Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) find the significant adverse selection 
effect in their study of the annuity market in the U.K. While another study by these 
authors in 2004 in the same market setting finds no support for a positive correlation  
between risk status and the annuity insurance purchase (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004).   
 
 Buchmueller et al. (2013) suggests that multidimensional private information may 
offset or reverse the positive correlation between risk and selection. De Meza and Webb 
(2001) adopt the idea of individual preference heterogeneity and find that risk-averse 
individuals are not only more likely to buy insurance but also put more effort in limiting 
risk exposure. As a result, the standard positive hypothesis could be reversed such that 
the healthier would be more likely to be insured. Likewise, high-risk individuals who are 
risk tolerant may be less likely to purchase health insurance. De Meza and Webb’s theory 
suggests that ignoring risk preference may mask the relationship between risk class and 
insurance, leading to false conclusions. In evaluating the relationship between private 
information and the demand for health insurance, this paper attempts to justify valuation 
of health insurance by consumers in two dimensions: health risks and health preference. 
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Making use of self-reported attitudinal measures and self-reported health status provided 
by the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), I demonstrate how consumer 
preference and health status jointly are related to two types of health insurance decisions: 
the decision to become insured and the decision of choosing employment-based 
insurance if insured.  
 
 The findings in this study reveal that healthier and wealthier consumers are more 
positive towards having health insurance and make more aggressive insurance decisions. 
Although consumer preference varies across age, gender and race, which commonly are 
used as its proxies in studies of insurance decisions, I find that the direct preference 
measures have substantially more significant effects on insurance decisions than those 
demographic characteristics. Compared with health status, consumer preference also is 
found to play a more prominent role in insurance decisions. Conditional on health status, 
consumer preference in need of health insurance appears dominant when making 
decisions to become insured, while consumer preference in valuing health insurance has a 
stronger effect on employment-based insurance decisions. I also find that different risk 
measures have inconsistent effects to insurance decisions. For example, healthcare 
expenditures have a larger effect in making decisions of “whether to be insured compare 
with its effect in employment-based insurance decisions; perceived health status is 
negatively associated with the decision to become insured while positively associated 
with the decisions of choosing employment-based insurance for the insured. This finding 
may explain the inconclusive selection effects in previous studies.    
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 The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II reports a brief 
review on the role of private information in insurance purchasing decisions, followed by 
the empirical framework for health insurance decision. Section III provides data 
description. Section IV presents the empirical results. Finally, Section V concludes with a 
discussion of findings and policy implications. 
 
II.2 Literature Review and Empirical Framework  
 
II.2.1 Previous Research on the Role of Consumer Preferences  
 
 To understand the factors that impact plan choices, Scanlon and his colleagues 
conducted a comprehensive literature review (Scanlon, Chernew, and Lave, 1997). They 
identify a set of primary variables representing attributes of health plans that directly 
impact health plan choice, including price, quality, choice of provider, benefit design 
coverage, and convenience. The set of secondary variables representing consumer 
characteristics include consumer demographics and health status. In this literature review, 
consumer tastes for health insurance are not specifically identified as a separate factor.   
 
In studies exploring the role of worker preferences in employer decisions regarding the 
content of health insurance benefits, Gruber and Lettau (2004) presume individual 
demographics such as age, gender, race/ethnicity, and education impart information about 
health insurance preferences. However, Pudney (1989) points out that “not all variation in 
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preferences is likely to be explicable solely in terms of observed demographic and social 
factors.”  
 
 Most standard models of asymmetric information predict positive correlation 
between health insurance and health risks, assuming that individuals only differ in risk 
classes/levels but are identical in risk preference. There are very few studies that have 
explored the role of health insurance preferences on health insurance purchasing 
decisions and even fewer studies explore the joint role of consumer preferences and risk 
status. Barsky et al. (1997) found that not only were more risk-averse individuals more 
likely to purchase health insurance but also more risk-averse employed individuals are 
more likely to sort into jobs that offer health insurance. Finkelstein and McGarry (2006) 
conduct a general test for multiple dimensions of private information about risk type and 
preference for long-term care insurance. They demonstrate that risk type and preference 
jointly influence insurance decisions, however, they do not examine how preference and 
risk type jointly influence insurance decisions.  
 
 According to the United States Census Bureau, over half of Americans obtain 
insurance through their employers (employer-based health insurance), about 10 percent 
purchase health insurance directly, and about 15 percent of Americans were enrolled in 
Medicare and about 16 percent enrolled in Medicaid4. For those who obtained insurance 
through employer, they may also obtain reimbursement with the defined contribution 
                                                        
4 "Income, Poverty, and Health Insurance Coverage in the United States: 2010." U.S. Census 
Bureau. Issued September 2011.     
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health benefits. As a result of wage and price controls imposed by the federal 
government, employers increasingly offers fringe benefits, especially health insurance 
coverage, to attract workers. This makes employer-based health insurance soon achieved 
its popularity in the U.S. However, lack of insurance among many working Americans 
persists. The 2012 statistics from the Department of Health and Human Services report 
that the uninsured rates were higher among part-time employees and the unemployed. 
Although working full-time increases the likelihood of having insurance, 15.3 percent 
full-time workers were uninsured5.  
 
 The employed uninsured has been documented by many studies. Cooper and 
Schone (1997) reported an approximately 80 percent take-up rate of the employment-
based health insurance with a declining trend. Their findings confirm that workers do sort 
among jobs but this does not guarantee every worker choose to purchase health insurance 
offered by the employer. Monheit et al. (1985) examine the circumstances and 
characteristics of the employed uninsured. In their study, they find that the largest 
component of those without health insurance coverage are the employed uninsured and 
their dependents; although workers who are young and poor are the most likely to be 
uninsured, about half of the employed uninsured are older than 30 years of age and half 
reside in middle or high-income households; some employed uninsured are offered health 
insurance at the workplace, and they do not receive higher wages in place of health 
insurance fringe benefits.  
                                                        
5 "Overview of the Uninsured in the United States: A Summary of the 2012 Current Population 
Survey Report." Susan R. Todd and Benjamin D. Sommers. Issued September 2012. 
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 While studies like Monheit’s seek to redirect the policy debate on the uninsured, 
many policy efforts expanding health insurance coverage had been made during the last 
two decades. Finally achieving universal health coverage remained a top priority among 
those policy efforts.  Aiming to ensure everyone has predictable, affordable health care 
regardless of unforeseen illness or injury, the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
enacted in 2010 mandates coverage and penalize employers who failed to provide health 
insurance coverage, creating mechanisms for people to pool risk and buy insurance 
collectively6. 
 
 From a policy perspective, policymakers are concerned with efficiency and 
distributional consequences when health insurance is mandated and individuals with 
heterogeneous tastes are required to purchase insurance coverage (Melese, 1995; 
Summers, 1989). For example, if workers prefer jobs that do not offer health insurance 
benefits and are required to purchase health insurance through the employer, reforms to 
expand coverage may not achieve the expected success level and may burden the group 
of individuals who do not value health insurance as expected. As a result, individuals and 
society may suffer welfare losses by failing to reach the efficiency gains from risk 
pooling and from externalities associated with the under-consumption of healthcare 
(Arrow, 1963; Pauly, 1986).  
 
 This paper attempts to understand how consumer preferences towards health 
                                                        
6 Kaiser Family Foundation (April 15, 2011). "Summary of new health reform law." Menlo Park, 
Calif.: Kaiser Family Foundation. Archived from the original on April 17, 2012. 
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insurance play the role jointly with health risks in consumers’ insurance decisions and to 
draw policy implications for implementing health insurance mandates.  
 
II.2.2 Empirical Framework  
 While the neoclassical model remains the benchmark for most economic 
applications, behavioral economics stir the debate in questioning the foundational 
assumptions of neoclassical economics. Starting with Simon (1955), Kahneman and 
Tversky (1979), and Thaler (1980), a large body of research has incorporated insights 
from psychology such as risk aversion, present bias, and inattention into economic 
models. Researchers increasingly have realized that behavioral economics can contribute 
to public policy by offering new policy tools, improving predictions about the effects of 
existing policies, and generating new welfare implications (Chatty, 2015). In light of 
behavioral economics insights, behavioral features such as consumer perceptions and 
valuations should be incorporated into the conceptual decision-making process to answer 
the related research questions about the demand for health insurance.   
 
 Traditional analysis of demand for health insurance suggests that it varies with 
risk status, assuming homogeneous preferences. The riskier are more likely to purchase 
more comprehensive coverage due to the higher expected healthcare utilization and 
higher medical expenses (Rothschild, 1992). However, numerous studies find that risk-
averse consumers tend to purchase more coverage than the less risk averse even when 
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they have lower health risks (Buchmueller, 2013; Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008; 
Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006; Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004; Finkelstein and Poterba, 
2002). In their study, De Meza and Webb (2001) induced multidimensional information 
consisting of risk preference and risk status. They find that failure to condition on risk 
preference may mask the positive correlation between health risks and insurance 
decisions (de Meza and Webb, 2001)I retrospectively investigate a consumer’s health 
insurance decision with private information prior to the ACA and derive policy 
implications for health insurance mandates. Consumer insurance decisions are examined 
based on two-dimensions of private information: risk status and risk preference. To 
investigate the effect of private information on the health insurance purchasing decision, I 
employ logistic regression models to estimate the probability of general health insurance 
decisions and the probability of employment-based health insurance decisions, 
respectively. 
  
 I assume that individuals are utility maximizers. Individual obtains utility 
from selecting alternative from the finite set of J alternatives contained in a choice set. 
Thus an individual makes a health insurance purchasing decision based on his own 
characteristics and the attributes of insurance. Let  represent individual  utility from 
purchasing health insurance. The utility of purchasing health insurance is 
 
 
 
i Uij
j
U i i' s
U = U il (X il , M;Fi
l ) + εil , i =1,...,I; l = 0,1 (1)
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where  equals 1 indicates the decision of purchasing health insurance,  indicates 
individual characteristics,  indicates monthly out-of-pocket premium,  indicates 
consumer private information about their risk status or risk preference, and a stochastic 
component .  
 
 An individual making choice maximizes his or her utility. Individual  makes the 
decision to purchase health insurance if . The probability  that an individual 
 decides to purchase health insurance is given by 
 
 
 
 Further, the probability that an individual decides to purchase health insurance or 
enroll in employer-sponsored health insurance, incorporating private information, takes 
the form:  
 
 
 
 In this equation, the joint role of risk preference and health status can be 
determined by estimating the probability of purchasing health insurance as a function of 
private information F for risk preference or risk status alternatively. When F is estimated 
as risk preference, it is estimated conditional on risk measures and the risk class for each 
risk measure. When health status is estimated, it is estimated conditional on preference 
l X
M F
εil
i
U i1 > Ui0 pil
i
logit( pi1) =log
pi1
1− pi1
 
 
 
 
 
 = αX − λM + β(Fi1 − Fi0) + (εi0 −εi1) (3)
pi1 = prob(U i1(X i1,M;Fi
1) −U i0(X i0,M;Fi
0) > εi0 −εi1) (2)
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measures and the levels of each preference measure. There are three preference measures 
and three risk measures, thus logistic regression models are estimated and  odds 
ratios of private information in relation to each type of insurance decisions are reported 
and compared. 
 
 Last, assuming is logistically distributed, the probability of purchasing 
health insurance is inversely related to price, and positively related to age, income, 
medical expenditures, positive preferences, and high risks.  
 
 
II.3. Data and Variables  
 
II.3.1 Data 
 
 The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data provide national and 
regional estimates of annual health services utilization, medical expenditures, payment 
source and health insurance for the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population. I 
integrate the full-year population characteristics files, job files, person-round-plan files, 
and risk adjustment scores files in the MEPS household component along with the pooled 
linkage file. From the integrated data, I identify a sample population from 2002–2009 
MEPS data in a total of 66,040 individuals ages 18 to 64. It consists of information on 
age, sex, ethnicity, income level, education, marital status, number of dependents, health 
3×3 3×3
ε0 −ε1
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status, employment status, health insurance status, plan type, health insurance coverage 
types, monthly out-of-pocket premium, premium subsidy, and most importantly, 
consumer attitude toward health insurance and risk-taking behavior.   
 
 I use STATA 12.0 to do the data management and statistical analyses. All 
analyses are run on the full sample of data incorporating weights to adjust for complex 
survey design. Since the MEPS data is open for public use, this study is exempt from 
Institutional Review Board approval.   
 
II.3.2 Variables  
 
II.3.2.1 The Outcome Variable 
 
 In the study sample, there are two outcome measures: whether individuals are 
insured and whether they are insured with employment-based health insurance. Both of 
these two measures are binary. Consumer purchase health insurance is 1, 0 otherwise. 
Consumer purchased employment-based health insurance is 1, 0 otherwise.  
 
II.3.2.2 Consumer Preference  
 
 Health insurance has been considered as an important element in access to care 
and protection against the risk of costly and unforeseen medical events. Attitudes among 
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consumers toward the need for and cost of health insurance may impact the extent to 
which the population is covered. The MEPS data contains consumer’s attitudinal 
information (Adult Self-Administered Questionnaire) that asked adults age 18 and over 
whether they strongly agree, agree, were uncertain, disagree, or strongly disagree with the 
following three statements: “Health insurance is not worth the money it costs;” “I’m 
healthy enough that I really don’t need health insurance;” “I’m more likely to take risks 
than the average person.”     
 
 I use these three measures as relevant preferences that may be related to choices 
leading to health insurance coverage. They represent the level of consumer preference in 
health investment. Consumers that disagreed with these statements indicate they prefer to 
make health investment with health insurance and are considered having positive attitude, 
thus they are assumed more likely to be insured. Consumers that agreed with the 
statement are considered to be negative with health insurance, and they are assumed less 
likely to be insured.  
 
II.3.2.3 Health Status 
 
 Health status is an individual’s relative level of wellness and illness, taking into 
account the presence of biological or psychological dysfunction, symptoms, and 
functional impairment. There are three measures of health status examined in this 
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analysis: “perceived health status,” “any long-term conditions” and “healthcare 
expenditure.”  
 
  “Perceived health status” is a subjective measure of health status. It is how one 
thinks of one’s own health relative to the health of people in one’s age group. 
Respondents were asked to rate their health as excellent, very good, good, fair, or poor. 
The worse an individual perceived their health, the more likely for her/him to be insured.  
 
 In addition to a subjective measure, an objective measure of health status is 
constructed and examined. “Any long-term conditions7” are consumer reported diagnosis 
of major long-term conditions including cholesterol, high blood pressure, coronary heart 
disease, angina, heart attack, other heart disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, and asthma 
(Ellis et al., 1996). Although Doiron, Jones, and Savage (2008) found the “long-term 
conditions” perceptions may capture two possible effects with both positive and negative 
associations with insurance decisions, I hypothesize that a positive relationship between 
long-term conditions and insurance decisions for this study. Any long-term conditions 
motivate individuals to buy insurance or choose employment-based insurance.   
 
 In the real world, there might be discrepancies between the subjective and 
                                                        
7 The chronic diseases were originally selected by HCFA in 1995. Ellis et al. (1996) identify 6 
high-cost conditions that overlap with the HCFA chronic diseases. In this dissertation research, I 
refer to the lists from both HCAF and DCG system and take use of the available information from 
MEPS as well. It ends up with a list of long-term conditions: cholesterol, high blood pressure, 
coronary heart disease, angina, heart attack, other heart disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, and 
asthma. 
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objective measures of health status. Some people may perceive themselves as healthy 
despite suffering from one or more chronic diseases, while others perceive themselves as 
ill when no objective evidence of disease can be found. These two measures and their 
associations with insurance decisions are examined and compared.  These confounding 
differences are a major problem in formulation of useful research using self-reported 
health status. 
 
 Healthcare expenditure as a risk measure also had been discussed in studies of 
risk selection. In their study “Predictability and predictiveness in health care spending,” 
Ellis and McGuire examine health plan decisions about healthcare spending on certain 
services, building on risk selection research that focuses on cost information and health 
plan uses to select enrollees (Ellis and McGuire, 2007). The positive association between 
healthcare expenditure and insurance decisions is hypothesized in Ellis and McGuire’s 
study. Consumers have incentives to spend more if they are insured (moral hazard). 
Consumers that expect to spend more on healthcare or health services also have 
incentives to pursue health insurance (adverse selection). Therefore a positive relation is 
hypothesized so that the more consumers spent on healthcare the more they are likely to 
be insured. 
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II.3.2.4 The Covariates  
 
 I include a series of covariates in consumer’s decision-making process. 
Predisposing variables include age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and whether the 
individual has dependents. They are associated with the individual’s lifestyle and the 
physical and social status that may impact the individual’s behavioral patterns. I expect 
age is positively associated with preference and insurance. As one becomes older, he/she 
would probably not only tend to purchase more comprehensive insurance, but also agree 
that they need insurance and insurance is worth the money it costs. Married consumers or 
those who have dependents are expected to be more likely to have insurance due to the 
needs of family members.     
 
 Resources such as income and employment status enable individuals to obtain 
health insurance or engage in health-related behaviors. A positive relationship between 
income and the use of health insurance is assumed. Education level can also be an 
enabling factor that influences health-related behaviors.  
 
 Other factors influencing the choice of health insurance coverage include the 
services provided, choice of healthcare providers, price and other fees. To avoid 
collinearity among the covariates, the covariates selected only include age, sex, ethnicity, 
education, marital status, employment status, total healthcare expenditures, whether the 
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individual has dependents, monthly OOP, whether the premium was subsidized, income 
level, and geographic region.  
 
II.3.3 Data Description  
 
 This analysis includes a sample of 66,040 individuals who range in age from 18 to 
64. Table II.1 presents the distributional statistics of individual characteristics and the 
prevalence of consumer preference in three measures. Among the total sample 
population, about 30 percent (29.23%) are individuals 50 years and above and 25 percent 
(25.26%) under 30 years of age. The majority of study population is between 30 and 50 
years of age. The forties group is slightly larger than the thirties (23.77% v. 21.75). The 
similar age group distribution is found for the insured and the insured with employment-
based insurance. In the insured population, the age distribution is slightly older than in 
the overall study population. Females comprise about 51% of the study population, 
slightly higher than the proportion of males. Over 81% of the study population is White. 
The study population is 12 percent Black, while about 10% of those who are insured are 
Black (9.71% and 9.91%). Over 70% of individuals in the study population had an 
education level below college, while 66% in the insured groups (65.77% and 65.56%), 
indicating higher education levels among those who were insured. More than 70% of the 
study population was ever married, but a higher proportion of insured individuals are 
married (75% and 77%). About 41% of individuals’ family income is greater than 400 
percent of poverty, whereas more than half of the insured individuals have family 
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incomes above 400 percent of the poverty line (52% and 54%). About 75 percent of the 
study population is employed, while more than 80 percent of insured individuals is 
employed (83% and 84%).  
 
 Health status measures used in this study include perceived health status, a 
comorbidity indicator, and healthcare expenditures. More than sixty percent (61%) of the 
study population perceived their health as excellent or very good, while less than 12 
percent perceived poor health. Among those who were insured (the insured and insured 
with employment-based health insurance), more than sixty-five percent perceived their 
health in good condition (66% and 66%), while less than ten percent report poor health 
(8% and 8%). On average, the prevalence of comorbidity is about the same in three 
comparison groups (39%, 40%, and 40%). In the study population, 38 percent spent less 
than $500 on healthcare annually, about 27 percent incurred annual healthcare 
expenditure between $500 and $2,000, and about 34 percent spent more than $2,000 
annually. Among those who were insured, there is a higher proportion of individuals who 
incurred higher expenditure. Nearly 38 percent of insured individuals spent more than 
$2,000 annually on healthcare, compare with 34 percent of the entire study sample. 
 
 Consumer preference measures are consumers’ responses to three attitudinal 
statements including “Do not need health insurance,” “Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs,” and “More likely to take risks.” More than 80 percent of consumers 
disagreed with the statement that they “Do not need health insurance”, less than 8 percent 
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were not certain, and about 10 percent agreed. About 60 percent of the study sample 
disagreed with the statement “Health insurance is not worth the money it costs,” whereas 
about 25 percent agreed with it. Similar distributions are found for consumer responses to 
the statement of “More likely to take risks.” The response discrepancy between “Do not 
need health insurance” and “Health insurance is not worth the money it costs” indicates 
the difference between the perceived health needs and the perceived value of insurance. 
Among those disagreed with the need for health insurance (N=52,458), about 67 percent8 
are also disagreed with the worth of health insurance (N=35,338), which is about 90 
percent of those who disagreed with the worth of health insurance (N=39,082). There are 
about 30 percent of individuals who perceived the need for health insurance but did not 
value health insurance enough.   
 
 Overall, individual characteristic distributions are similar for the insured and for 
those who are covered under employment-based health insurance. 
 
 Table II.2 presents the joint distribution of health status and preference across 
different age groups.  
 
 The first panel shows the distribution of consumers’ preferences and perceived 
health status across age groups. First, in each level of each preference measure, more than 
half of individuals perceived “excellent/very good” health across age groups, 
                                                        
8 The percentages are not weight adjusted. 
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representing a generally healthy population. Second, consumer’s health perception of 
“excellent/very good” decreases in the older age groups. Accordingly, health perception 
of “fair/poor” increases in the older age groups. This trend is even notable for those who 
were uncertain or agreed with the statement, indicating a positive association between 
poor health perceptions and negative preferences. Third, individual’s responses to general 
risk preference have very similar distribution patterns to the “worth” statement. 
 
 Panel 2 describes the distribution of healthcare expenditures across age and 
preference levels. In each age group, the majority spent less than $500 on healthcare 
annually disagreed with the statements, showing healthier individuals prefer health 
insurance or are unwilling to take risks. Results in panel 2 indicate the positive 
associations among age, healthcare spending and negative preferences. The very similar 
distribution patterns across age and healthcare spending can be observed between 
individual’s worth-based preference and individual’s general risk preference. 
 
 The distribution of comorbidity across age and preference levels shows in Panel 3 
is very similar to the distribution in Panels 1 and 2. What very different from Panels 1 
and 2 is that the distributions among the three health risk measures are similar. Although 
there is a slightly larger variations in consumer’s need-based preference across age and 
the level of health status, it is not as much as the variations in Panels 1 and 2.  
 
 In summary, consumer preferences not only vary across individual characteristics 
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such as age, but also vary across health risk measures. From the descriptive statistics, the 
positive associations among age, poorer health status, and the negative preference are 
presumed. The variation in the joint distribution may lead to variation in consumers’ 
insurance decisions.  
 
II.4 Results  
 
 I aim to investigate the joint roles of consumer preferences and health status in 
health insurance decision-making including the general decision of insured and insured 
with employment-based insurance. The likelihood of being insured is examined with 
three preference measures separately, then the likelihood of being insured with 
employment-based insurance is examined with three preference measures separately as 
well. Next, the roles of preference conditional on health status are examined, followed by 
examining the roles of health status in condition of preference levels. Lastly, the price 
effect is also examined for employment-based insurance decisions conditional on 
preference and health status respectively.    
 
 Table II.3 reports the association between preference and the general insurance 
decision and the association between preference and the employment-based insurance 
decision. The need-based preference for health insurance has the largest effect compared 
with the other two preference measures. Consumers who disagreed with the statement 
“Do not need health insurance” is 1.77 times more likely to be insured compared with 
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those who agreed with the statement (OR=1.77, 95% CI=[1.62, 1.92], p<0.01). 
Preference based on money value is slightly less than preference based on need. It has an 
odds ratio of 1.66 (OR=1.66, 95% CI=[1.56, 1.78], p<0.01). General risk preference has 
the smallest effect and the odds ratio is 1.47 (OR=1.47, 95% CI=[1.38, 1.57], p<0.01). 
Consumers who were uncertain about the statements are not significantly associated with 
the insurance decision except the uncertain response to the money value of health 
insurance. Consumer preferences have more significant association with employment-
based insurance among those who were insured. The effects of responses as “uncertain” 
become positive and more significant (except the response to “Do not need health 
insurance”) in employment-based insurance decision-making. It seems that, compared 
with those who had negative preferences, consumers may not choose to be insured if their 
preferences were uncertain, but they would like employment-based insurance once 
insured. However, in the decisions for employment-based insurance, health need 
preference and general risk preference are less significant compared with effects in the 
general insurance decisions, while consumer’s response to “health insurance is not worth 
the money it costs” are persistently significant and even stronger in magnitude. 
Consumers who disagreed with the statement “health insurance is not worth the money it 
costs” are 1.66 times more likely to be insured (OR=1.66, 95% CI=[1.56, 1.78, p<0.01]), 
whereas consumers who disagreed with the statement are 1.77 times more likely to take 
employment-based insurance (OR=1.77, 95% CI=[1.62, 1.94], p<0.01).   
 
 Among these three preference measures, consumer’s response to “health 
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insurance is not worth the money it costs” is significant in both insurance decisions and 
has an even stronger effect in the decision of employment-based insurance. General risk 
preference is also significant in the employment-based insurance enrollment decision. It 
seems the effect of health need is stronger when consumers are making the general 
insurance decision compared with making the employment-based insurance decision, 
however it is not statistically significant9.  
 
 Additionally, in these analyses, age and race/ethnicity do not show significant 
effects, after adjusting for other variables (see appendix). Employment status is 
significantly associated with both insurance decisions. Employed individuals are about 
2.5 times more likely to be insured compared with those who were unemployed in all 
three analyses. Family income is also statistically significantly associated with both 
insurance decisions. Families with income above 400% percent of poverty are 10 times 
more likely to be insured, while families with income between 138–400% percent of 
poverty are about 3 times more likely to be insured. This finding makes further 
examination of the effects of different family income levels worthwhile. Results of this 
are shown in table II.5 and table II.6.  
 
                                                        
9 The equality of odds ratios across groups had been tested with the Adjusted Wald test (STATA 
post estimation command –suest–). The odds of disagreed with need statement and worth 
statement do not show significantly difference (F<0.01, p=0.95), however both of them are 
significantly different from the odds of disagreed with the risk statement for general health 
insurance decision (F=25.69, p<0.01) and the employment-based decision (F=7.15, p<0.01). The 
odds of disagreed with need statement for general health insurance is also significantly different 
from the odds for employment-based decision (F=2.34, p=0.13).   
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 Table II.4 presents similar analyses for the effect of health status on insurance 
decisions. Consumer’s annual total healthcare expenditures and comorbidities are found 
positively associated with both health insurance decisions; however, consumer perceived 
health status is negatively associated with the insurance decision. Consumers who 
perceived their health “Fair/Poor” are 0.58 times less likely to be insured compared with 
those who perceived health as “Excellent/Very good” (OR=0.58, 95% CI=[0.54, 0.63], 
p<0.01). Consumers who incurred annual healthcare spending over $500 are about two 
times more likely to be insured compared with those who spent less than $500 (OR=2.24, 
95% CI=[2.10, 2.41], p<0.01; OR=2.45, 95% CI=[2.30, 2.62], p<0.01). Consumers who 
had any comorbidities are 1.16 times more likely to be insured (OR=1.16, 95% CI=[1.09, 
1.23], p<0.01). Compared with the other two health status measures, healthcare 
expenditures have stronger associations with the insurance decision. However, the 
stronger association may also be caused by “moral hazard.” Once consumers are insured, 
they may have the tendency to engage in risky behaviors and result in more negative 
consequences such as spending more on healthcare.   
 
 The effects of health status are more consistent in employment-based insurance 
decisions. First, in employment-based insurance decisions, the effect of “perceived health 
status” is the opposite of its effect in the general insurance decision. Consumers who 
perceived “Good” health are 1.15 times more likely to be insured with employment-based 
health insurance compared with those who perceived “Excellent/Very good” health 
(OR=1.15, 95% CI=[1.04, 1.26], p<0.01). Consumers who perceived “Fair/Poor” health 
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are positively associated, however not significantly. Second, the effects of healthcare 
expenditures become less strong compared with the effects in general insurance 
decisions. Compared with those who spent less than $500, consumers who spent $500–
2,000 are 1.13 times more likely to be insured with employment-based insurance among 
those who were insured (OR=1.13, 95% CI=[1.02, 1.25], p<0.01), and consumers who 
spent more than $2,000 are 1.29 times more likely to take employment-based insurance. 
Lastly, consumers who had any comorbidities are 1.13 times more likely to take 
employment-based insurance compared with those who did not have any comorbidities 
(OR=1.13, 95% CI=[1.03, 1.23], p=0.01), which is consistent with other health status 
measures and also consistent with its effect on the general insurance decision. 
 
 The findings in table II.4 indicate that health risk measures play different roles in 
different insurance decisions. In general insurance decision-making, consumers who 
perceived poor health status are less likely to be insured; however, consumers who 
perceived health status as poor are more likely to be insured with employment-based 
insurance. This can be explained in that less healthy individuals tend to be unemployed 
and have low-income, and thus may lack of access to healthcare. When individuals were 
insured, their decisions for employment-based health insurance become more consistent 
across subjective and objective health status measures.  
 
 Second, the effect of healthcare expenditures on the general insurance decision is 
twice the effect on the employment-based insurance decision. This may indicate that 
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healthcare expenditure is more likely to be the result of health insurance (moral hazard) 
rather than the reason for health insurance (adverse selection). Consumers would have 
spent more with employment-based insurance if more healthcare expenditure indicates 
poorer health status. There is a significantly larger effect of healthcare expenditure on 
general insurance decisions meaning being insured may result in more healthcare 
expenditures compared with the other two health status measures. Individuals who were 
insured tend to spend more on healthcare. Also, among all the insured, the association 
between healthcare expenditures and the employment-based insurance decision becomes 
more consistent with other risk measures (OR=1.13 v. OR=1.15 (perceived health status) 
v. OR=1.13(any comorbidities)). 
 
 Third, it is not reported in table II.4 but can be found in the appendix that age and 
race/ethnicity do not statistically associate with insurance decisions controlling for all 
other covariates, except that Black appears more likely to be insured with the 
employment-based insurance compared with White. Female appears more likely to be 
insured compared with Male. Employment status and income are both statistically and 
significantly associated with the two insurance decisions. The odds of being insured for 
the employed are 1–3 times those for the unemployed. High-income individuals are as 
high as 10 times more likely to be insured compared with low income individuals, while 
the income effect sharply decreases when individuals are making the decision of 
employment-based insurance (see appendix: OR=10 v. OR=3). This finding suggests that 
income levels strongly associate with insurance decisions. Individuals who were 
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employed are more likely to have higher family income. Therefore they are more likely 
to be insured. Further, when individuals were insured, income in employment-based 
insurance decision-making is not as important as it was in general insurance decisions. 
Income effect also will be examined in the following analyses.    
 
 Table II.5 compare the effects of consumer preference to insurance decisions 
conditional on differential health status. Table II.5 abstracts and reports 33 odds ratio of 
those who disagreed with each statement from 4×3 ×3 regression models (three health 
status measures plus a financial factor “income” by three risk preference measures by 
three levels of each preference measure except two levels of “comorbidity”). Each row 
presents the odds ratios indicating one preference measure conditional on different status 
level. Each column presents the odds ratios indicating different preferences conditional 
on each level of each health status measure. Panel 1 presents the odds ratios conditional 
on each level of medical expenditures. Panel 2 presents the odds ratios conditional on 
each level of perceived health status. Panel 3 presents the odds ratios conditional on each 
level of comorbidity. Panel 4 additionally presents the odds ratios conditional on income 
levels.  
 
 Results in table II.5 show that consumer preferences have consistent effects on 
insurance decisions across healthcare expenditure levels. The effects of all preference 
measures appear less strong among consumers who have annual healthcare spending over 
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$2,000 10 , and consumers’ preference of health need is not even significant. Similar 
patterns can be found conditional on perceived health status and the comorbidity 
indicator. Therefore, consumers’ positive attitudes tend to have stronger effects on the 
insurance decision when they spent less, have better health perceptions, and have no 
comorbidity. The findings in table II.5 may indicate that consumer’s positive attitude is 
positively associated with their positive health insurance decisions. In other words, the 
healthier individuals tend to have a positive attitude and are more likely to be insured.  
 
 In addition to examining the effects of consumer preference across health status, 
the effect of consumer preference across income levels is also examined.  In tables 3 and 
4, income shows a strikingly strong effect on insurance decisions (OR=10 for those who 
were insured and OR=2 for those who were insured with employment-based insurance). 
It is worth examining the association between consumer preference and insurance 
decisions across different income levels. The results show strong effects of consumer 
preferences on insurance decisions across all income levels compared with the 
associations conditional on health status, especially in the high-income study population. 
Combined with the results across health status, one finding is obvious: healthier and 
wealthier consumers are more positive towards health insurance and make more 
aggressive insurance decisions.  
                                                        
10 The Adjusted Wald test is conducted for the equality of the odds ratios (STATA post 
estimation command –suest–). The tests take the odds ratios in first column as the reference 
group, the odds ratios conditional on the second or the third level of health status are compared 
with the reference odds ratio. They are all statistically significantly different from the reference 
group, except the medical expenditure at the level of “$500–$2,000” and the perceived health 
status at the level of “good.”   
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  Table II.6 presents a same set of analyses for employment-based insurance 
decisions. Compared with the results in table II.5, the effects of consumer preferences 
seem more consistent across all health risk measures, even across income levels. 
Compared with other levels of risk status, the effects of consumer preference are 
relatively stronger among those who spent less on healthcare, perceived better health, or 
with higher income. Additionally, compared with general insurance decision, consumer 
preferences appear to have stronger effects on employment-based insurance decision for 
those who have comorbidities.  
 
 Consumer responses towards the statement “Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs” is worth noting because it shows stronger effects on employment-based 
insurance decision across all risk levels compared with the other two preference 
measures. Among those who have annual healthcare spending over $2,000, consumers 
disagreed with this statement is 1.88 times more likely to have employment-based 
insurance compared with those who agreed with this statement. Also, consumers 
disagreed with the statement “Health insurance is not worth the money it costs” is 2.05 
times more likely to choose employment-based insurance within the high-income group.  
 
 Results in table II.5 tell that healthier and wealthier consumers are more positive 
towards insurance and make more positive insurance decisions, whereas results in table 
II.6 show that the associations between consumer preferences and employment-based 
insurance decisions are consistent across health status and wealth levels, in both 
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magnitude and significance levels. However, it can be visually seen that consumers’ 
response to the statement “Health insurance is not worth the money it costs” has stronger 
effects to employment-based insurance, comparing with other preference measures.    
 
 Table II.7 presents the relationships between health status and general insurance 
decisions conditional on consumer preference. The associations between health status and 
insurance decisions are strikingly consistent given any preference measure at any 
preference level. For example, among consumers with positive attitude, those who 
incurred healthcare spending over $500 are about 2 times more likely to be insured 
compare with those who incurred healthcare spending less than $500. Among consumers 
with positive attitude, those who perceived health “Fair/Poor” are 0.5 times less likely to 
be insured compare with those who perceived better health. The effects of health status to 
insurance decisions are also consistent across all preference levels. For example, the odds 
of being insured for consumers who had higher medical expenditures are consistently 
about 2 times the odds of those who spent less regardless their preference levels. Also, 
odds of being insured for consumers who perceived poorer health are consistently about 
0.5 times the odds of being insured for those who perceived better health regardless 
preference levels. The odds of being insured for consumers who have any comorbidities 
are about 1.2 times the odds of being insured for those who did not have any 
comorbidities across all preference levels except among those who disagreed with the 
statement.  
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 Therefore, results in table II.7 shows that the associations between health status 
and general health insurance decisions are consistent within each preference level, and 
the effects of health status to insurance decisions are larger among consumers who did 
not prefer health insurance compared with other preference levels. In other words, the 
riskier individuals have higher odds to be insured although they did not prefer health 
insurance. This counterfactual finding may reflect the situation that consumers who were 
insured did not obtain the satisfying care as they should have deserved.  
 
 Table II.8 reports the relationships between health status and employment-based 
health insurance decision conditional on preference levels. Health status does not show a 
significant effect to the decision of employment-based health insurance except healthcare 
expenditures. The effects of healthcare expenditures are consistently significant across 
different preference levels for all preference measures. The odds ratio range is from 1.2 to 
1.4. The effects of consumer perceived health status are nonexclusively insignificant 
across all level of preference level and all different preference measures. Any 
comorbidities may show some effect however they are very limited. The findings in table 
II.8 indicate that health risks are not typically associated with employment-based health 
insurance decisions. The significant association between healthcare expenditures and 
employment-based health insurance decision may hint “moral hazard” instead. The 
riskier individuals may not be more likely to be insured with employment-based health 
insurance. Instead, those who are insured with employment-based health insurance may 
spend more.  
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 From table II.5 to table II.8, the conditional relationships between consumer 
preference/risk status and health insurance decisions are examined. The results show that 
consumer preference plays a more consistent and significant role in health insurance 
decisions conditional on different health risks (table II.5 and table II.6). However, health 
risks often used in traditional health insurance decision models do not show its 
significance in employment-based health insurance decisions conditional on different 
preference levels or measures (table II.7 and table II.8). Specifically, comparing the 
results in table II.8 with the results in table II.4, we can tell that the effect of healthcare 
expenditures are very consistent, whereas, perceived health status and comorbidities fail 
to obtain statistically significant associations with employment-based health insurance 
conditional on some preferences. This finding may indicate that consumer preference 
heterogeneity plays a far more important role in health insurance decision-making than 
researchers had acknowledged, and health risks may not be as important as researchers 
have weighted. It has important implications regarding policy efforts for expanding 
insurance coverage especially when risks are not allowed to select consumers.  
 
 Lastly, the price effect is examined. Since out-of-pocket premium is only 
available for the insured individuals, the price effect can only be examined in the model 
of employment-based health insurance decisions. Table II.9 and table II.10 report the 
price effects to employment-based health insurance decisions from the analyses in table 
II.6 and table II.8. Basically, price is negatively associated with employment-based health 
insurance, which is consistent with the hypothesis. A one thousand dollar increase in 
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price decreases the odds of choosing employment-based health insurance by 50% on 
average. All those odds ratios greater than one or close to 1 are not statistically 
significant. There is also a pattern of price effect conditional on health risks or 
preferences. For example, price effects are not significant for those who spent less than 
$500 on healthcare for all preference measures. Price effects are only significant for 
individuals who have high income. Price is significantly associated with employment-
based insurance decisions only for those who disagreed with the statement “Do not need 
health insurance,” adjusting for health risks. However, for those who disagreed with 
“Health insurance is not worth the money it costs,” price is not significantly associated 
with employment-based insurance. Price effects are not significant among those who 
were uncertain or disagreed with the statement “more likely to take risks.”    
 
 The findings in table II.9 and table II.10 show that, first, price does not seem 
correlated with preference because its effect is consistent conditional on each preference 
level. Second, price takes effect when healthcare expenditures exceed $500 and when 
incomes are high. When price increases by one thousand dollars, the odds of choosing 
employment-based health insurance decreases by about 40 percent for those who’s 
annual healthcare expenditures exceed $2,000 (OR=0.6); the odds of high-income 
individuals choosing employment-based insurance decreases by 50 percent (or=0.5), 
controlling for preferences. Third, consumers who perceived better health (good, 
excellent/very good) tend to be more sensitive to price change compared with those who 
perceived poor/fair health (OR=0.6 v. OR=0.4). Fourth, consumer’s insurance decisions 
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respond to price change either when they felt the needs for health insurance, or when they 
were risk tolerant and did not value health insurance.  
 
II.5 Conclusion  
 
 Disproportional distribution of health insurance has been an obstacle for equal 
access to healthcare in the U.S. Low-income individuals and minorities most often are 
reported to lack health insurance. Enacted in 2010, the ACA requires that all consumers 
must be accepted into open insurance plans regardless of health status. However, the 
view of health insurance as a “merit good” stresses the provision of health care or health 
insurance benefits based on consumer valuation and perceptions. A health insurance 
mandate requiring consumers with heterogeneous preferences for health insurance to 
purchase coverage may invoke concern regarding economic efficiency and the 
distributional consequences (Melese, 1995; Summers, 1989). If consumers do not value 
having health insurance as much as policymakers value them having it, then the policy 
efforts for expanding insurance coverage may not translate toward true market efficiency. 
As a result, consumers may not respond to health insurance coverage expansions in the 
way policymakers expected. 
 
 Much of the debate about the ACA has focused on the expansion of coverage to 
the uninsured through subsidies to individuals and the expansions of Medicaid. I address 
the questions about ACA’s potential effect to employer-sponsored insurance as well. I 
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attempt to explain the weak responses from a consumer valuation and perception 
perspective for two types of insurance decisions:  the general insurance decision (insured 
v. uninsured) and the employment-based insurance decision if insured (insured with 
employment-based insurance v. insured with non-employment-based insurance).  
 
 I use self-reported attitudinal measures and self-reported health status provided by 
the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS), and examine the joint role of consumer 
preference and health risks in health insurance decision-making. I then provide policy 
implications of consumer valuation for health insurance expansion initiatives.  
 
 The study results suggest first that consumers not only vary across age and 
potentially other individual characteristics, but also vary or vary to some degree across 
health status and preferences. The variations can lead to differentiation in insurance 
decisions made by consumers.  
 
 Second, the healthier and wealthier consumers are more positive towards their 
health insurance coverage and make more positive insurance coverage decisions. Among 
three preference measures, consumer valuation of their need for health insurance has a 
stronger association with general insurance decisions comparing with the employment-
based insurance decision, whereas consumer’s preference for health insurance valued in 
terms of “worth” (“health insurance is not worth the money it costs”) is more 
significantly and strongly associated with employment-based health insurance.  
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 Third, the effects of health risk measures vary substantially in insurance decision-
making compared with employment-based health insurance. Consumers perceived in 
poorer health are less likely to be insured, whereas consumers with poorer perceived 
health status are more likely to be insured with employment-based insurance. The odds of 
being insured for those who spent more than $500 on healthcare are twice the odds of 
being insured with employment-based insurance.  
 
 Fourth, there is evidence that the sicker individuals who did not appreciate health 
insurance are more likely to be insured compared with those who are sicker but value 
health insurance. It may imply that the insured individuals were not satisfied with the 
care provided by the health insurance while the uninsured were those who in need of 
health insurance but lack of access to health insurance. Additionally, perceived health 
status and comorbidity indicator do not appear to have significant associations with 
employment-based insurance decision conditional on preferences. This finding indicates 
that health risks are only effective in general health insurance decisions but not 
necessarily in employment-based insurance decisions.  
 
 Finally, contradictory to conventional studies, which find that low-income 
individuals tend to be more price sensitive, in employment-based health insurance 
decision-making high-income individuals are more sensitive to price change controlling 
for preferences. Also, consumers in poorer health conditions and do not value health 
insurance tend to be more price sensitive compare with the price sensitivity conditional 
  
 
54
on health need preference.  
 
 In addition to the findings above, I also find that the direct consumer preference 
measures have substantially significant effects to insurance decisions while consumer 
characteristics such as age and race/ethnicity that used to viewed as preference proxies do 
not show significance associations with insurance decisions.  
 
 I use three different attitudinal measures as preference measures along with risk 
measures to examine their roles in insurance decision-making. The study of consumer 
attitude and insurance demand addresses the importance of private information, 
especially consumer attitude, in health insurance decision-making process in the new 
policy environment created by the ACA. The current study reveals that consumer 
preference in different measures show persistent and significant associations with 
insurance decisions. In employment-based insurance, preferences have more significant 
effects than health risks. Further, I find that the effects of different preference measures to 
insurance decisions are similar, whereas the effects of health status measures vary 
conditional on different preference measures. 
 
 The data and results also are subject to some limitations. First, MEPS data do not 
provide specific information about plan type. I only study the insurance decisions in a 
broader sense for general insurance decision and the employment-based insurance 
decision. However, in making employer-sponsored health insurance decisions, 
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employees’ motivations are more likely associated with the job. The study results may 
not interpret individual’s preference to health risks. Second, even though I collect the 
data for those who were followed for two consecutive years, the cross-sectional analysis 
for coverage bundle choices may not be ideal. A panel data set gathered over a longer 
period may provide more sound study results. Third, in the MEPS data, the regional 
variations of the choices were limited to “Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.” But the 
characteristics of insurance markets and consumer behaviors vary largely even within 
each of these regions. Obtaining county level data may help to identify the regional 
effect, which is not available in the national publicly available data set, but only on-site at 
AHRQ.  
 
 Although most policy initiations have focused on financial incentives in 
expanding insurance coverage, the current study stresses the role of consumer valuation 
toward health insurance represented in specific preferences and health risks relative to 
health insurance decisions. I provide important policy implications for engaging 
consumers in health insurance enrollment.  
  
 On one hand, to engage in insurance enrollment, educational efforts are 
suggested. More generic health insurance information should be provided to consumers, 
especially to the low-income and minorities who had lower educational level and had 
limited access to healthcare. In educating the population at risk who are under insured, 
the meaning and purpose of health insurance, the costs and benefit buying insurance 
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should be presented and compared. The open information tool online that makes 
insurance benefits known and available can help consumers obtain health insurance. On 
the other hand, feedback on valued benefits from consumers also should be solicited to 
facilitate insurance management. Consumer preferences towards health insurance 
measured in “need” or “value” have different meanings for health insurance decisions for 
the populations at different risk levels. Understanding the joint role of consumer 
preference and health risks in the ACA’s new insurance market can help policymakers 
and insurers to make arrangements of health plans and coverage types accordingly and 
reduce welfare loss. Additionally, in designing health plans and educating consumers, 
searching costs for appropriate insurance and time costs to access health services should 
be accounted and largely limited. Therefore the information should be consumer 
valuation orientated, well-tailored, and easily accessible.  
 
 Lastly and most importantly, I find that a large number of insured individuals did 
not value health insurance enough, indicating the health care and services consumers 
received through health insurance did not meet their needs. Therefore, healthcare quality 
improvement is the ultimate way to attract consumers and achieve health insurance 
coverage expansion. 
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Table II.1. Consumer characteristics (2002–2009, %) 
 
Total The Insured 
The employment-
based insurance 
  
N=66,040 
N=41,557 
(62.93%) 
N=36,754 
(55.65%) 
Demographics    
Age    
    <30 25.26 22.00 21.08 
    30–39 21.75 22.02 22.33 
    40–49 23.77 24.80 25.3 
    >49 29.23 31.18 31.28 
Sex    
    Female 51.11 51.38 51.47 
Race/Ethnicity    
    White 81.25 83.29 83.22 
    Black 11.73 9.71 9.91 
    Other 7.03 7.01 6.87 
Degree below college 72.49 65.77 65.56 
Ever been married 70.91 75.38 76.5 
Income    
    < 200% FPL 27.69 14.66 12.91 
    200%–400% FPL 31.53 33.58 33.52 
    >400% FPL 40.78 51.76 53.57 
Employed 75.17 82.87 84.41 
    
Health status    
Perceived health status    
    Excellent/Very good 61.18 65.90 65.81 
    Good 26.88 25.73 26.01 
    Fair/Poor 11.92 8.36 8.17 
Any comorbidities 39.45 40.02 40.35 
Healthcare expenditure    
    <$500 38.48 32.17 31.62 
    $500–$2000 27.24 30.45 30.53 
    >$2000 34.28 37.38 37.85 
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Preference    
 "Do not need health insurance" 
    Disagree 80.85 83.91 84.77 
    Uncertain 7.30 5.78 5.51 
    Agree 11.67 10.15 9.58 
"Health insurance is not worth the money it costs" 
    Disagree 61.18 65.84 67.28 
    Uncertain 13.03 10.20 10 
    Agree 25.79 23.96 22.72 
"More likely to take risks" 
    Disagree 60.76 64.19 64.96 
    Uncertain 15.22 13.64 13.54 
    Agree 23.67 21.94 21.27 
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Table II.2. The distribution of health status and consumer preference by age  (N=66,040).  
      Consumer Preference (column %)  
 "Do not need health 
insurance" 
  "Health insurance is not 
worth the money it costs" "More likely to take risks"  
Perceived health status Disagree Uncertain Agree Disagree Uncertain Agree Disagree Uncertain Agree 
 Age: <30   
    Excellent/Very good 80 73 67 72 67 70 71 66 71 
    Good 18 23 26 23 26 24 22 28 24 
    Fair/Poor 3 4 7 6 6 6 6 6 6 
Age: 30–39   
    Excellent/Very good 78 66 63 67 58 66 68 57 66 
    Good 18 27 27 25 29 26 23 32 25 
    Fair/Poor 4 7 10 9 13 8 9 11 9 
Age: 40–49   
    Excellent/Very good 73 60 56 60 50 59 58 55 59 
    Good 21 30 29 27 32 28 28 30 28 
    Fair/Poor 6 9 15 12 17 14 15 15 13 
Age: >49   
    Excellent/Very good 69 58 52 54 45 54 56 47 54 
    Good 23 29 30 29 31 29 26 31 30 
      Fair/Poor 9 13 19   17 24 17   18 22 17 
Healthcare Expenditures                       
 Age: <30   
    <$500 68 63 48 59 58 49 58 56 50 
    $500–$2000 21 24 28 24 23 28 25 24 27 
    >$2000 11 13 25 16 18 23 18 20 23 
Age: 30–39   
    <$500 64 62 41 53 54 41 53 50 42 
    $500–$2000 22 23 29 26 23 29 26 25 29 
    >$2000 14 15 30 21 23 30 22 25 29 
Age: 40–49    
    <$500 57 56 33 45 42 32 45 42 33 
    $500–$2000 28 26 30 30 26 30 28 26 31 
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    >$2000 15 18 37 25 32 38 27 32 36 
Age: >49   
    <$500 43 46 19 29 28 18 27 26 19 
    $500–$2000 29 26 26 28 24 26 27 24 27 
      >$2000   28 28 55   43 48 56   46 50 54 
Comorbidity                       
 Age: <30   
    No 87 84 79 82 83 80 81 81 81 
    Yes 13 16 21 18 17% 20 19 19 19 
Age: 30–39   
    No 82 77 70 74 72 71 70 73 72 
    Yes 18 23 30 25 28 29 29 27 27 
Age: 40–49   
    No 72 70 56 62 57 57 60 59 57 
    Yes 28 29 43 37 42 43 39 40 42 
Age: >49   
         No 53 48 32 40 34 32 37 33 33 
    Yes   46 51 67   59 65 67   61 66 65 
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Table II.3. The relationships¶ between consumer preference and insurance decisions. 
 I   II   III 
 
"Do not need health insurance"   
"Health insurance is not 
worth the money it costs" 
"More likely to take risks" 
 OR 95% CI p-value OR 95% CI p-value OR 95% CI p-value 
The probability of insured   
    Agree Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     
    Uncertain 0.96 [0.86 – 1.08] 0.49  0.81 [0.74 – 0.89] <0.01 *** 1.02 [0.93 – 1.11] 0.7  
    Disagree 1.77 [1.62 – 1.92] <0.01 *** 1.66 [1.56 – 1.78] <0.01 *** 1.47 [1.38 – 1.57] <0.01 *** 
             
The probability of insured with employment-based insurance if insured        
    Agree Ref.     Ref.     Ref.     
    Uncertain 1.15 [0.96 – 1.40] 0.13  1.36 [1.20 – 1.56] <0.01 *** 1.18 [1.04 – 1.34] <0.01 *** 
    Disagree 1.57 [1.38 – 1.78]] <0.01 *** 1.77 [1.62 – 1.94] <0.01 *** 1.33 [1.21 – 1.47] <0.01 *** 
Notes: 1. ¶: The odds ratios are reported. By default, all specifications control for age, sex, race, region, employment status, marital status, 
degree, income level, monthly oop, and year; 2. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent.  
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Table II.4. The relationships¶ between health status and insurance 
decisions. 
 OR 95% CI p-value  
The probability of insured   
Perceived health status   
    Excellent/Very good Ref.   
    Good 0.84 [0.79 – 0.90] <0.01 *** 
    Fair/Poor 0.58 [0.54 – 0.63] <0.01 *** 
   
Healthcare expenditures   
    <$500 Ref.   
    $500–$2000 2.24 [2.10 – 2.41] <0.01 *** 
    >$2000 2.45 [2.30 – 2.62] <0.01 *** 
   
Any comorbidities 1.16 [1.09 – 1.23] <0.01 *** 
   
The probability of insured with employment-based insurance if 
insured  
Perceived health status   
    Excellent/Very good   
    Good 1.15 [1.04 – 1.26] <0.01 *** 
    Fair/Poor 1.04 [0.91 – 1.19] 0.58  
   
Healthcare expenditures   
    <$500 Ref.   
    $500–$2000 1.13 [1.02 – 1.25] 0.02 ** 
    >$2000 1.29 [1.16 – 1.43] <.001 *** 
   
Any comorbidities 1.13 [1.03 – 1.23] 0.01 *** 
Notes: 1. ¶: The odds ratios are reported. By default, all specifications control for age,  
sex, race, region, employment status, marital status, degree, income level, monthly oop,  
and year; 2. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1  
percent. 
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Table II.5. The relationships¶ between consumer preference and general health insurance 
decisions conditional on health status 
    Medical Expenditures 
 <$500 $500–2000  >$2000 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.57 1.50 1.04 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 1.63 1.61 1.20 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.45 1.42 1.24 
 Perceived health status 
 
    Excellent/Very 
good Good 
    
Fair/Poor 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.91 1.77 1.06 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 1.76 1.61 1.19 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.43 1.60 1.16 
 Comorbidity 
 None  Any 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.72  1.51 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 1.68  1.45 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.42  1.45 
 Income 
 High Middle Low 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 2.32 1.78 1.25 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 2.24 1.63 1.30 
Disagree "More likely to take risks"   1.54 1.52 1.25 
Notes: ¶: The odds ratios are reported (with the reference group that “agree” with each statement). 
By default, all specifications control for age, sex, race, region, employment status, marital status, 
degree, income level, monthly oop, and year; ‡: The bold number indicates it is not significant at 
95% confidence level. 
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Table II.6. The relationship¶ between consumer preference and employment-based 
insurance decisions conditional on health status. 
 Medical Expenditures 
 <$500 
  $500–
$2000  >$2000 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.51 1.6 1.46 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 1.63 1.63 1.88 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.45 1.23 1.21 
 Perceived health status 
 
 Excellent/ 
Very good  Good 
    
Fair/Poor 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.63 1.47 0 .95
‡ 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 1.78 1.67 1.44 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.37 1.24 1.03 
 Comorbidities 
 None  Any 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.54  1.61 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 1.76  1.79 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.28  1.29 
 Income 
 High Middle Low 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.78 1.41 1.39 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 2.05 1.70 1.48 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.35 1.34 1.20 
Notes: ¶: The odds ratios are reported (with the reference group that “agree” with each statement). 
By default, all specifications control for age, sex, race, region, employment status, marital status, 
degree, income level, monthly oop, and year; ‡: The bold number indicates it is not significant at 
95% confidence level. 
 
  
  
 
68
Table II.7. The relationship¶ between health status and insurance decisions conditional 
on consumer preferences. 
 "Do not need health insurance" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 2.33 1.86 1.82 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 0.57 0.60 0.42 
Any comorbidities 1.26 1.23 0.98
‡ 
 
 "Health insurance is not worth the money 
it costs" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 2.11 1.71 1.76 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 0.53 0.57 0.41 
Any comorbidities 1.12 1.15 0.98 
 "More likely to take risks" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 2.10 1.92 1.86 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 0.53 0.58 0.42 
Any comorbidities 1.14 1.17 0.98 
Notes: ¶: The odds ratios are reported. By default, all specifications control for age, sex, race, 
region, employment status, marital status, degree, income level, monthly oop, and year; ‡: The 
bold number indicates it is not significant at 95% confidence level. 
  
  
 
69
Table II.8. The relationship¶ between health status and employment-based health 
insurance conditional on consumer preferences. 
 "Do not need health insurance" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 1.31 1.4 1.17 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 1.27
‡ 1.28 0.93 
Any comorbidities 0.98 1.19 1.07 
 
 "Health insurance is not worth  
the money it costs" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 1.19 1.08 1.26 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 1.01 1.2 0.95 
Any comorbidities 1.14 0.83 1.09 
 "More likely to take risks" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 1.32 1.42 1.19 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 1 1.25 0.97 
Any comorbidities 1.1 1.13 1.15 
Notes: ¶: The odds ratios are reported. By default, all specifications control for age, sex, race, 
region, employment status, marital status, degree, income level, monthly oop, and year; ‡: The 
bold number indicates it is not significant at 95% confidence level. 
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Table II.9. The price effects¶ to employment-based health insurance decisions and 
conditional on health risks and income levels. 
The controlled preference measures Medical Expenditures 
 
<$500 
 $500–
$2000 
>$2000 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 1.15
‡ 0.41 0.55 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 
1.23 0.42 0.60 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 1.16 0.41 0.56 
 Perceived health status 
 
Excellent/ 
Very good 
Good 
    
Fair/Poor 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 0.65 0.62 0.42 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 
0.69 0.63 0.44 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 0.66 0.63 0.43 
 Income 
 High Middle Low 
Disagree "Do not need health insurance" 0.48 1.01 0.66 
Disagree "Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs" 
0.53 1.02 0.69 
Disagree "More likely to take risks" 0.48 1.003 0.68 
Notes: ¶: All odds ratios are obtained controlling for consumer preferences; By default, all 
specifications control for age, sex, race, region, employment status, marital status, degree, income 
level, monthly oop, and year;  ‡: The bold number indicates it is not significant at 95% confidence 
level. 
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Table II.10. The price effects¶ to employment-based health insurance decisions 
conditional on consumer preferences. 
The controlled risk measures "Do not need health insurance" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 0.93
‡ 1.89 0.53 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 0.95 1.92 0.53 
Any comorbidities 0.96 2.37 0.52 
 
 "Health insurance is not worth the money 
it costs" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 0.42 0.53 0.93 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 0.43 0.52 0.93 
Any comorbidities 0.43 0.56 0.92 
 "More likely to take risks" 
 Agree Uncertain Disagree 
Higher medical expenditures 0.51 0.81 0.70 
Perceived health status: Fair/Poor 0.52 0.81 0.70 
Any comorbidities 0.51 0.85 0.72 
Notes: ¶: All odds ratios are obtained controlling for consumer preferences; By default, all 
specifications control for age, sex, race, region, employment status, marital status, degree, income 
level, monthly oop, and year;  ‡: The bold number indicates it is not significant at 95% confidence 
level. 
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CHAPTER THREE 
Does attitude influence behavior? Exploring the role of consumer attitudes in the 
demand for private health insurance. 
 
III.1 Introduction  
 
 To discourage insurers from competing with one another to only enroll the 
healthiest participants, the Affordable Care Act (ACA) eliminates the ability of insurers 
to use medical underwriting to charge discriminatory premiums in the individual and 
small group markets. The ACA also requires insurers to accept all applicants for non-
grandfathered coverage, regardless of health status. Although many have not chosen to 
purchase insurance coverage, as of 2015 the uninsured rate had dropped to 11.9% in first 
quarter 11 . The ACA’s individual mandate creates incentives such as subsidies for 
individuals to ensure that there are a sufficient number of low risk individuals in the 
system to achieve price stability and prevent a “death spiral” caused by an increasingly 
high-risk, high-cost pool (Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1992). Therefore potential selection is 
expected to be largely prevented in the ACA’s new marketplace where price and risk play 
a limited role in purchasing decisions by consumers. Within the flexibility of choosing 
affordable health insurance plans, tastes and preferences of individuals could be a major 
driver that influences purchasing decisions of health insurance by consumers. 
                                                        
11 A survey conducted by Gallup reports that, uninsured Rate Dips to 11.9% in First Quarter. 
http://www.gallup.com/poll/182348/uninsured-rate-dips-first-quarter.aspx 
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Researchers should take this opportunity to enrich the understanding of how specifically 
tastes and preferences in the demand function for health insurance might affect the new 
marketplace.  
 Rothschild and Stiglitz (1976) was the first paper to examine asymmetric 
information between insurers and consumers in the insurance market. They assume 
individuals have their own private information about their “accident probabilities” while 
insurers do not. Other things equal, individuals with higher accident probabilities (greater 
risk) are assumed to demand more insurance than low risk individuals (Rothschild and 
Stiglitz, 1976). Their theory sets the foundation for the positive hypothesis of adverse 
selection. Studies in this tradition predict that riskier individuals are more likely to be 
insured or purchase more comprehensive health insurance (Cawley and Philipson, 1999; 
Chiappori, Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie, 2006; Chiappori and Salanie, 2000; Ettner, 1997; 
Monheit, 2004; Propper, 1989). However, many empirical findings do not seem to 
support this positive hypothesis (Buchmueller, 2013; Fang, Keane, and Silverman, 2008; 
Finkelstein, and McGarry, 2006; Finkelstein and Poterba, J., 2004; Finkelstein and 
Poterba, 2002).  
 
 Whether or not they support the positive hypothesis, these studies suffer a 
common flaw regarding private information by assuming that individuals only differ in 
risk classes/levels but are identical in risk preference. De Meza and Webb (2001) take 
individual preference heterogeneity into account and assume that individuals differ in risk 
status and risk preferences as well. They find that risk-averse individuals are not only 
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more likely to buy insurance but also put more effort in limiting risk exposure. As a 
result, the standard positive hypothesis could be reversed such that the healthier would be 
more likely to be insured. Likewise, high-risk individuals who are risk tolerant may be 
less likely to purchase health insurance. De Meza and Webb’s theory suggests that 
ignoring the property of multidimensional private information may mask the relationship 
between risk and insurance, leading to false conclusions. 
 To examine consumers’ private information in the U.S. health insurance market is 
challenging, primarily since private information is generally unobservable. It requires a 
marketplace in which a type of private information can be identified when the effect of 
price is less dominant.  
 First, Instead of studying health plan choices, I study the optional coverage 
choices offered by health plans as measured from consumer surveys. Coverage type has 
been found to be significantly associated with health plan choice (Short and Taylor, 
1989). In many enrolled health plans, consumers may also be offered the optional 
coverage. The optional choices of coverage are offered to meet personal and family’s 
health needs. The coverage options vary in types and numbers across health plans. In this 
study, I constrain consumer’s choice of optional coverage assuming that all consumers 
had identical choice options regardless of from which plan the options were offered. In 
doing so, it allows me to create a special setting that, in making a choice among the 
optional coverage options offered by the realized enrolled plan that consumers report, 
consumer decisions are more likely to rely on personal valuation.  
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 Second, instead of studying “discrete” plan choices, the choice set in this study is 
health insurance coverage bundles. Foster et al. (2010) suggests that consumers have their 
own interpretations about what the choices entail, and tend to make rankings between 
rival bundles of goods or bundles of product characteristics. A consumer’s purchasing 
decision involves forming expectations about rival bundles based on the consumer’s 
valuation of the product characteristics (Foster et al., 2010). Unlike discrete health plan 
choices, coverage options offered by a health plan are not substitutes but are 
complementary to each other. For example, prescription drug coverage is mostly reported 
supplemental to the enrolled health plans 12 . However consumers do not choose 
prescription drug solely if there are other distinct options such as dental or vision care 
offered at the meantime. They choose coverage options in the bundled form, choosing 
any particular ones from the offered coverage options to all of the offered coverage 
options. A very small portion of enrollees did not choose any choices, which is excluded 
from the choice set in this study. Aside from health plan choices based on price, private 
information held by consumers is assumed to be more important for coverage bundle 
choices.  
 I use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data for the period 2002–
2009 to examine the relationship between private information and insurance purchasing 
decisions. The data sample is nationally representative of the non-institutionalized 
civilian population. It provides population characteristics and individual plan information 
including coverage options that are used for constructing coverage bundles. Most 
                                                        
12 National Compensation Survey (2014): http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2014/ebbl0055.pdf 
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importantly, MEPS also provides attitudinal information that can be used as risk 
preference indicators. The current study uses consumer attitude towards health insurance 
as the primary preference measure and examines its effect on the choice of insurance 
coverage. Consumer perceived health status and diagnosed long-term conditions are used 
to represent subjective and objective health status respectively. Additionally, consumer 
general risk attitude “more likely to take risk” is also used to proxy consumer risk 
preference compared with the effect of primary preference measure - consumer attitude 
towards health insurance; the total healthcare expenditure is used to proxy consumer risk 
class comparing with perceived health status and long-term conditions. 
 In this study, I estimate a series of logit models. For each analysis, a set of 
variables is added, the changes in the relationship between consumer private information 
and the coverage bundle choice can be observed controlling for the added variables.  
 
 The study results indicate that consumer attitude toward the statement “the 
insurance is not worth the money it costs” is statistically significantly associated with the 
choice of coverage bundle, whereas other risk measures such as consumer perceived 
health status and long-term conditions are not “necessarily” statistically associated with 
coverage bundle choice. After controlling for demographics, income, and other socio-
economic variables, the relationship between consumer attitude and the probability of 
selecting a more comprehensive coverage bundle is increased, remaining monotonic and 
significant. However, after adding risk attitude and smoking status, the effect of 
consumer attitude becomes insignificant. Sensitivity analyses are conducted to examine 
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changes in the relationship between consumer attitude and bundle choice by using 
subsamples and other proxies.    
 
 I then use the method developed by Lokshin and Ravallion (2005) to better 
understand correlations among the risk factors and their relationships with choice of 
coverage bundle. The reduced form of coverage bundle choice and consumer attitude 
ordered logits are estimated separately with all or subsets of the covariates. Coefficients 
of correlation between consumer attitude and choice of coverage bundle are estimated.  
 
 I find that the factors significantly associated with coverage bundle choice are not 
associated with consumer attitude and vice versa. For example, total healthcare 
expenditure is assumed to be associated with the choice of coverage bundle. Instead, it is 
found significantly associated with consumer attitudes only.  Income, on the other hand, 
makes the most contribution to the correlation between attitudes and the choice of 
coverage bundle. The study findings suggest a pathway from risk class to risk preference, 
and then, as a result, to insurance purchasing decisions.  
 
 The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section II reviews the related 
literature. Section III provides a description of the data and variables. Section IV presents 
a conceptual framework for studying the selection of coverage bundle choice. Section V 
discusses the models and the empirical results. Finally, Section VI concludes.   
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III.2 Literature Review  
 
 Adverse selection and moral hazard are at the center of modeling the demand for 
health insurance. Adverse selection addresses the notion that individuals differ in health 
risks. Riskier individuals are more likely to purchase insurance or purchase higher 
coverage due to greater expected benefits. Moral hazard occurs when healthier consumers 
invest less in preventive health behaviors once they are insured. These effects alter the 
distribution of probabilities across health states. This literature review focuses on studies 
of adverse selection, in which private information and its role in the insurance purchasing 
decision are examined. 
 Adverse selection posits a positive association between risk and insurance 
(Rothschild, 1992). The theory hypothesizes a positive correlation between insurance 
coverage and ex post realizations of loss. When an individual is better able to predict 
whether an insurable event will occur than the insurers, he/she will be more likely to 
purchase (or purchase more comprehensive) health insurance coverage.  
 However, the empirical evidence is mixed. Studies of the annuity market in the 
U.K. by Finkelstein and Poterba (2002) find a significant adverse selection effect. 
However, another study of theirs in 2004 in the same market setting finds no support for 
the positive correlation hypothesis (Finkelstein and Poterba, 2004). In a study of the long 
term care insurance market, Fang et al. (2008) fail to find adverse selection. His study 
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suggests advantageous selection 13  in the Medigap insurance market. Studies for the 
Australian health insurance market, such as Asinski (2005) and Buchmueller (2013), find 
no support for the positive correlation. 
 
 Cutler, Finkelstein, and McGarry (2008) examine the relation between risky 
behaviors, insurance purchases, and risk occurrence in five different insurance markets: 
life insurance, acute health insurance, annuities, long-term care insurance, and Medicare 
supplemental insurance (Medigap). Their findings suggest preference heterogeneity may 
help explain the differences in demand in different insurance market. Their results have 
important implications to the concern of classic, unidimensional adverse selection 
models.      
 Buchmueller et al. (2013) gives two explanations for not supporting the positive 
correlation hypothesis in health insurance markets. First, the information asymmetry that 
is central to adverse selection for health insurance is not empirically important if insurers 
have obtained enough consumer information and are able to predict the losses and set 
premiums accordingly. Second, private information is multidimensional. Factors other 
than risk status that inversely correlate with insurance may offset or reverse the positive 
correlation between risk and selection.  
                                                        
13 Adverse selection refers to the positive relationship between “high” risk and insurance 
(Rothschild and Stiglitz, 1976). In some markets, such as automobile insurance (Chiappori and 
Salanie,2000) and long-term-care insurance (Finkelstein and McGarry, 2006), there was no 
statistically significant support of the positive correlation. They argue that selection based on risk 
aversion is advantageous if those who have lower risks and are more risk averse buy more 
insurance coverage. Findings in these studies stress multidimensional private information and call 
this phenomenon “advantageous selection.”   
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 de Meza and Webb (2001) postulate that individuals have private information 
about both their risk class and risk preference.  The individuals who have lower health 
risk and are risk averse are more likely to buy health insurance. Failure to condition on 
risk aversion may mask the positive correlation between risk and selection of insurance.  
 
Doiron, Jones, and Savage (2008) use data from the Australian healthcare system to 
investigate the relationship between consumer self-assessed health status and purchasing 
health insurance. They find that riskier consumers are less likely to be insured. They 
explain that this is due to the correlation between self-assessed health status and other 
health related factors. Their findings suggest that multi-dimensional private information 
is responsible for explaining the lack of adverse selection.   
 
 The complexity of the US health insurance market makes it difficult for 
researchers to examine private information in the U.S. The main concern for studying 
private information in the US insurance market is that the price is not highly regulated as 
it is in UK or Australia.  The Medicare marketplace provides a relatively ideal market 
setting for studying multidimensional private information for two reasons (Fang and 
Silverman , 2008). First, the coverage and pricing of Medicare policies have been highly 
regulated by the U.S. government. Second, detailed administrative data is available.  
However, studying private information in the private insurance market remains a 
challenge.  
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 I aim to bridge the gap between revealed and unrevealed information (private 
information) and to better understand consumer private information and its role in the 
process of health insurance decision-making. 
  
III.3 Data and Variables  
 
III.3.1 Data  
 
 The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data provide national and 
regional estimates of annual health services utilization, medical expenditures, payment 
source and health insurance for the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population. I 
integrate the full-year population characteristics files, job files, person-round-plan files14, 
and risk adjustment scores files in the MEPS household component along with the pooled 
linkage file. I identify a sample population from 2002–2009 MEPS data in a total of 
16,101 individuals age between 18 and 64 who had only one policy. It consists of 
information on age, sex, ethnicity, income level, education, marital status, number of 
dependents, health status, employment status, health insurance status, plan type, optional 
coverage options, monthly out-of-pocket premium, premium subsidy, and most 
importantly, consumer attitudes toward health insurance and risk-taking behavior.   
                                                        
14 The Person-Round-Plan (PRPL) file is a complex file of privately insured persons and their 
private health insurance plans and links to the jobs providing insurance. The PRPL file is 
designed to facilitate research on the sometimes complex and dynamic relationships between 
consumers and their private insurance. 
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 The statistical analysis tool used for this study is STATA 12.0. All analyses are 
run on the full sample of data incorporating weights to adjust for complex survey design. 
Since the MEPS data is open for public use, this study is exempt from Institutional 
Review Board approval.   
 
III.3.2 Variables  
 
III.3.2.1 The Outcome Variable 
 
 MEPS “Health Insurance Cost Study Plan Information Questionnaire” asks 
enrollees separate questions about whether specific health services such as prescription 
drugs, vision care and dental care were covered by their enrolled health plans. The 
questions are: (1) “Were prescription drugs covered under this health plan?” (2) “Which 
of the services listed were covered by this plan?” The services listed include chiropractic 
care, vision care, and dental care. The answers to these questions would be Yes or No.  
 
 In the study sample, there are three most prevalent coverage options provided by 
the plans. Among all optional coverage options in the enrolled health plans, 92% of the 
study population bought coverage for prescription drugs, and this is the most prevalent 
optional coverage chosen by consumers. Consumers choosing vision and/or dental care 
are often subordinated to prescription drugs depending on their specific health needs. 
About 68% bought dental coverage, and about 60% bought vision care coverage. These 
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three types of coverage are chosen to construct the coverage bundle because they are the 
most prevalently purchased and have the most available information in MEPS.  
 
 Consumers purchase health insurance coverage in bundles with any combination 
of these three coverage options. The bundle choice design in this study follows the nature 
of the survey, with the restrictions that entails.  I take the most available information on 
coverage options including prescription, dental and vision care and create coverage 
bundle choices in an order from the least complete as any one of these three coverage 
options to the most complete including all three coverage options. To construct coverage 
bundle choices the coverage types I assume that (1) all individuals were enrolled in the 
same health plans, (2) all coverage options were optional and offered by the enrolled 
health plans. It is thus consumers’ choices based on individual perceptions for their 
purchasing decisions.  
 
 Finally, the coverage bundle choice is constructed as a binary variable. Consumer 
that purchase all three available coverage options are denoted with a 1, 0 otherwise. 
 
 
III.3.2.2 The Main Effect of Risk Status and Risk Preference  
 
 Health insurance coverage has been considered as important for obtaining access 
to care and protection against the risk of costly and unforeseen medical events. Attitudes 
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among consumers toward the need for and cost of health insurance may impact the extent 
to which the population is covered. The MEPS data contains consumers’ attitudinal 
information that asked adults age 18 and over whether they strongly agreed, agreed, were 
uncertain, disagreed, or strongly disagreed with the statement: “Health insurance is not 
worth the money it costs.”   
 
 I use attitude towards the cost of health insurance as a measure of risk preference. 
It represents the level of consumer’s preference in health investment. The total amount of 
money they spend on healthcare had been a risk measure. How consumers value the 
money they spend on health care implies their risk preference. Consumers who disagree 
with the statement indicate they are satisfied with their health investment, thus they are 
assumed more likely to purchase more health insurance coverage. On the other hand, 
consumers that agree with the statement indicate they are not satisfied with their health 
investment, thus they are assumed less likely to purchase more health insurance coverage. 
The sensitivity analysis will be also conducted for consumer’s general risk attitude “I’m 
more likely to take risk” to test the risk preference and its impact on the choice of 
insurance.   
 
 Consumer risk heterogeneity has two components. In addition to risk preference, 
risk status is an equally important source that influences consumer’s purchasing decision. 
To study consumer’s private information and its role in decision-making process, three 
measures of risk status are used: “perceived health status,” “any long-term conditions” 
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and “healthcare expenditure.”  
 
  “Perceived health status” is how one thinks of one’s own health relative to the 
health of people in one’s age group. It is the main measure of health risk class in this 
study, and the other two measures are examined in the sensitivity analyses. 
 
  “Any long-term conditions” indicate whether there is consumer reported 
diagnosis of major ten long-term conditions15 including cholesterol, high blood pressure, 
coronary heart disease, angina, heart attack, other heart disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, 
and asthma (Ellis et al., 1996). “Long-term conditions” can capture two possible effects 
(Doiron and Savage, 2008). First, there is evidence of adverse selection based on 
objective health class if there is a positive association between long-term conditions and 
insurance. Second, there is evidence of advantageous selection if a negative association is 
found. In this study, everyone has been enrolled in the plan that is similar to the ACA 
marketplace, in which all applicants are accepted regardless of health status.  
 
 Healthcare expenditure has been identified as a risk measure (Ellis and McGuire, 
2007). This paper also takes “total health care expenditure” as an indicator for 
consumer’s health status to examine its effect on the choice of coverage bundle under an 
                                                        
15 The chronic diseases were originally selected by HCFA in 1995. Ellis et al. (1996) identify 6 
high-cost conditions that overlap with the HCFA chronic diseases. In this dissertation research, I 
refer to the lists from both HCAF and DCG system and take use of the available information from 
MEPS as well. It ends up with a list of long-term conditions: cholesterol, high blood pressure, 
coronary heart disease, angina, heart attack, other heart disease, stroke, diabetes, arthritis, and 
asthma. 
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ACA-type environment where premiums cannot be tailored to individual characteristics 
or past claim behavior.   
  
III.3.2.3 The Explanatory Variables and Risk Adjustment 
 
 I include a series of covariates representing consumer’s decision-making process 
for coverage bundle choice, where each variable can independently predict the selection 
of coverage bundle.  
 
 Predisposing variables include age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and whether 
the individual has dependents. They associate with the individual’s lifestyle and the 
physical and social status that may impact the individual’s behavioral patterns. I expect 
age has significant relationships with attitude and with insurance. As one becomes older, 
he/she would probably not only tend to purchase more comprehensive insurance, but also 
agree that insurance is worth the money it costs. Marital status or having dependents are 
expected to associate with more comprehensive insurance due to the needs of family 
members or due to spousal coverage that had already been included in the enrolled health 
plans.     
 
 Resources such as income and employment status enable the individuals to obtain 
health insurance or engage in health-related behaviors. A positive relationship between 
income and the use of health services is assumed. Education level can also be an enabling 
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factor that influences health-related behaviors.  
 
 There are other factors influencing the choice of health insurance coverage, 
including the services provided, choice of healthcare providers, price and other fees. Ex-
post experience with the plan also influences individuals in making coverage bundle 
choices. To avoid collinearity among the covariates, the covariates only include age, sex, 
ethnicity, education, marital status, employment status, total healthcare expenditures, 
current smoker, whether the individual has dependents, monthly OOP, whether the 
premium was subsidized, income level, and geographic region. 
 
 
III.3.2.4. Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Table II.1 presents demographic characteristics for the study population. There is 
a total of 16,101 individuals who are privately insured with single policies at the time of 
first interview. The mean ages of those who bought a comprehensive coverage bundle 
and a less comprehensive coverage bundle are 41 and 43 years respectively. About 47% 
of the study sample are male. More than 80% of consumers are white. Among the more 
comprehensive bundle group, 62% are married, compared with 66% married consumers 
in the less comprehensive bundle group. About 35% of consumers have degrees beyond 
college. There is near 30% of consumers have dependents. There are more than 55% of 
consumers have high income and about 30% have middle-income.  More than 60% of 
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consumers rated their perceived health status “Excellent.” More than 70% of consumers 
rated their perceived mental health status “Excellent.” There are 43% of the study 
population reported any diagnosed long-term conditions. Around 20% of consumers 
agreed they are “more likely to take risk.” The South has the highest coverage rate among 
all regional areas. About 26% of consumers who purchased comprehensive coverage 
bundle are in the West, compared with less than 20% (18%) consumers who purchased 
less comprehensive coverage bundle are the Westerners.  
 
 All differences between the proportions in table II.1 are statistically significant at 
the 0.05 level or higher.   
 
III.4 Empirical strategy  
 
III.4.1 The Conceptual Framework  
 
 The consumer decision-making process of purchasing health insurance can be 
described as follows. A typical individual entering the insurance market faces the 
decision of whether to purchase health insurance. Individual makes a choice among 
health plans once he/she decided to purchase health insurance. Individual also has the 
choice of coverage options offered by the enrolled health plans. In the traditional health 
insurance marketplace, private information influences consumers’ choice of health plan. 
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However, in the ACA insurance market, whether to purchase health insurance is not 
consumer’s primary choice because everyone is mandated to purchase health insurance. 
Including consumers who had enrolled in health plans creates a research setting that is 
similar to the ACA market place. Consumer’s choices of coverage options that offered by 
their enrolled plans is more likely to rely on their private information.  
 This paper studies consumer purchasing decision among insurance coverage 
bundles instead of health plan choices. This is because the choice of coverage is not 
directly competitive in price but instead is a comprehensive valuation about needs. 
Choosing among coverage types given the enrolled plan, consumers will be more likely 
to rely on personal valuation compared to making their choice of a plan. The structure of 
the bundle choice set lacks the nature of competition and gains more weight from 
personal valuation of the consumers. Therefore, the key concept of coverage bundle 
choice is critical under the current conceptual framework in which the effect of private 
information can be better identified.  
 
III. 4.2 Modeling Approach 
 
 The demand for health insurance depends on consumer valuations of factors 
important to them. The issue of selection arises when consumer demand varies according 
to their risk status. The positive hypothesis refers to adverse selection that the riskier are 
more likely to purchase more comprehensive coverage due to the higher expected 
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healthcare utilization and higher medical expenses (Rothschild, 1992).  However, given 
multidimensional private information, the positive correlation between ex post risk 
realizations and coverage may not hold. In some cases, risk-averse consumers tend to 
purchase more coverage even when they have lower health risks. Failure to condition on 
risk preference may mask the positive correlation and lead to advantageous selection (de 
Meza and Webb, 2001; Jullien, Salanie, and Salanie, 2007).  
 
 I investigate consumer’s purchasing behavior for health insurance coverage 
bundles with multi-dimensional private information in a conceptual setting that is similar 
to ACA marketplace. In this setting, the individuals’ choice decision for coverage bundle 
is restricted to two-dimensional private information: risk status and risk preference. I 
make use of an empirical strategy similar to Ettner (1997); the logistic regression models 
are used to estimate the probability of choosing more or less comprehensive coverage 
bundle among the enrolled individuals. I begin with a simple model containing only 
consumer’s risk preference. Then I try to eliminate the counterintuitive relationship 
between preference and the choice of coverage bundle by adding explanatory variables in 
order to control for observed sources of individual heterogeneity.  
 
 An individual’s choice of health insurance coverage bundle is modeled as: 
 
Iit
*
= ′β Xi + ′γ Ai +εit, (1)
Iit =1, if Iit
* > 0
Iit = 0, otherwise
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where is a continuous and latent variable measuring the utility of choosing coverage 
bundle  at year . is the observed coverage bundle choice.  represents consumer 
attitude.  is a vector of characteristics.  are vectors of coefficients. is the 
measure of unobserved factors. It is assumed to be normally distributed with i.i.d. across 
individuals in the study sample. The logistic regression is applied for coefficient 
estimation. 
 
 To estimate the correlation between coverage bundle choice and consumer 
attitude, I also adapts the approach developed by Lokshin and Ravallion (2005). I 
estimated the reduced forms for coverage bundle choice and consumer attitude 
respectively. In each model all covariates are controlled. Then I compare the predicted 
linear indices for consumer attitude and coverage bundle choice. 
 
 For binary coverage bundle choice (the complete bundle choice v. less complete 
bundle choice), the logistic regression model in equation (1) will be estimated without 
including consumer attitude: 
                                                                          
  
Iit
*
j t Iit Ai
X i β, γ εit
Iit
*
= ′ φ X i + εit , (2)
Iit =1, if Iit
* > 0
Iit = 0, otherwise
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 Since consumer attitude is ordinal, the ordered logit regression model applies. 
Therefore                  
 
where  denotes individual ,  denotes the ordinal consumer attitude with ;  
denotes the year dummy from 2002 to 2009.  is a vector of coefficients;  is a vector 
of cut-off points for the index with . The i.i.d. assumption holds for the 
error term . Then I compute the correlation coefficients between the predicted coverage 
bundle choice and consumer attitude for the same sets of explanatory variable 
combinations.  
 One major concern for studies of health insurance decision is price endogeneity. 
However it is not likely to be the concern in this study. The goal for this study is to create 
a virtual market setting similar to the ACA marketplace, where all applicants are accepted 
regardless of health status. Under the conceptual framework with the key concept of 
coverage bundle choice, consumers discover the premium they must pay once they 
decide to be enrolled. Then the choice of coverage bundle is not premium-based. It is also 
very unlikely for the insurers to adjust premiums based on any particular individual’s 
preference. For this reason, the observed correlation between consumer characteristics 
and the choice decision only reflects consumer preference instead of insurer’s reaction to 
consumer choice. 
 
Ait
*
= ′ ϕ X it + ηit, Pr(A = j) = Pr(k jt−1) < ′ ϕ X it + ηit < k jt ) (3)
i i j j =1, 2, 3 t
ϕ k
k ⊂ [−∞, + ∞]
η
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III.5 Results  
 
 Table III.2 presents models predicting the binary consumer coverage bundle 
choice, comprehensive coverage bundle including all three coverage types and less 
comprehensive bundle including two or fewer coverage types (not including none), in 
response to consumer attitude with various sets of demographic characteristics. 
Consumer attitude towards the statement “Health insurance is not worth the money it 
costs” is set as three dummy variables in the estimation models. They are “Disagree” 
versus otherwise, “Uncertain” versus otherwise, and “Agree” versus otherwise. 
Consumers who disagreed with the statement are risk averse and assumed to purchase 
more comprehensive coverage bundle based on the positive hypothesis for adverse 
selection. Consumers who were uncertain may or may choose more comprehensive 
coverage bundle therefore are assumed not significantly associated with their choices. 
Consumers who agreed with the statement are risk tolerant and assumed to purchase less 
comprehensive coverage bundle.   
 
 Model I presents the association between consumer attitude and coverage bundle 
choice controlling for plan characteristics only. Different sets of consumer demographic 
characteristics are added from Model II through Model VI to test their impacts on the 
relationship between consumer attitude and coverage bundle choice.  
 
 The results show that consumers who agreed with the statement present a 
  
 
94
statistically significant pattern of being less likely to purchase the comprehensive 
coverage bundle. Consumers who are risk tolerant are about 0.8 times less likely to 
purchase comprehensive coverage bundle, compared with consumers who disagreed with 
the statement. Responding ‘uncertain’ to the statement was also significantly associated 
with their coverage bundle choice. Compared with consumers who disagreed with the 
statement, these consumers are about 0.9 times less likely to have comprehensive 
coverage bundle choice.  
 
 Consumer attitude to health insurance may associate with consumer’s education, 
wealth, lifestyle and health status. Controlling for consumer demographics does not 
change the association between consumer attitude and the probability of choosing 
comprehensive insurance coverage, showing that risk preference is not correlated with 
consumer demographics. Risk tolerant consumers’ unwillingness to purchasing 
comprehensive coverage bundle is persistent.  
 
 In model VI when all socioeconomic characteristics, health status and heath 
behavior are controlled, “Agree” with the statement of “Health insurance is not worth the 
money it costs” is still significantly associated with coverage bundle choices. Smoking 
status represents consumer health-related behavior and is often used to proxy for risk 
preference. Current smoker is considered risky behavior engagement. In studies of health 
insurance decisions, smoker had also been found negatively associated with health status 
and health insurance decisions (Hopkins and Kidd, 1996; Butler, 1999). However, 
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controlling for smoking status does not create collinearity with consumer attitude.  
 
 To further examine the potential correlation between consumer attitude and 
consumer demographics and its impact on the association between consumer attitude and 
insurance coverage, the method developed in Lokshin and Ravallion (2005) is used. 
Lokshin and Ravallion’s method suggests estimating the correlation between the 
predicted outcome and the main effect with the same sets of variables. Thus the 
correlation coefficients are computed for the predicted probability of consumer 
purchasing more comprehensive coverage bundle and the predicted probability of 
consumer attitude in equations (2) and (3) with various sets of variables.    
 
 Table III.3 presents the correlation coefficients for consumer attitude and 
consumer choice of insurance coverage bundle. Including all variables yields a 
correlation coefficient of 11%. It indicates the percent correlation between the predicted 
net benefit of insurance coverage and the predicted underlying continuous consumer 
attitude. Including demographic variables generate a negative and significant correlation 
between consumer attitude and insurance coverage at 52%. Specifically, age and sex do 
not show a significant effect on coverage bundle choice except race/ethnicity. But all 
three components of consumer demographics are significantly associated with consumer 
attitude. It seems that race/ethnicity is mainly responsible for the 52% correlation 
between consumer attitude and coverage bundle choice. This finding indicates the 
different race/ethnicities have different attitudes towards health insurance.     
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 The correlation based on geographic variation is about 12%. However, it appears 
that the geographic effect is only responsible for explaining the coverage bundle choice 
decision but not consumer attitude.  
 
 Including income creates 72% correlation between consumer attitude and 
insurance coverage. Income has positive and significant effect on both the probability of 
purchasing more comprehensive coverage bundle and consumer attitude. Employment 
status also has positive and significant effect on both the probability of purchasing 
comprehensive coverage bundle and consumer attitude; however, only contributing to a 
2% correlation. Education does not show significant effect on coverage bundle choice but 
shows significant effect to consumer attitude, yielding a 6% correlation between them.    
 
 Perceived health status is significantly associated with coverage bundle choice but 
has no significant effect on consumer attitude. However, there is a 13% correlation 
between the predicted consumer attitude and the predicted probability of comprehensive 
coverage bundle based on perceived health status. Long-term condition is an objective 
health status measure. It shows the opposite effect from consumer perceived health status. 
Long-term condition does not associate with the probability of coverage bundle choice, 
but is significantly associated with consumer attitude. It also creates 13% correlation 
between coverage bundle choice and consumer attitude. This finding shows that the 
effect of the subjective health status measure is the opposite of the effect of objective 
health status measure in predicting coverage bundle choice and consumer attitude. It asks 
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for cautious use of subjective or objective health status measures when evaluating its 
effect on consumer health related behavior. The less healthy a consumer perceived 
himself/herself, the less likely for her/him to purchase a more comprehensive coverage 
bundle. It is contradictory to the positive hypothesis. The insignificant effect of long-term 
condition does not support the adverse selection either. Long-term condition has a 
significant negative effect on consumer attitude. Consumers with any long-term condition 
are less likely to agree with the statement “Health insurance is not worth the money it 
costs.” It implies that less healthy consumers who have positive attitude make a positive 
insurance decision and purchase a comprehensive coverage bundle.  
 
 This finding suggests that the effects of subjective health status measure and 
objective health status are different in evaluating the association between health class and 
the insurance purchasing decision. First, subjective health measure has a direct effect on 
the insurance coverage choice decision, whereas objective health measure has an indirect 
effect on the insurance decision through consumer attitude. Second, the effect of the 
subjective health measure does not support the hypothesis for adverse selection. Third, 
the negative effect of the objective health measure on consumer attitude is mainly 
focusing on positive attitude. However positive attitude does not show a significant effect 
on the insurance coverage bundle choice. Fourth, it seems that there is an effect chain 
between risk class and risk preference, and between risk preference and the insurance 
decision. This chain, which connects risk status, risk preference and insurance decision, 
may explain why the positive hypothesis of adverse selection is altered. Fifth, controlling 
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for any of the two risk measures, the correlations between consumer attitudes and 
insurance coverage bundle choices are not affected.   
 
 Including “current smoker” yields a 27% negative and significant correlation 
between consumer attitude and the probability of purchasing a more comprehensive 
coverage bundle. “Current smoker” has a significant effect on consumer attitude only. 
This finding suggests current smoker contributes to the correlation between consumer 
attitude and insurance choice through other characteristics.  
 
 Another estimated preference measure is the attitude to the statement “more likely 
to take risk.” It associates with consumer’s insurance attitude only. Consumers who are 
more likely to take risk are two times more likely to agree “health insurance is not worth 
the money it costs,” yielding a negative 18% correlation between the predicted 
probability of choosing more comprehensive coverage bundle and the predicted 
consumer attitude. 
 
  “Total healthcare expenditure” as a risk measure (Ellis and McGuire, 2007) is 
also examined in the correlation between consumer attitude and the choice of coverage 
bundle, where “total healthcare expenditure” is assumed to be positively associated with 
the choice of coverage bundle and negatively associated with consumer attitude. 
Consumers who spent more are more likely to purchase a more comprehensive coverage 
bundle, while maybe more likely to agree that the insurance is not worth the money it 
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costs. The results show that total healthcare expenditure does not have a significant effect 
on the choice of coverage bundle but does have a significant effect on consumer attitude. 
The more spent on healthcare the less likely for these consumers to agree with “health 
insurance is not worth the money it costs.” Including “total healthcare expenditure” 
yields 18% correlation between the predicted probability of choosing more 
comprehensive coverage bundle and the predicted consumer attitude. 
 
 The results in table III.3 suggest consumer attitude has significant correlation with 
coverage bundle choice with each set of variables. However, most factors associated with 
coverage bundle choice do not correlate with consumer attitude except race/ethnicity, 
income and employment status. It indicates that, first, there is an independent correlation 
between consumer attitude and coverage bundle choice in nature; second, factors that 
independently correlated with these consumer attitude or coverage bundle choice may 
enhance or reduce the correlation between them but they do not stand in the pathway 
between consumer attitude and insurance coverage bundle choice. Table III.3 also 
suggests that there is no evidence for adverse selection because objective risk class 
measure of long-term conditions does not appear significantly associated with bundle 
choice while subjective risk measure of perceived health status shows a negative 
association with coverage bundle choice (OR=0.84, 95%CI=[0.94, 0.95], p=0.004).  
 
 Lastly, table III.4 presents the regression results for the probability of coverage 
bundle choice in response to consumer attitude controlling for selected variables in 
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Model V. The only difference in this regression model is that consumer attitude is 
estimated as an ordinal variable instead of a set of dummies. The regression results show 
that consumer attitude has a stronger association with the probability of purchasing 
comprehensive coverage bundle. Both of “Agree” and “Uncertain” consumers are less 
likely to purchase comprehensive coverage bundle and the effects for both are 
statistically significant. “Agree” with the negative statement decreases the likelihood of 
choosing more comprehensive coverage bundle by 22% (OR=0.78, 95% CI [0.71–0.86]) 
compared with those who disagree with the statement.  
 
 Age in the study of health insurance is often interpreted as a stock of health. It 
influences the demand for health insurance. Younger aged individual are healthier in 
general and demand less health insurance compared with older individuals. I include 
working-age population from 18 to 64 years of age. Age is categorized into four groups: 
18–29, 30–39, 40–49, 50–64. Although results in table III.4 indicate that the older groups 
appear less likely to purchase the comprehensive coverage bundle compared with the 
youngest age group of 18–29 (the odds ratios are all less than 1), none of the age groups 
is statistically significantly associated with coverage bundle choice. 
 
 In this study, more than half (53%) of the study population are female. The results 
in table III.4 indicate that there is no significant difference in health insurance decision-
making between the two genders.   
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 The explanation for the insignificant effect of age and sex may be due to the 
nature of coverage bundles. Once individuals are enrolled in health plans, their decision 
to purchase a coverage bundle will be more likely to be need-specific rather than age or 
sex specific. Consumer’s valuations of health insurance can be explained by attitudes, 
while age and sex are considered associated with attitude but play more important role on 
health plan choice making rather than coverage bundle choice. It further stresses the 
importance of consumer preference in the market setting where health insurance is 
mandated.    
 
 The disparity in health care among race/ethnicities has been reported in health 
related studies. Barriers to heath care for racial and ethnic minorities have also been 
recorded. However, study results in table III.4 indicate that black and other ethnicity 
groups are more likely to purchase comprehensive coverage bundle compared to White.  
Black is 1.66 times more likely to purchase more comprehensive coverage bundle 
compared to White (OR=1.66, 95%CI=[1.47–1.87], p<0.001). This finding indicates that 
the minority groups may have stronger desire for comprehensive health insurance. Once 
getting over the barrier of insured (refers to “enroll in health plans”), their needs are 
unleashed and show stronger desire for a comprehensive coverage bundle.   
 
 Single working-age population is assumed to have less demand for health 
insurance than those who are married or have families. Therefore, marital status and 
having dependents are assumed to positively associate with coverage bundle choice. The 
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results in table III.4 show that, as expected, those having any dependent are more likely 
to purchase comprehensive coverage bundle, but marital status does not show a 
significant effect. The effect of marital status is insignificant may be because the spousal 
coverage has been included in the enrolled health plan. Whether married or not does not 
influence the purchasing decisions for the defined coverage bundles. It may also be 
explained by its broad definition. I define anyone who has ever been married as the 
indicator of marital status. “Has ever been married” include those who are currently 
married, divorced and widowed. It may compound the effect of current marital status and 
make marital status insignificant.  
 
 Income is an important factor indicating consumer’s affordability for health 
insurance. I find income associated with both coverage bundle choice decision and 
consumer attitude. The results in table III.4 indicate that, the higher family income 
consumers have, the more likely for them to purchase comprehensive coverage bundle. It 
is consistent with the expectation. Consumers with high income are 1.44 times more 
likely to purchase more comprehensive coverage bundle compared with low-income 
consumers (OR=1.44, 95%CI=[1.27, 1.63], p<0.001). Consumers with middle income are 
1.34 times more likely to purchase more comprehensive coverage bundle compared with 
low-income consumers (OR=1.34, 95%CI=[1.19, 1.51, p<0.001])  
 
 Factors such as employment status and union membership also show significant 
effects in coverage bundle choice. The employed are 1.19 times more likely to purchase 
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more comprehensive coverage bundle (OR=1.19, 95%CI=[1.05, 1.35], p=0.01). 
However, a union member is less likely to purchase more comprehensive coverage 
bundle (OR=0.6, 95% CI=[0.54, 0.67], p<0.001). This might be because union 
membership may offer consumers certain benefits as the trade-off for coverage choices.  
 
 Education level influences individual’s life style, professional skills, and social 
network. A higher education may increase the odds of purchasing more comprehensive 
coverage bundle. Table III.4 shows that, compared with those who had lower educational 
level, consumers who have a degree beyond college are 1.13 times more likely to 
purchase more comprehensive coverage (OR=1.13, 95%CI=[1.03, 1.23], p=0.01).  
 
 After controlling for other consumer and plan characteristics, consumer perceived 
health status does not show a significant effect on the probability of purchasing 
comprehensive coverage bundle. It has been discussed in table III.3 that subjective health 
status does not associate with consumer attitude. When controlling for perceived health 
status, consumer attitude is still significantly associated with coverage bundle choice, but 
the effect of perceived health status on coverage bundle choice becomes insignificant.  
 
 Above all, the results indicate that, in insurance coverage bundle choice decision-
making, health status does not support the positive hypothesis of adverse selection. 
However, health status is correlated with consumer attitude, which is correlated with 
insurance decision. Consumers who had a passive attitude towards health insurance are 
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less likely to purchase comprehensive coverage bundle. These findings suggest that, in 
the environment where health insurance is mandated and price effect is limited, consumer 
preference may internalize risk status and take effect in insurance purchasing decision-
making.  
 
III.6 Sensitivity Check  
 
III.6.1 Risk Class  
 
 Age. Age as an important demographic factor often associates with consumer 
behavior. In many medical studies, aging is associated with weakening health conditions. 
Older populations typically have more healthcare utilization and higher healthcare costs 
than younger populations. At the same time, age is also positively associated with wage. 
Older individuals are more likely to afford more expensive health insurance. Therefore, I 
assume age is positively associated with the choice of more comprehensive coverage 
bundle. 
 
 However, age categories (<30 years, 30–39 40–49, and older than 50 years) do 
not show significant effects in table III.4. The sensitivity of age is checked in its 
continuous and quadratic terms separately. The results in table III.5 show that, when age 
is continuous, it is positively associated with the probability of choosing a more 
comprehensive coverage bundle, indicating the likelihood of choosing a more 
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comprehensive coverage bundle steadily increases as age increases (OR=1.03, 95% CI 
[1.10–1.06]). In table III.3, age is significantly associated with consumer attitude, but not 
associated with coverage bundle choice. Along with sex and race, these three 
demographic characteristics contribute a 52% correlation between consumer attitude and 
coverage bundle choice. Using continuous age and quadratic age may overstate the 
correlation between age and coverage bundle choice. Therefore it is reasonable to control 
for age categories in the regression model to present a true relationship with coverage 
bundle choice.  
 
 Total healthcare expenditure. One alternative health risk measure is health 
expenditure. Studies had reported that healthcare cost is associated with health plan 
choices. Adverse selection arises when insurers select enrollees by predicting potential 
enrollees’ health care costs. “Total healthcare expenditure” is assumed to be positively 
associated with coverage bundle choice. The more consumers spent on healthcare, the 
more likely for them to purchase a comprehensive coverage bundle. Table III.6 shows the 
effect of total healthcare expenditure in a model replacing perceived health status with 
total health expenditures. The results indicate that “total healthcare expenditure” yields a 
positive however insignificant effect. Total healthcare expenditure is only associated with 
health insurance attitude but not coverage bundle choice in table III.3. After controlling 
for all other covariates, total healthcare expenditure is still insignificantly associated with 
coverage bundle choice. The correlation between total healthcare expenditure and 
consumer attitude causes the “uncertain” attitude becomes insignificant. However, 
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consumer agreed with the statement towards health insurance remains significant.  
 
 Interestingly, in table III.6, the regression results show that “whether premium 
was shared” becomes insignificant after controlling for total healthcare expenditure. It 
can be explained by the correlation between total healthcare expenditure and plan price. 
Riskier consumers may enroll in a more generous health plan and spend more on 
healthcare. The change in significance of “whether plan premium is shared” is worth 
noting because one goal for the ACA is to make health insurance affordable for low and 
some middle income families by creating a subsidy system. The significance of “whether 
premium is shared” indicates the importance of subsidy in making purchasing decision of 
insurance. However the correlation between “total healthcare expenditure” and “whether 
premium is shared” makes subsidy indicator insignificant.  
 
 Long-term condition. Objective risk measure is an alternative to subjective risk 
measure. As it is discussed in the “Data and Variable” section, the “long-term conditions” 
capture two possible effects (Doiron and Savage, 2008). If there is a positive association 
between long-term conditions and insurance, it confirms the positive hypothesis. 
Otherwise, there is an evidence of advantageous selection if a negative association is 
found. Table III.7 reports the effect of long-term condition. After controlling for other 
covariates, long-term condition shows a weakly significant effect on coverage bundle 
choice. Any long-term condition increases the odds of selecting comprehensive coverage 
by 8% (OR=1.08, 95% CI [0.99–1.08], p=0.08). Referring to the regression results in 
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table III.4 where consumer perceived health status does not show a significant effect, the 
positive effect of long-term condition in table III.7 provides an evidence of adverse 
selection based on the objective risk measure. This finding suggests that the effects of 
subjective and objective risk measures may have opposite effects on health insurance 
choice. The possible explanation for this finding is that consumers may perceive better 
health when their health conditions do not impact their daily life and work. It is especially 
possible for the employed. Subjective risk measure and objective risk measure thus have 
different meanings in explaining insurance purchasing decision. Since perceived health 
status is not correlated with consumer attitude (table III.3), the regression model controls 
for the subjective measure can avoid the concern of collinearity between long term 
condition and consumer attitude and provide a more accurate estimation of consumer 
attitude. 
 
III. 6.2 Risk Preference  
 
 More likely to take risk. The main interest of this study is consumer attitude 
toward health insurance. MEPS data also include questions that ascertain non-health 
related attitudes. It is interesting to compare consumer’s non-health related attitudes that 
might influence decisions in purchasing health insurance and using health services. 
MEPS ask respondents whether they strongly agreed, agreed, were uncertain, disagreed, 
or strongly disagreed with the statement: “more likely to take risks than the average 
person.” Table III.3 shows that consumer’s general risk attitude does not associate with 
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insurance coverage bundle choices but is significantly and positively associated with 
consumer attitudes toward health insurance. Predicted probability of choosing more 
comprehensive bundle choice and the predicted consumer’s health insurance attitude 
based on consumer’s risk attitude yield a significant and negative correlation at 18%.  
 
 Table III.8 presents the regression results of “More likely to take risk” controlling 
for the same set of variables in table III.4. The results show consumer’s general risk 
attitude has no significant effect on the decision for health insurance. This finding 
suggests that consumer’s risk preferences may be homologous, however, non-health 
related attitude does not affect health insurance decision-making directly.  
 
III.7 Conclusions  
 
 The hypothesized positive relationship between risk and insurance had long been 
accepted in theory. Yet the findings in empirical studies are mixed. In order to examine 
the relationship between private information and insurance in a marketplace where 
insurers are required to accept all applicants, I selected an empirical setting in which 
consumers do not make insurance purchasing decisions according to the price and 
consumer ex ante risk does not take effect on insurance purchasing decisions. In this 
empirical setting, health insurance coverage bundle choices are constructed and 
consumers who had already enrolled in their health plans are included. By making 
choices of health insurance coverage bundles, the price effect on consumers’ choice 
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decision is constrained and the effect of consumer private information can be more 
identifiable.   
 
 I find that plan price and individual risk status do not significantly associate with 
coverage bundle choice. This indicates that the empirical setting selected meets 
conditions similar to the ACA’s mandatory requirement that “all consumers are accepted 
regardless of health status” and “medical underwriting is not allowed to establish 
premiums.” The effect of risk status is not significant in all measures including perceived 
health status, long-term conditions, and total healthcare expenditures. It suggests that the 
study results do not empirically support the association between risk status and insurance.   
 
However, one risk preference indicator - consumer attitude is found significantly and 
positively associated with coverage bundle choice. Consumers who agreed with the 
statement “Health insurance is not worth the money it costs” are less likely to choose 
more comprehensive insurance coverage bundle. Consumers who are risk tolerant appear 
less likely to purchase comprehensive coverage.  
 
 More importantly, most risk class measures that are not found correlated with 
coverage bundle choice are correlated with consumer attitude. This finding suggests that 
consumer risk preference may capture the variations in risk class and impact coverage 
bundle choice decision-making as the result. For example, total healthcare expenditure is 
found negatively associated with consumer attitude. The more consumers spend on 
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healthcare, the less likely for them to agree with the negative statement about health 
insurance. Even though total healthcare expenditure does not correlate with insurance 
decision directly, its association with consumer attitude may capture its indirect effect to 
insurance decision. Another example is long-term condition. Any long-term condition 
does not show a significant effect on insurance decision. But they are found negatively 
associated with consumer attitude. The effect of long-term condition on insurance 
decisions also may be captured by consumer attitudes.  
 
 In summary, when consumers are making choices about insurance coverage 
bundles they are not based on price and risk status, risk preferences may internalize 
health risks and take effect on their decisions. 
 
 The data and results are also subject to some limitations. First, as a major flaw the 
constructed coverage bundle choices may deviate from the true choice options. MEPS 
data do not provide specific information about plan type and the available coverage 
options offered by the enrolled plan. In this study sample of the privately insured 
individuals, about 96% took prescription drug coverage, 71% took dental care, 60% took 
vision care 16 . In fact, among all these privately insured, over 80 percent obtained 
employer-sponsored insurance. Thus consumers’ choices of optional coverage may have 
been predetermined if their plans were purchased through employers. Consumers’ 
                                                        
16 The U.S. Bureau of Statistics reported take-up rates of prescription drug coverage, dental care 
and vision care are at 74%, 79% and 79% respectively. Health care benefits: Access, 
participation, and take-up rates, civilian workers, National Compensation Survey, March 2014. 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2014/ebbl0055.pdf 
  
 
111
choices of coverage may have been well defined and offered in bundles by employers. 
Especially for those who selected one of the coverage options, it might because it is the 
only one that is offered. For those individuals who did not take any of the listed coverage 
options, it may be because the coverage options were just simply not offered. Given the 
available information I have to make the assumptions that everyone face equal 
opportunities to choose health plans and all health plans offer a same menu of coverage 
options including prescription drug, dental and vision care. It may bias the study results 
by overestimating the effect of individual preference heterogeneity. On the other hand, 
consumers have different motivations to take different coverage options. The coverage 
bundle design that combing coverage options may mask individual risk preference 
towards different coverage options. To identify individual’s preference to specific health 
risks, future study should focus on each single coverage option.   
 Second, some may suggests that cross-sectional analysis is not ideal for study of 
health insurance purchasing behavior. However, MEPS does not follow a particular 
group of individuals over long time of period. A panel data over a longer period may 
provide more sound study results. 
 
 Third, in the MEPS data, the regional variations of choices were limited to 
“Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.” The characteristics of insurance markets and 
consumer behaviors vary largely even within each of these regions. Obtaining county 
level data, which is possible by traveling to the data center, may help to identify the 
regional effect.  
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 In conclusion, I examine the association between consumer attitudes and the 
health insurance decisions for individuals who had enrolled in health plans. I address the 
importance of private information, especially consumer attitudes, in the health insurance 
decision-making process in the new policy environment created by the ACA. The study 
results indicate that, in a marketplace where medical underwriting is not allowed to 
establish premiums and all applicants are insured regardless of health status, consumer 
attitude plays an important role in the process of insurance purchasing decision-making. 
The findings suggest that there is a pathway among risk class, risk preference in the 
decision making process: consumers may internalize health status and influence health 
insurance purchasing decisions through attitudes. It provides important implications for 
policy makers in enhancing consumer engagement in the ACA new marketplace.    
 
  
  
 
113
References 
Asinski, D. (2005). Health insurance, access to care, and risk-aversion: separating  
incentive and selection effects. Unpublished manuscript, Iowa State University.  
 
Buchmueller, T. C., Fiebig, D. G., Jones, G., and Savage, E. (2013). Preference  
heterogeneity and selection in private health insurance: The case of Australia. J  
Health Econ, 32(no. 5).  
 
Cawley, J., and Philipson, T. (1999). An empirical examination of information  
barriers to trade in insurance. American Economic Review, 89(4), 827–846. doi: Doi  
10.1257/Aer.89.4.827 
 
Chiappori, P. A., Jullien, B., Salanie, B., and Salanie, F. (2006). Asymmetric  
information in insurance: general testable implications. Rand Journal of Economics,  
37(4), 783–798.  
 
Chiappori, P. A., and Salanie, B. (2000). Testing for asymmetric information in  
insurance markets. Journal of Political Economy, 108(1), 56–78. doi: Doi  
10.1086/262111 
 
de Meza, D., and Webb, D. C. (2001). Advantageous selection in insurance markets.  
Rand Journal of Economics, 32(2), 249–262. doi: Doi 10.2307/2696408 
 
Doiron, D., Jones, G., and Savage, E. (2008). Healthy, wealthy and insured? The role  
of self-assessed health in the demand for private health insurance. Health Econ,  
17(3), 317–334. doi: 10.1002/hec.1267 
 
Ellis, R. P., and McGuire, T. G. (2007). Predictability and predictiveness in health care  
spending. J Health Econ, 26(1), 25–48. doi: Doi 10.1016/J.Jhealeco.2006.06.004 
 
Ellis, R. P., Pope, G. C., Iezzoni, L., Ayanian, J. Z., Bates, D. W., Burstin, H., and Ash, 
A. S. (1996). Diagnosis-based risk adjustment for Medicare capitation payments. Health  
Care Financ Rev, 17(3), 101–128.  
 
Ettner, S. L. (1997). Adverse selection and the purchase of Medigap insurance by the  
elderly. J Health Econ, 16(5), 543–562. doi: Doi 10.1016/S0167-6296(97)00011-8 
 
Fang, H. M., Keane, M. P., and Silverman, D. (2008). Sources of advantageous  
selection: Evidence from the Medigap insurance market. Journal of Political  
Economy, 116(2), 303–350. doi: Doi 10.1086/587623 
 
Finkelstein, A., and McGarry, K. . (2006). Multiple dimensions of private information:  
evidence from the long-term care insurance market. American Economic Review,  
  
 
114
96(no. 4).  
 
Finkelstein, A., and Poterba, J. (2004). Adverse selection in insurance markets:  
Policyholder evidence from the UK annuity market. Journal of Political Economy,  
112(no. 1).  
 
Finkelstein, A., and Poterba, J. (2002). Selection effects in the United Kingdom  
individual annuities market. Economic Journal, 112(476), 28–50. doi: Doi  
10.1111/1468-0297.0j672 
 
Jullien, B., Salanie, B., and Salanie, F. (2007). Screening risk-averse agents under  
moral hazard: single-crossing and the CARA case. Economic Theory, 30(1), 151–169.  
doi: Doi 10.1007/S00199-005-0040-Z 
 
Lokshin, M., and Ravallion, M. . (2005). Rich and powerful?: Subjective power and  
welfare in Russia. Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 56(no. 2 ).  
 
Monheit, A. C., and Vistnes, J. P. . (2004). Health insurance enrollment decisions:  
understanding the role of preferences for coverage. Ann Arbor, 1001.  
 
Pope, G. C., Kautter, J., Ellis, R. P., Ash, A. S., Ayanian, J. Z., Iezzoni, L. I., . . . Robst, J.  
(2004). Risk adjustment of Medicare capitation payments using the CMS-HCC model.  
Health Care Financ Rev, 25(4), 119–141.  
 
Propper, C. (1989). An econometric analysis of the demand for private health  
insurance in England and Wales. Applied Economics, 21(no. 6).  
 
Rothschild, M., and Stiglitz, J. (1992). Equilibrium in competitive insurance markets:  
an essay on the economics of imperfect information. Springer Netherlands.  
 
Zhao, Y., Ash, A. S., Haughton, J., and McMillan, B. (2003). Identifying future high-cost  
cases through predictive modeling. Disease Management & Health Outcomes, 11(6),  
389–397. doi: Doi 10.2165/00115677-200311060-00005 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
115
Note: The MEPS contained questions that asked adults age 18 and over whether they agree or 
disagree with the following statement: "Health insurance is not worth the money it costs." The 
respondents choose the answers among strongly agree, agree, uncertain, disagreed, or strongly 
disagreed. Since it was designed to be negative question, I categorize the answers into three 
groups that is more straightforward: positive (disagree), uncertain, and passive (agree). 
Table III.1. Descriptive statistics of selected variables (N=16,101) 
  
More 
comprehensive 
Less 
comprehensive 
p-value 
N 8,766 7,335   
Age 41.28 42.54 <0.001 *** 
Male 47% 47% 0.74 
White 80% 85% <0.001 *** 
Total healthcare expenditure ($) 3727.455 3878.05 0.17 
Consumer attitude*   <0.001 *** 
    Disagree 64% 60% 
    Uncertain 9% 10% 
    Agree 19% 23% 
Marital status 62% 66% <0.001 *** 
Beyond college 35% 34% 0.49 
Employed 85% 84% 0.01 *** 
Dependent 29% 27% 0.05 ** 
Union 21% 13% <0.001 *** 
Income   
    Low  10% 13% <0.001 *** 
    Middle 32% 32% 
    High 58% 55% 
Perceived health Status   0.01 *** 
    Excellent 65% 64% 
    Good/Fair 26% 26% 
    Poor 8% 10% 
Perceived mental health   0.70 
    Excellent 74% 73% 
    Good/Fair 21% 22% 
    Poor 4% 4% 
Diagnosed conditions 43% 43% 0.95 
More likely to take risk 22% 21% 0.26 
Region   
    Northeast 18% 18% <0.001 *** 
    Midwest 22% 23% 
    South 34% 40% 
    West 26% 18%   
  
 
1
1
6
 
Table III.2. Coverage bundle choice in response to consumer attitude controlling for various variables (N=16,101). 
 I.   II. III. IV. V. VI.  
Consumer 
Attitude 
OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value OR p-value 
    Disagree Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref. Ref.  
    Uncertain 0.90 0.130 0.87 0.041** 0.87 0.046** 0.86 0.03** 0.85 0.03** 0.93 0.036** 
    Agree 0.79 <0.01*** 0.77 <0.01*** 0.78 <0.01*** 0.78 <0.01*** 0.78 <0.01*** 0.85 <0.01*** 
Controlling for 
No 
Demographics 
Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics Demographics 
  Region Region Region Region 
  Income Income Income Income 
   Education Education Education 
  Marital Status Marital Status Marital Status 
  Union Union Union 
  Employment Employment Employment 
  
Perceived 
health status 
Perceived health 
status 
  Risk behavior 
Goodness-of-
fit test‡ 
F=12.99, p- 
value<0.0001 
F=14.20, p-
value<0.0001 
F=16.62, p-
value<0.0001 
F=17.51, p-
value<0.0001 
F=16.44, p-
value<0.0001 
F=15.90, p-
value<0.0001 
 Notes: 1. The outcome variable is “coverage bundle choice” with a 1 indicating more comprehensive coverage bundle choice and 0 
otherwise. Each regression model has different set of coefficients from none in Model I to all covariates included. By default, all 
specifications control for plan characteristics including plan type, given plan choices, whether plan premium was shared. 2. ‡: Goodness-
of-fit test p-value<0.0001 suggests no evidence of lack of fit. 
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Table III.31 The correlation8 between consumer attitude and coverage bundle choice 
with different components (N=16,101) 
 
Coverage 
bundle2 
Consumer 
attitude3 
Correlation 
coefficient4 p-value 
All variables Mixed7 Mixed 0.109 <.001 
Demographics   -0.522 <.001 
    Age No5 Yes6   
    Sex No Yes   
    Race/Ethnicity Yes Yes   
Geography Yes No 0.116 <.001 
Income Yes Yes 0.723 <.001 
Employment Yes Yes 0.023 <.001 
Education No Yes 0.063 <.001 
Perceived health status Yes No 0.129 <.001 
Long-term conditions No Yes 0.129 <.001 
Current Smoker No Yes 0.273 <.001 
More likely to take risk No Yes -0.177 <.001 
Total healthcare 
expenditure No Yes 0.179 <.001 
Notes: 1. The results (OR, 95%CI, and p-values) with more details can be found in the appendix. 
2. This column reports the associations between the coverage bundle choice and each component. 
3. This column reports the associations between consumer attitude and each component. 4. The 
correlation coefficients are calculated using the components of the linear indices in the ordered 
logit regression for “consumer attitude” and the logistic regression for coverage bundle choices. 
5. “No” denotes that the component is not statistically significantly associated with the outcome 
variables. 6. “Yes” denotes that the component is statistically significantly associated with the 
outcome variables. 7. “Mixed” denotes the associations are significant or insignificant when 
include all variables.  8. See more details in the appendixes.  
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Table III.4. Logistic regression results for selected variables  
 I  
  OR 95% CI p-value  
Consumer attitude†                  
    Uncertain 0.85 [0.74 – 0.98] 0.03 ** 
    Agree 0.78 [0.71 – 0.86] <0.001 *** 
Male 0.49 [0.20 – 1.20] 0.12  
Age     
    30 – 39 0.97 [0.84 – 1.13] 0.68  
    40 – 49 1.00 [0.82 – 1.08] 0.96  
    50 – 64 0.88 [0.65 – 0.85] 0.21  
Race     
    Black 1.66 [1.47 – 1.87] <0.001 *** 
    Other 1.17 [1.00 – 1.37] 0.05 ** 
Ever been married 1.06 [0.95 – 1.18] 0.32  
Dependent 1.11 [1.00 – 1.23] 0.05 ** 
Employed 1.19 [1.05 – 1.35] 0.01 *** 
Income     
    Middle 1.34 [1.19 – 1.51] <0.001 *** 
    High 1.44 [1.27 – 1.63] <0.001 *** 
Degree beyond college 1.13 [1.03 – 1.23] 0.01 ** 
Perceived health status     
    Good/Fair 1.02 [0.94 – 1.11] 0.66  
    Poor 0.94 [0.81 – 1.07] 0.35  
Union member 0.60 [0.54 – 0.67] <0.001 *** 
Given plan choice 0.67 [0.61 – 0.73] <0.001 *** 
Premium shared 1.09 [1.00 – 1.20] 0.06 * 
Notes: 1.The outcome variable is “coverage bundle choice” with a 1 indicating more 
comprehensive coverage bundle choice and 0 otherwise. 2.The MEPS sampling weight is used in 
the regression. 3. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. 4. †: the reference group of consumer attitude is “disagree with the statement of ‘Health 
insurance is not worth the money it costs.’” 5. Goodness-of-fit test: F=15.90, p-value<0.0001, 
indicates no evidence of lack of fit.  
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Sensitivity Check: 
Table III.5. Logistic regression results for selected variables   
 I  
  OR 95% CI p-value  
Consumer attitude     
    Uncertain 0.85 [0.74 – 0.98] 0.03 ** 
    Agree 0.78 [0.71 – 0.86] <0.001 *** 
Male 0.49 [0.20 – 1.20] 0.12  
Age 1.03 [1.01 – 1.06] 0.01 *** 
Age square 0.95 [0.92 – 0.98] <0.001 *** 
Race     
    Black 1.65 [1.47 – 1.86] <0.001 *** 
    Other 1.17 [1.00 – 1.37] 0.05 ** 
Ever been married 1.07 [0.96 – 1.20] 0.22  
Dependent 1.13 [1.02 – 1.26] 0.02 ** 
Employed 1.14 [1.00 – 1.30] 0.04 ** 
Income     
    Middle 1.34 [1.20 – 1.51] <0.001 *** 
    High 1.44 [1.27 – 1.63] <0.001 *** 
Degree beyond college 1.14 [1.03 – 1.23] <0.001 *** 
Perceived health status     
    Good/Fair 1.02 [0.94 – 1.11] 0.66  
    Poor 0.94 [0.81 – 1.07] 0.35  
Union member 0.60 [0.54 – 0.67] <0.001 *** 
Given plan choice 0.67 [0.61 – 0.73] <0.001 *** 
Premium shared 1.09 [1.00 – 1.20] 0.06 * 
Notes: 1.The outcome variable is “coverage bundle choice” with a 1 indicating more 
comprehensive coverage bundle choice and 0 otherwise. 2.The MEPS sampling weight is used in 
the regression. 3. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. 4. Goodness-of-fit test: F=18.17, p-value<0.0001, indicates no evidence of lack of fit. 
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Table III.6. Logistic regression results for selected variables: total 
healthcare expenditure  
 I  
  OR 95% CI p-value  
Consumer attitude     
    Uncertain 0.89 [0.77 – 1.04] 0.13  
    Agree 0.79 [0.71 – 0.88] <0.01 *** 
Age     
    30 – 39 1.00 [0.86 – 1.17] 0.98  
    40 – 49 1.03 [0.87 – 1.22] 0.70  
    50 – 64 0.90 [0.72 – 1.13] 0.38  
Male 0.44 [0.16 – 1.20] 0.11  
Race     
    Black 1.63 [1.43 – 1.85] <0.01 *** 
    Other 1.16 [0.98 – 1.38] 0.08 * 
Ever been married 1.04 [0.93 – 1.25] 0.47  
Dependent 1.12 [1.00 – 1.25] 0.05 ** 
Employed 1.22 [1.00 – 1.25] 0.05 ** 
Income     
    Middle 1.39 [1.22 – 1.57] <0.01 *** 
    High 1.45 [1.27 – 1.65] <0.01 *** 
Degree beyond college 1.15 [1.00 – 1.25] <0.01 *** 
Total healthcare 
expenditure 1.13 [0.68 – 1.91] 0.62  
Union member 0.62 [0.55 – 0.69] <0.01 *** 
Given plan choice 1.09 [0.62 – 0.75] <0.01 *** 
Premium shared 1.07 [0.97 – 1.19] 0.18  
Notes: 1.The outcome variable is “coverage bundle choice” with a 1 indicating more 
comprehensive coverage bundle choice and 0 otherwise. 2.The MEPS sampling weight is used in 
the regression. 3. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. 4. Goodness-of-fit test: F=14.72, p-value<0.0001, indicates no evidence of lack of fit. 
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Table III.7. Logistic regression results for selected variables: Long-term condition 
 I  
  OR 95% CI p-value  
Consumer attitude     
    Uncertain 0.86 [0.75 – 0.99] 0.03 ** 
    Agree 0.78 [0.71 – 0.86] <0.01 *** 
Age     
    30 – 39 0.96 [0.84 – 1.11] 0.62  
    40 – 49 0.98 [0.84 – 1.15] 0.82  
    50 – 64 0.85 [0.69 – 1.05] 0.13  
Male 0.47 [0.19 – 1.17] 0.11  
Race     
    Black 1.66 [1.47 – 1.87] <0.01 *** 
    Other 1.18 [1.01 – 1.39] 0.04 ** 
Ever been married 1.05 [0.94 –  1.17] 0.36  
Dependent 1.11 [1.00 – 1.23] 0.05 ** 
Employed 1.21 [1.06 – 1.37] <0.01 *** 
Income     
    Middle 1.34 [1.20 – 1.51] <0.01 *** 
    High 1.45 [1.28 – 1.64] <0.01 *** 
Degree beyond college 1.13 [1.04 – 1.23] <0.01 *** 
Any long-term condition 1.08 [0.99 – 1.08] 0.08 * 
Union member 0.60 [0.54 – 0.67] <0.01 *** 
Given plan choice 0.67 [0.61 – 0.73] <0.01 *** 
Premium shared 1.09 [1.00 – 1.20] 0.06 * 
Notes: 1.The outcome variable is “coverage bundle choice” with a 1 indicating more 
comprehensive coverage bundle choice and 0 otherwise. 2.The MEPS sampling weight is used in 
the regression. 3. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. 4. Goodness-of-fit test: F=17.54, p-value<0.0001, indicates no evidence of lack of fit. 
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Table III.8. Logistic regression results for selected variables: more likely to take risk  
 I  
  OR 95% CI p-value  
More likely to take risk     
    Uncertain 0.98 [0.90 – 1.05] 0.53  
    Disagree 0.95 [0.79  – 1.15] 0.62  
Male 0.51 [0.21 – 1.20] 0.12  
Age     
    30 – 39 0.96 [0.83 – 1.10] 0.55  
    40 – 49 1.01 [0.86 – 1.18] 0.92  
    50 – 64 0.88 [0.72 – 1.08] 0.22  
Race     
    Black 1.64 [1.45 – 1.84] <0.01 *** 
    Other 1.15 [0.98 – 1.36] 0.08 * 
Ever been married 1.06 [0.95 – 1.18] 0.28  
Dependent 1.11 [1.00 – 1.23] 0.05 ** 
Employed 1.20 [1.06 – 1.36] 0.01 *** 
Income     
    Middle 1.34 [1.19 – 1.51] <0.01 *** 
    High 1.45 [1.28 – 1.64] <0.01 *** 
Degree beyond college 1.11 [1.02 – 1.22] 0.02 ** 
Perceived health status     
    Good/Fair 1.02 [0.94 – 1.11] 0.60  
    Poor 0.94 [0.82 – 1.08] 0.39  
Union member 0.60 [0.54 – 0.67] <0.01 *** 
Given plan choice 0.66 [0.61 – 0.72] <0.01 *** 
Premium shared 1.11 [1.01 – 1.22] 0.03 ** 
Notes: 1.The outcome variable is “coverage bundle choice” with a 1 indicating more 
comprehensive coverage bundle choice and 0 otherwise. 2.The MEPS sampling weight is used in 
the regression. 3. * significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 
percent. 4. Goodness-of-fit test: F=16.04, p-value<0.0001, indicates no evidence of lack of fit. 
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CHAPTER FOUR 
 
Consumer Satisfaction and Health Insurance Coverage Bundle Choices  
 
IV.1. Introduction  
 
 The Affordable Care Act aims to improve the coverage, quality, choices, and 
affordability of premiums for purchasers in health insurance markets. The ACA’s new 
marketplaces facilitate health insurance purchases and subsidize qualified individuals. As 
a result, consumers will have greater opportunities to find affordable health products that 
may better fit their preferences regarding price and quality. In the new marketplace, more 
health plan diversity may arise. The various plan features can be valued differently by 
different consumers. Scanlon (1997) pointed out in his comprehensive literature review 
of consumer health plan choice that “the keystone of the competitive strategy in health 
insurance markets assumes that consumers make informed choices based on the costs and 
quality of competitive plans. However, little is known about how individuals use the 
information other than price in the decision making process. The new environment 
requires better understanding how plan attributes other than price influence plan choice.”  
 
 Researchers have made considerable efforts to study the dimensions of quality 
that matter to consumers in the context of health plan and provider choices (MChernew 
and Scanlon, 1998; Farley, Short, Elliot, Kanouse, Brown, Hays, 2002; Scanlon and 
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Chernew, 1999; Scanlon, Chernew, McLaughlin, and Solon, 2002; Schultz, Call, 
Feldman, and Christianson, 2001). Standardized and publicly reported data on health plan 
quality have become available. However, most of the existing studies on quality and plan 
choice do not directly examine the effect of consumers’ private information on plan 
quality.   
 
 Zeithaml (1988) posits that consumer’s purchasing behavior depends on overall 
judgment of a product with collective information from simple product attributes to 
personal values. Then individual judgment is made with the personalized formulation 
weighting the information items differentially. Foster et al. (2010) suggest that consumer 
purchasing behavior involves highly subjective assessments that are made within 
personal systems of decision rules. Better understanding of consumer valuation of the 
product can contribute to more precise and optimal health plan management, and help 
policymakers to enhance consumer engagement and optimize health outcomes. 
Therefore, in this study, I argue that consumer valuation can be identified as the quality 
information that influences consumer’s purchasing behaviors within a personal decision 
system.  
 
 In this line of research, the commonly employed method is the neoclassical 
economic approach, modeling the probability that an individual makes the choice 
decision as a function of price, quality and other attributes that are believed to influence 
the decision making process. This class of models is appropriate when choice is of a 
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binary or discrete nature (Scanlon, Chernew and Lave, 1997). However, consumers’ 
valuations of alternative options are likely to be complicated by the uncertainty of the 
situation, number of options, and the complexity of decision-making environment. Foster 
et al. (2010) suggests that consumers have their own interpretations about what the 
choices entail, and tend to make rankings between rival bundles of goods or bundles of 
product characteristics. A consumer’s purchasing decision involves forming expectations 
about rival bundles based on the consumer’s valuation of the product characteristics 
(Foster et al., 2010).  
 
 In many enrolled health plans, consumers also are offered the optional coverage 
such as prescription drugs coverage, dental care, and vision care. The optional choices of 
coverage are offered to meet personal and family’s health needs. The coverage options 
vary in types and numbers across health plans. This is most common in employer-based 
insurance where the employer decide the options offered to the employee, which may be 
compounded with individual perceptions and willingness to choose. Moreover, the 
coverage options offered by an individual health plan are not substitutes but are 
complementary to each other. Thus when consumers make choices of coverage options in 
the bundled forms, they choose from one particular option to all of the offered coverage 
options.  In making a choice among the optional coverage options offered by the realized 
enrolled plan that consumers report, consumer decisions are more likely to rely on 
personal valuation. Therefore, consumer choice of health insurance coverage bundles is 
considered more appropriate to understanding the role of consumer valuation.   
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 To my knowledge, this is the first study examining the role of consumer 
perception and valuation in making choices among coverage bundles. This study is 
innovative in three ways. First, instead of studying health plan choices, I study how 
consumers make choices among health insurance coverage bundles offered by the 
enrolled health plan. Coverage type has been found to be significantly associated with 
health plan choice (Short and Taylor, 1989). However, in an enrolled plan, consumer also 
needs to choose coverage options. In making a choice among coverage options offered by 
the enrolled plan, consumer decisions will be more likely to rely on personal valuation. 
Second, instead of studying “discrete” plan choices, the choice set in this study is health 
insurance coverage bundles in an order from the least complete to the most complete. The 
ordinal bundle choice design in this study follows the nature of survey, from which the 
available information on coverage options including prescription, dental and vision care 
are obtained and bundled in an order from one to three. Third, instead of examining the 
effect of publicized health plan quality indicators or any quality proxy, I use consumer 
satisfaction with the enrolled health plan to directly examine the effect of consumer’s 
private information within a personal decision system.  
 
 To estimate the effect of consumer perception on the consumer purchasing 
decision, I further apply the Bayesian learning process in the generalized ordered logit 
model (Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon, 2008). The Bayesian learning process 
posits that consumers apply past quality perception to form present choice. In this model, 
each individual makes his or her coverage bundle choice in the enrolled health plan each 
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year (past and present years) to achieve expected utility maximization. Expected utility is 
a function of plan price, perceived quality, and other observed and unobserved plan and 
individual characteristics.  
 
 The specific hypotheses are as follows: 
H1: Consumer satisfaction (consumer subjective plan rating) influences consumers’ 
coverage bundle choice.  
H2: Past experiences in plan rating and bundle choice influence consumers’ present 
coverage bundle choice.  
H3: Changes in consumer satisfaction influence the changes in bundle choices. 
 
 I use the Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data for the period 2002–
2009. The data sample is nationally representative of the noninstitutionalized civilian 
population. It provides population characteristics and individual plan information 
including coverage options that are required for this study. The unique panel design of 
the MEPS data allows me to obtain a sample population that was followed for two years, 
in which the learning process can take effect within the individuals.   
 
 This paper begins with a literature review, then describes the data and variables. 
Section 4 outlines the empirical strategies. Section 5 presents the results in more detail. 
Section 6 concludes and discusses implications of the findings.   
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IV.2. Literature Review  
 
IV.2.1 Studies of Consumer Choice  
 
 Existing studies of consumer choice in health insurance markets mainly focus on 
health plan choice making. The common assumption made in these studies is that 
consumers make informed choices based on the costs and quality of competing health 
plans. Thus consumer choice of health plan implies consumers are cognizant of the 
relevant features of the health plans under consideration, and that they carefully weigh 
the health risks they face and the potential costs of the medical care that they may 
consume. It is assumed that the consumers are risk averse and the consumer utility 
function assigns a level of satisfaction to different possible standards of wealth or health. 
Health uncertainty leads consumers to choose the health plan that maximizes expected 
utility. The consumer’s utility function also has been extended to include preferences for 
insurance benefit packages such as healthcare provider choices (Scanlon et al., 1997). 
Through literature review, the studies of health plan choices appear to have evolved in 
two branches.  
 
 In one branch of plan choice studies, research focused on estimating the price 
elasticity of health plan choices (Buchmueller and Feldstein, 1996; Feldman, Finch, 
Dowd, and Cassou, 1989; Long, Settle, and Wrightson, 1988; Mcguire, 1981; Short and 
Taylor, 1989; Welch, 1986). These studies pertain to indemnity plan enrollment and 
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examine price effects such as out-of-pocket premiums, deductibles, co-insurance rates, 
and benefit structure as the key determinants of plan choice. These studies consistently 
find a significant and negative relationship between plan price and plan enrollment 
ranging from -0.1 to -0.8. In estimating the price elasticity, most researchers have been 
unable to control for differences in enrollees’ perceptions of health plan quality 
explicitly. If plan premiums and plan qualities are correlated, and if differences in plan 
qualities are not observable to the researcher, then estimates of the price elasticity may be 
biased (Beaulieu, 2002; Harris and Keane, 1999).  
 
 Very few studies have attempted to quantify the effects of other non-price 
characteristics on plan choice. In their comprehensive literature review of the health plan 
choice literature, Scanlon and his colleagues present a framework for understanding the 
factors that impact plan choices (Scanlon, Chernew, and Lave, 1997). They identify a set 
of primary variables representing attributes of health plans that directly impact health 
plan choice, including price, quality, choice of provider, benefit design coverage, and 
convenience. The set of secondary variables representing consumer characteristics also 
are identified, including consumer demographics and health status. The secondary 
variables are considered to impact health plan choice indirectly by affecting the effects of 
primary variables. The secondary variables are sometimes viewed as the proxy for the 
importance of primary variables.  
 
 While studies of price effects on health plan choices have continued to explore the 
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most appropriate methodologies over the last two decades, another branch of studies is 
evolving. A small but growing body of literature has looked at plan performance 
information for consumers in plan choice decision-making (Chernew and Scanlon, 1998; 
Farley, Short, Elliot, Kanouse, Brown, Hays, 2002; Scanlon and Chernew, 1999; 
Scanlon, Chernew, McLaughlin, and Solon, 2002; Schultz, Call, Feldman, and 
Christianson, 2001).   
 
 These studies are consumer information based and mainly focus on the effect of 
report cards on consumer choice in health insurance markets. Chernew and Scanlon 
(1998) examine the cross-sectional relationship between report card ratings of plan 
performance and plan choice. However, they do not detect the hypothesized relationship 
between these two. They conclude that the omitted plan traits may bias the results 
because of the correlation between the unobserved attributes and the ratings. Farley et al. 
(2002) conducted a study to examine the effect of report card on plan choice for 
Medicaid enrollees. The authors find that only 50% of the survey respondents reported 
receiving and reading the report card, and the report card had very limited effect on 
enrollment. The authors conclude that although commercially insured individuals are 
better educated, they may receive information from other sources and be less likely to 
respond to the report cards. Nevertheless, Spranca et al. (2000) tells another story of 
report card perception, stating that reporting plan quality increases the likelihood that 
lower priced plans will be chosen over higher priced plans. Beaulieu (2002) also finds a 
small effect of reported quality and satisfaction on the likelihood of plan switching.  
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 Even fewer studies examine the effect of other important factors in plan choice. 
For example, there are several studies that have examined the effect of coverage on plan 
choice including dental, drug, mental health and preventive care (Feldman, Finch, Dowd, 
and Cassou, 1989; Short and Taylor, 1989; Welch, 1986); there are also two studies that 
examine the convenience of the plan choices (Feldman, Finch, Dowd, and Cassou, 1989; 
Juba, 1980); in Feldman et al.’s study, the authors examine the effect of enrollees’ ability 
to choose physicians on plan choice (Feldman, Finch, Dowd, and Cassou, 1989). Aside 
from these studies, there are also several studies indicating that consumers find process 
measures of consumer satisfaction to be the most useful, because they can infer the 
meaning of measures such as overall satisfaction and time spent with the physician 
(Edgman-Levitan, 1996; Hibbard and Jewett, 1996, 1997; Sainfort and Booske, 1996; 
Tumlinson, Bottigheimer, Mahoney, Stone, and Hendricks, 1997). 
 
 The literature review shows that the mainstream studies of consumer choice-
making rely on information about plan quality provided to consumers. However, the 
major body of previous studies generally ignores consumer subjective assessments within 
personal systems of decision rules and only stresses the importance of comprehensive 
quality measures (HEDIS measures and patient reports of quality through the CAHPS 
survey).  
 
 In consumer-centered healthcare regimes, optimal health care management calls 
for more and more attention to consumers’ needs and preferences. Foster et al. (2010) 
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suggests that consumer health decision-making may also involve highly subjective 
assessments that are made within personal systems of decision rules. Better 
understanding of consumer valuation can contribute to more precise and optimal health 
plan management, and facilitate policymakers in enhancing consumer engagement and in 
optimizing health outcomes.  
 
IV.2.2 Healthcare Quality Measurement  
 
 The quality measure has multidimensional forms. The most commonly studied 
quality measures are the report cards or the HEDIS measurement of plan performance 
(Beaulieu, 2002). The Healthcare Effectiveness Data and Information Set (HEDIS) is 
produced by the National Committee on Quality Assurance (NCQA) to provide 
assessment of quality of care, access to care, and member satisfaction. The HEDIS score 
is designed for large purchasers in order to provide quality and cost information when 
making plan choices (Hibbard and Jewett, 1996). In addition, the Consumer Assessment 
of Healthcare Providers and Systems (CAHPS) survey collects consumer data measuring 
consumer perceptions about the quality of the health plan.  
 
 In order to better inform consumers, report cards were introduced in the mid-
1980s17. Report cards translate quality information that measures various aspects of a 
healthcare system (hospital quality, health plan quality, the quality of healthcare 
                                                        
17 http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Health_care_provider_ratings 
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providers, and patient experiences) into simplified ratings that are understandable to 
consumers. Many studies of report cards conclude that report cards expand consumers’ 
ability to make optimal purchasing decisions. However, some studies argue that report 
cards do not explain plan choice very well because they are not designed to capture the 
variation in perceptions. A 2008 survey (Kaiser Family Foundation) of public awareness 
and use of quality reports found less than 20% of Americans had seen quality information 
about hospitals and physicians, and only 7% of them reported use of quality information 
to make a decision. A number of studies that examine how consumers use report cards 
show that, on average, consumers spent 30 minutes reviewing the information. Less than 
40% of the consumers who read the quality information reported the quality information 
to be useful. The authors also find that individuals without exposure to quality 
information moved from lower to higher quality plans as much as those with quality 
information. (Farley, Short, Elliott, Kanouse, Brown, and Hays, 2002).  
 
 Consumers are found to obtain information largely from many informal sources 
such as friends and family, social networks and the internet. Moreover, individual 
valuation of a homogenous product varies, depending on individual heterogeneities 
related to age, gender, race, individual experiences, beliefs/religion, cultural background, 
and family history (Harris, Schultz, and Feldman, 2002). In his classic work of 
“Consumer perceptions of price, quality, and value,” Zeithaml (1988) states that quality 
is not simply an array of product attributes but a higher level of abstraction that is 
differently perceived by different individuals. Behavioral economics posits that 
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consumers collect information at various levels of abstraction ranging from simple 
product attributes to personal values, then make overall judgments with the personalized 
formulation weighting the information items differentially. Product value is thus the type 
of perceived quality that “I get for the price I pay and I get for what I give.” It involves a 
mental calculation of loss and gain when making purchasing decisions (Zeithaml, 1988). 
For example, spending $50 on a monthly out-of-pocket premium could be perceived as 
either expensive or cheap depending on individual valuation. Quality is value-based and 
subjective. Consumer rated satisfaction represents consumer’s personal experience with 
the plan, implying individual valuation.  
 
 Compared with more comprehensive quality measurements and report cards, the 
subjective measure of plan quality at the individual level has been under-stressed. 
Consumer perception in its subjective measure of consumer satisfaction may be 
scientifically ambiguous but psychologically informative at the person level. Unlike the 
report cards influencing the individual decision-making processes by providing objective 
information, consumer perception enters the decision making process naturally and often 
times subconsciously. Therefore there is no concern about information underuse. Since 
individuals infer from their past experience, the decision-making process is consistent 
within each individual, ensuring internal validity. Capturing the effect of consumer 
perception in the decision-making process may further help to inform the development of 
report cards and increase the uptake of quality information.    
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IV.2.3 Health Insurance Purchasing Behavior  
 
 In studies of consumer behavior in health insurance markets, consumers’ choice 
of health plan has policy implications for improving health plan management. However, 
in consumer-centered health insurance markets, analyzing consumer demand for health 
insurance should not be limited to the choices of health plan. When consumers are 
enrolled in health plans, they may also face choices for coverage. Some studies find that 
coverage is strongly associated with plan choice (Wedig and Tai-Seale, 2002). Instead of 
observing consumers' choice of health plan, the current study attempts to examine 
consumers’ choice of coverage options in an enrolled plan. Selection of coverage options 
is correlated with, but different from, the selection of health plan. The choice of health 
plan has been reported to be correlated with plan characteristics such as price and quality; 
however, given the choice of health plan, in the selection of coverage option consumer 
perception may play a more important role than objective plan characteristics.  
 
IV.2.4 A New Idea  
 
 Therefore, I conduct this study to explore the role of consumer perception in the 
consumer decision-making process in a setting where consumer behaviors are more likely 
to be triggered by consumer valuation of their choices. This study is different from 
conventional studies of plan quality.  
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 First, I study consumer’s purchasing decision among insurance coverage bundles 
instead of health plan choices. Coverage type had been found to be significantly 
associated with consumer plan choice (Short and Taylor, 1989). However, there are no 
studies conducted that test the choice of coverage types given the enrolled plan. Choosing 
coverage given the enrolled plan, consumers will be more likely to rely on personal 
valuation compared with health plan choice making. This is because the choice of 
coverage is not directly competitive in price but instead is a comprehensive valuation 
about needs.  
 
 Second, the choice set of coverage bundle is ordinal. This choice design follows 
the nature of survey questions, from which we obtain the available information on 
coverage options including prescription, dental and vision care. Then the bundle choices 
are formed based on the numbers of chosen coverage options. Unlike the choices of 
health plan in the competitive market setting where price effect is dominating, coverage 
bundle choices gain more weight from consumers’ personal valuation18.  
 
 Third, I use consumers’ perceived quality as the main reason to explain consumer 
decisions within this personal value system. Consumer satisfaction featured as patient 
satisfaction in health services research has been widely studied for healthcare outcomes 
(Rosenthale, 1994), but not commonly studied in health insurance choice making. In this 
                                                        
18 Studying consumer’s choices of optional coverage creates a setting that is similar to the ACA 
environment in which the effect of price is restricted by government regulations. In making a 
choice among the optional coverage options offered by the enrolled plan, consumer decisions are 
more likely to rely on personal valuation. 
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study of health insurance coverage bundle choices, instead of using the publicized quality 
measures, the main effect of consumer satisfaction based on individual experience with 
the plan is more appropriate to use to discover consumers’ decision-making in their 
personal valuation systems. 
 
IV.3. Data and Variables  
 
IV.3.1 Data  
 
 The Medical Expenditure Panel Survey (MEPS) data provides national and 
regional estimates of annual health services utilization, medical expenditures, payment 
source and health insurance for the U.S. civilian non-institutionalized population. I 
integrate the full-year population characteristics files, job files, person-round-plan files, 
and risk adjustment scores files in the MEPS household component along with the pooled 
linkage file. The MEPS data has an overlapping panel design, by which individuals are 
interviewed five times across two years.  It allows me to obtain a sample population who 
are followed for two consecutive years. The individuals included are (1) between 18 and 
64 years of age, (2) privately insured, and (3) policy holders only, (4) covered by a single 
policy at the time of the first interview and then (5) followed for two consecutive years. 
The subjects were studied between 2002 and 2009.  
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 The study sample at the person-level comprises a total of 10,492 individuals. It 
consists of information on age, sex, ethnicity, income level, education, marital status, 
number of dependents, health status, employment status, health insurance status, plan 
type, health plan coverage options, monthly out-of-pocket premium, premium subsidy, 
and most importantly, consumer satisfaction (plan ratings).   
 
 The statistical analysis tool used for this study is STATA 12.0. All analyses are 
run on the full sample of data incorporating weights to adjust for complex survey design. 
Since the MEPS data is open for public use, this study is exempt from Institutional 
Review Board approval.   
 
IV.3.2 Variables  
 
IV.3.2.1 The Outcome Variable 
 
 The coverage bundle choice is a constructed outcome variable. It is an ordinal 
variable indicating the number of coverage options that each individual chose. In the 
study sample, 92% of the study population bought coverage for prescription drugs, 68% 
bought dental coverage, and about 60% bought vision care coverage. These three types of 
coverage are chosen to construct the coverage bundle because they are the most 
prevalently purchased and have the most available information in MEPS. Therefore, to 
construct coverage bundle choices the coverage options must satisfy that (1) the coverage 
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was offered by the enrolled health plan and (2) the coverage had been chosen by the 
individual.  
 
 Making the choice of coverage is not equivalent to making the choice of health 
plan. The coverage options within a health plan are not substitutes (competitive) but 
rather complementary to each other. Consumers are not selecting alternatives from 
discrete choice sets. Instead, consumers make choices in a sense of order. Among the 
offered coverage options in the enrolled health plans, prescription drug is the most 
prevalent coverage options chosen by consumers. Consumers choosing vision and/or 
dental care often complement to prescription drugs depending on their specific health 
needs. Therefore, the choice structure of coverage options appears ordinal, choosing from 
any one of the offered coverage options to all of the offered coverage options. There are 
three levels of coverage bundles for this study: bundle I is the least complete bundle 
choice indicating any one type of insurance coverage was purchased; bundle II indicates 
any two types of insurance coverage out of three were purchased; and bundle III is the 
most complete bundle choice indicating all three listed insurance coverage options were 
purchased.  
 
 Individuals who did not choose any of the coverage options are excluded for two 
reasons.  On one hand, not all health plans offer supplemental coverage options. 
Individuals did not report any coverage options may be because these options were not 
offered. On the other hand, it is also likely that individuals chose not to take any coverage 
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options even if they were offered. However, it is a very small portion of individuals (less 
than 2%) in this study sample and it represents consumer’s extreme preferences towards 
health insurance. It is hardly to be generalized and provide meaningful policy 
implications.    
 
IV.3.2.2 The Main Effect of Consumer Satisfaction 
 
 Consumer perception indicates consumer valuation within personal system of 
decision-making. To study consumer perception and its role in the consumer decision-
making process, there are two perception measurements I have chosen: consumer 
satisfaction and consumer attitude. Consumer attitude had been studied in Chapter II. 
This study evaluates the effect of another type of private information, consumer 
perceived plan quality - consumer satisfaction.  
 
MEPS data contain comparative and descriptive information on the individual 
experiences with his or her enrolled plan. The survey asks the individuals to rate their 
experiences with the plan from 0 to 10, where 0 is the worst health plan possible and 10 
is the best health plan possible. I group the rating scores into three categories representing 
the consumer’s satisfaction level: poor (0–4), fair/good (5–7), and excellent (8–10).  
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IV.3.2.3 The Covariates  
 
 I include a series of covariates representing the cognitive process of an individual 
making a coverage bundle choice, where each variable can independently predict the 
selection of coverage bundle.  
 
 The predisposing variables include age, gender, ethnicity, marital status, and 
whether the individual has dependents. They associate with the individual’s lifestyle and 
the physical and social status that may impact the individual’s behavioral patterns.  
 
 Resources such as income and employment status enable the individuals to obtain 
health insurance or engage in health-related behaviors. A positive relationship between 
income and the use of health services is assumed. Education level can also be an enabling 
factor that influences health-related behaviors.  
 
 There are other factors influencing the choice of health insurance coverage, 
including the services provided, choice of healthcare providers, price and other fees. Ex-
post experience with the plan also influences individuals in making coverage bundle 
choices.  
 
 To avoid collinearity among the covariates, the selected covariates include 
ethnicity, whether the individual has dependents, monthly OOP, whether the premium 
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was subsidized, income level, and geographic region. Age and sex are not included 
because the risk-adjustment approach used for the analysis takes into account the effects 
of age and sex. 
 
IV.4 Empirical Strategies: The Choice Model and the Extended Forms  
 
 The purpose of this study is to examine consumer’s choice of coverage in 
responses to consumer rated satisfaction with the plan. The Bayesian learning process 
(Chernew, Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon, 2008) incorporates the idea that consumers use 
perceived plan quality from the past to make present choices. Because the outcome for 
this study is the ordinal coverage bundle choice, the traditional method of modeling 
discrete choice is not appropriate. Therefore, the ordered logit is employed. In what 
follows, I explain the ordered logit model development from the simplest form of binary 
choice probability to a series of binary choices for the ordinal choice model.  
 
IV.4.1 From Binary Logit to Ordered Logit  
 
                For each coverage bundle choice, there is a vector of characteristics for 
consumers to consider in their purchasing decisions. Let  represent individual  
utility from choosing coverage bundle  in year . In the Bayesian learning model, 
consumers learn from past experience to facilitate current decision-making. For the two-
year data, I denote year  as “past” and year  as “present.” Assuming individual’s 
U ijt i' s
j t
t −1 t
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present coverage bundle choice depends on his/her past experience and past bundle 
choice, consumer’s utility is a linear function of individual characteristics , plan 
characteristics , and the individual’s past experience 
. 
  
                
 
 Individual’s past experiences vary across coverage bundles, and is the 
coefficient of individual’s past experience allowing the effect of past experiences to vary 
among coverage bundles. Consumer characteristics are assumed consistent within the 
individual but vary across coverage bundles.  is the coefficient of individual 
heterogeneity.  represents the average individual valuation of plan characteristics. In 
this utility function, the stochastic term captures unobserved factors in each choice 
situation and other idiosyncratic measurement errors.  
 
 An individual making choice maximizes his or her utility. When facing binary 
choices, given the x’s, the and the , the probability that an individual  
chooses plan j in year t is  
 
                    
 
 Under the standard extreme value assumptions, the probability that individual  
wij
s jt xij(t−1)
Uijt = xij (t−1)β + wijγ + s jtλ +εijt, i =1,..., N; j =1,..., J;t =1, 2 (1)
β
γ
δ
εijt
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pijt = Pr ob(Uijt >Uikt )
= Pr ob[(εijt −εikt ) > β(xikt − xijt )+γ(wik − wij )+ λ(skt − s jt )], k =1,..., K (2)
i
  
 
144
chooses coverage bundle takes the form of 
 
                          
 
 
 In this study, the coverage bundle choice is an order of coverage bundles from 1 
to 3, indicating individuals makes choices from the least to the most complete coverage 
bundles. The binary choice model is not appropriate for the ordinal outcome. Therefore, 
the ordered logit model is employed.  
 
 The ordered logit can be thought of as the cumulative probability that individual  
choosing bundle  versus all lower or higher categories: 
 
where is the coverage bundle that the individual  chooses and takes on values 1 
through J. is the cumulative probability that individual  chooses bundle  or 
higher. The simplified ordered logit model is presented as follows:  
 
  
j
P(pijt =1 | β,γ,λ) =
exp x ij(t−1)β + wijγ + s jtλ + εijt{ }
exp x ik(t−1)β + wikγ + sktλ + εikt{ }
k=1
K
∑
(3)
i
j
Cij = Pr ob(yi ≤ j) = Pr ob(yi = j)
j=1
J
∑ , j =1,2,..., J (4)
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Cij i j
log it(Cij ) = log
Cij
1− Cij

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IV.4.2 The Generalized Ordered Logit  
    
 Take a simple form of the cumulative logit as a linear function of independent 
variables: 
 
  
The ordered logit model is also called the parallel-lines model, for which the proportional 
odds assumption is made, requiring each independent variable to have an identical effect 
at each cumulative split of the ordinal dependent variable, where the ’s are the same for 
all values of . However, this assumption is often violated in practice. It is common for 
one or more of the ’s to differ across a particular choice of .  
 
 To detect whether the proportional odds assumption is violated in the ordered 
logit regression, the Brant test 19  can be conducted (Williams, 2006). The Brant test 
provides both a global test of whether any variable violates the proportional odds 
assumption, and the tests for each variable separately. If there is evidence of proportional 
odds assumption violation, then the generalized ordered logit can be introduced to 
overcome the limitations of the proportional odds assumption violation (Williams, 2006). 
 
 The generalized ordered logit model can be specified as follows (Williams, 2006): 
                                                        
19 The approximate likelihood-ratio test of proportionality of odds across response categories will 
be reported by Brant test. A significant test statistic provides evidence that the parallel regression 
assumption has been violated.  
logit(Cij ) = α j + Xiβ j (6)
β
j
β j
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where M is the number of categories of the ordinal dependent variable. The probabilities 
that the choice Y will take on each of the values of (1, 2, …, M-1) are equal to 
 
 
 
When M=2, the generalized logit model is equivalent to the binary regression model. 
When M>2, the generalized logit model takes the form of a series of binary logistic 
regressions where categories of the dependent variable are combined comparing the 
higher values on the explanatory variable to the lower category. For example, if M=3, 
then for j=1 category 1 is contrasted with categories 2 and 3; for j=2 categories 1 and 2 
are contrasted with category 3. 
 
 The generalized model overcomes the violation of the proportional odds 
assumption by fitting partial proportional odds models, where the parallel-lines constraint 
is relaxed for those variables that violate the assumption, allowing some coefficients 
differ for . For example, applying it to the model specification in the current study, the
’s and ’s are the same for all values of j but the ’s for ’s are free to differ for plan 
.  
 
P(Yi > j) = g(Xiβ j ) = exp(α j + Xiβ j )
1+ exp(α j + Xiβ j )
, j =1, 2,..., M −1 (7)
j
P(Y i=1) =1− g(X iβ1) (8)
P(Yi = j) = g(X iβ j−1) − g(X iβ j ) (9)
P(Yi = M) = g(X iβM −1) (10)
j β
γ λ 2 s2 j
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 The gologit2 command in Stata 12.1 is used to estimate the model, with survey 
weights to account for complex survey design.  
 
IV.4.3 Identification  
 
 There are two potential concerns with this empirical analysis. First, whether the 
unobservable plan characteristics are correlated with the perceived quality. Second, 
whether there is a reversal effect of the coverage bundle choice to consumer perception. 
 
 The main goal of this study is to identify the relationship between consumer 
perceived plan quality (consumer satisfaction) and consumer purchasing behavior. It is 
not only to demonstrate the association between perceived quality and the decisions of 
purchasing coverage, but further to test the temporal relationship between consumer 
satisfaction and consumer purchasing decision. The coefficient on plan ratings will be 
identified to the extent that consumers are more likely to purchase a coverage bundle with 
particular types of plan ratings. Cross-sectional analyses are not sufficient for identifying 
the effects of plan ratings on the consumer purchasing decision. However, with two 
consecutive years of data, estimation of consumer purchasing behavior in which the 
P(Yi > j) = g(xij (t−1)β + wijγ + s jtλ +εijt )
=
exp(xij (t−1)β + wijγ + s jt1 λ1 + s jt2 λ j2 +εijt )
1+ exp(xij (t−1)β + wijγ + s jt1 λ1 + s jt2 λ j2 +εijt )
, j =1, 2,...M −1 (11)
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effects of consumer satisfaction can be separately identified from other plan 
characteristics is possible.  
 
 I include past plan ratings (the past experiences with the plan). Endogeneity 
would occur if particular ratings or changes in ratings are correlated with changes in 
unobserved plan characteristics. There is the concern of consumer taste heterogeneity; for 
example, some individuals who receive poor care but have low standards may report the 
same satisfaction as those who receive good care but have unreasonably high standards, 
and as a result, these two types of individuals may end up with the same type of bundle 
choice. However, it is unlikely that particular plan ratings (consumer satisfaction) would 
change unobserved plan characteristics and plans are unlikely to react to consumer 
ratings by changing their unobserved characteristics. Therefore endogeneity is unlikely to 
occur for consumer satisfaction (Chernew Gowrisankaran, and Scanlon,, 2008; Scanlon, 
Chernew, McLaughlin, and Solon 2002).  
 
 Another concern is the reversal effect of the purchasing decision on consumer 
satisfaction. That is, whether consumers’ perception of plan quality is influenced by 
his/her purchasing decision. For example, although the plan’s performance did not meet 
the certain level of qualification criteria, some individuals may still tend to rate their plan 
high only because they are enrolled in this plan. The individuals have the tendency to 
rationalize their perception based on the choices they had made.   
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 These concerns in fact reflect exactly consumer valuation in decision-making. 
There are two strategies to overcome the potential confounding effects between consumer 
satisfaction and consumer purchasing decision. First, to reduce individual variation when 
estimating the effect of consumer satisfaction, I categorize the rating scores into three 
distinct levels. Plan ratings within a defined score range will be considered as one level of 
satisfaction. Unless there is a shock of health or financial conditions, individuals’ 
perception should be consistent over the course of study. Thus any change within the 
satisfaction level will not affect consumer bundle choice. Even though consumers’ 
perception may not accurately reflect the actual plan performance, the consistency of 
consumer perception within the individual is guaranteed, thus the effect of consumer 
satisfaction on consumer purchasing decision is guaranteed. Second, to examine the 
potential reverse effect of consumer purchasing decision on satisfaction, I will test the 
effect of consumer choice on satisfaction as well. If consumer choice also influences 
consumer satisfaction, then the relationship between consumer perception and consumer 
choice should be interpreted cautiously.   
 
IV.5 Results  
 
 The data for this empirical study is collected from MEPS from 2002 to 2009.  
There are a total of 10,492 individuals who are privately insured with only one policy at 
the time of first interview. The mean age of the sample population is 45, 14% are poor, 
43% are male, and 39% are HMO enrollees. 
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IV.5.1 Health Insurance Coverage Bundle Choice  
 
 Table IV.1 presents the distribution of coverage options for coverage bundle 
choices.  In the study population, 96% purchased prescription drug coverage, 71% bought 
dental care, and 63% bought vision care. In the form of bundle choices, about 20% 
purchased bundle I (N=2,050), about 28% purchased bundle II (N=2,891), and about 
53% purchased bundle III (N=5,551).  Among those who purchased prescription drugs 
coverage, 54% also bought dental and vision, 27% bought any one of dental or vision 
insurance; and only 18% chose the coverage of prescription drugs only. Among those 
who purchased dental coverage (71%), 73% also bought the other two coverage options, 
25% chose to buy any one of prescription or vision insurance, and only about 2% bought 
dental coverage only. Among those who purchased vision insurance (63%), 83% also 
bought the two other coverage options; 16% chose to buy any one of prescription or 
dental insurance; less than 1% bought vision care only. Table IV.1 shows that 
prescription drugs were commonly bought by all privately insured consumers. Very few 
individuals in the study sample chose to buy dental or vision insurance separately from 
the coverage of prescription drugs. Compared with dental insurance, even fewer chose to 
buy vision insurance only. 
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IV.5.2 Main Effect of Consumer Satisfaction  
 
 Table IV.2 presents the distribution of plan ratings across coverage bundle 
choices. About 11% of the study population rated their plan "Poor," among which 45% 
bought the complete coverage bundles. About 51% of the study population rated their 
plan "Fair or Good," among which 53% bought the complete coverage bundle. About 
38% of the consumers rated their plan "Excellent," among which 55% of the study 
population bought the complete coverage bundle. On average, about 28% of individuals 
chose bundle II at each rating level. More than half of the individuals chose bundle III at 
each rating level except ratings of “Poor.” It seems a trend that the higher the score 
consumers rated their plans the more complete coverage bundles they purchased. 
 
IV.5.3 Plan Characteristics  
 
 Table IV.3 summarizes the comparisons of the selected plan characteristics for 
coverage bundle choices. Among those who bought bundle II and bundle III, over 40% 
are HMO enrollees, compared with 33% of HMO enrollees among those who bought 
bundle I. On average, those who bought bundle III paid $112 in monthly Out-of-Pocket 
premium, less than the monthly OOP of $141 for bundle II and $156 for bundle I. In the 
complete coverage bundle group, 91% of individuals were subsidized for their monthly 
OOP, whereas 87% and 75% of individuals were subsidized for those who chose bundle 
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II and bundle I respectively, indicating the more subsidized the less they pay for monthly 
OOP.      
 
IV.5.4 Consumer Characteristics  
 
 Table IV.4 describes individual characteristics for the study population. The mean 
ages of those who bought bundle I, II and III are 46, 45 and 44 years, respectively. There 
are Among those who bought bundle I, II, and III about 44%, 42% and 43% respectively 
are male. More than 80% of bundle I and bundle II consumers are white (83% and 81%, 
respectively), whereas 73% of bundle III consumers are white. Among bundle I 
consumers, 74% are married, compared with 70% and 68% of consumers who purchased 
bundle II and bundle IV. 30% of bundle I consumers have degrees beyond college, while 
34% of bundle II and 31% of bundle III consumers have degrees beyond college. Among 
bundle I consumers, 25% have dependents, whereas there are about 30% of consumers 
that have dependents among those who purchased bundle II and bundle III. Compared 
with 48% of bundle I consumers being high-income individuals, over half of the 
consumers who purchased bundle II and bundle III are high-income individuals (56% and 
58%, respectively). The middle-income individuals are almost equally represented across 
the three bundle choice groups (about 31%).   
 
 The sample’s regional distribution patterns are consistent across bundle choice 
groups. For example, less than 20% of consumers are in the Northeast (14%, 16%, and 
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16%); about 23% of consumers are in the Midwest (23%, 25%, and 21%); more than 
30% of consumers are in the South; and about 22% of consumers are in the West (19%, 
20%, 28%). Higher proportion indicates higher coverage rate. The South has the highest 
coverage rate for each bundle choice among all regional areas. The proportion of 
Southern residents is relatively higher among bundle I consumers than among bundle II 
and III consumers. The proportion of bundle III consumers is the highest in the West, 
whereas the proportion of bundle II consumers is the highest in the Midwest. 
 
IV.5.5 The Temporal Relationship between Plan Rating and Coverage Bundle Choice  
 
 Unlike the traditional studies of plan choice, I study the relationship between plan 
rating and coverage bundle choice in a temporal fashion; past experiences including past 
plan rating and past bundle choice may both influence the consumer’s present choice. 
One identification problem stated is that there might be a reverse effect of consumer 
bundle choice on plan rating. To examine whether there is a reverse effect of consumer 
bundle choice on plan rating, I flip the outcome with the same estimation process. The 
results in Table IV.5.1 and Table IV.5.2 present the tests for the relationship between 
plan rating and coverage bundle choices, where table IV.5.1 takes bundle choice as the 
outcome and table IV.5.2 takes plan rating as the outcome. Both models are estimated 
with the same set of independent variables.  
 
 In table IV.5.1, Model A tests the contemporaneous association between plan 
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rating and coverage bundle choices20. The results indicate that current plan ratings are 
statistically significantly associated with current coverage bundle choice. The higher the 
consumer rated the enrolled plan, the more likely for them to choose the complete bundle 
choice21 (OR=1.43, 95%CI [1.26 – 1.62]; OR=1.30, 95% CI [1.15 – 1.46]).  
 
 
 Model B examines the effects of present and past plan rating as well as the effects 
of past bundle choice on current bundle choice. The results show that both past and 
present plan ratings are significantly associated with current bundle choice. The effect of 
past choice of coverage bundle is strikingly significant. Those who chose bundle III in 
the past are 52 times more likely to choose bundle III at present (OR=52.18, 95% CI 
[29.20 – 93.22], p<.001) compared with those who chose bundle I. It strongly suggests 
the evidence of inertia (loyalty) in consumer’s purchasing behavior, especially for those 
who had bought the most complete coverage bundles. Most individuals in the study 
population retain their choices over the two-years. This probably is because they did not 
encounter substantial changes in life such as changes in family structure, health status, or 
work status. The studies reported the effect of health insurance on job lock (Gruber and 
Madrian, 2002), which may also help to explain the inertia.  
 
                                                        
20 Table IV.5 reports the ordered logit regression results. The ordered logit regression may be 
biased if the proportional odds assumption is violated. Therefore, this section only discusses the 
association between plan rating and coverage bundle choice. The proportional odds assumption 
will be tested in section 4.6 and the odds ratios will be reported and discussed in section 4.7.    
21 The ordered logit regressions are equivalent to a series of binary logistic regressions where the 
ordinal outcome variables will be reorganized and compared. The details will be discussed in 
sections 4.6 and 4.7.  
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 Including past bundle choice and past rating only, the results of Model C in Table 
IV.5.1 show that both past choice and past rating have significant effects on present 
coverage bundle choice. The higher they rated a plan, the more consumers were likely to 
choose the complete coverage bundle, and the more likely to stay with the more complete 
bundle choice. Consumers who rated their plan “Excellent” are 1.46 times more likely to 
buy the more complete bundle (p=0.001, OR=1.46, 95% CI [1.16 – 1.83]); consumers 
who rated their plan “Fair” are 1.26 times more likely to buy the more complete bundle 
(p=0.001, OR=1.26, 95% CI [1.02 – 1.65]). The past bundle choice remains strikingly 
significant in that consumers who bought the complete bundle choice in the past are 69 
times more likely to choose the more complete bundle choice at present. However, 
compared with those who purchased bundle III, bundle II consumers do not show 
significant willingness to upgrade their choice.  
 
 To further examine whether there is a reverse effect of bundle choices on 
consumer satisfaction, consumer satisfaction is taken as the outcome variable, controlling 
for the same set of covariates.  
 
 Table IV.5.2 presents the effects of past and present bundle choice on present plan 
ratings. Model A includes present coverage bundle choice only and the results indicate a 
significant association between present coverage bundle choice and present plan rating. It 
is consistent with the results of Model A in table IV.5.1. However, when past bundle 
choice and past plan rating are adjusted in Model B, neither past nor present bundle 
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choices are significantly correlated with present plan rating; only past plan rating is 
statistically significantly associated with present plan rating. The more satisfied with their 
past plan experience, the more likely for consumers to rate their present plan experience 
higher. Individuals rating their past plan as “Excellent” are 14 times more likely to rate 
their current plan as “Excellent” (p<0.01, OR=13.87, 95% CI [12.03 – 15.99]).  
Excluding current bundle choice in Model C, past bundle choice does not affect present 
plan rating. The results in table IV.5.2 indicate that past coverage bundle choice does not 
appear to affect present plan rating, while past plan rating does affect present bundle 
choice. No reverse effect of bundle choice to plan rating is found. The temporal effect of 
plan rating to bundle choice thus can be identified.  
 
IV.5.6 Tests for Proportional Odds Assumption  
 
 Table IV.6 shows the partial results of the Brant test. The significant test statistics 
indicate the proportional odds assumption has been violated. The effects of past bundle 
choice (bundle II), plan type and whether the premium is subsidized are not proportional 
when comparing the odds of choosing bundle II or bundle III versus the choice of bundle 
I (j=1) and the odds of choosing bundle III (j=2) versus the choice of bundle I or bundle 
II. Therefore, the generalized ordered logit is required to correct this violation. 
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IV.5.7 The Generalized Ordered Logit Regression of Bundle Choices  
 
 Table IV.7 presents the generalized ordered logit regression results for Model III 
in table IV.5.1. There are two sets of regression results reported by the generalized 
ordered logit. Panel 1 shows the regression results for the combined bundle II and bundle 
III versus bundle I. Panel 2 presents the results for bundle III versus the combination of 
bundle I and bundle II. These two pairs of comparisons can both be well perceived as 
“the more complete bundle choice” versus “the less complete bundle choice.” 
  
 The generalized ordered logit first tests the proportional odds assumption. The test 
results indicate that the model does not violate the proportional odds/parallel lines 
assumption because the violated variables had been auto-fitted (chi2=21.23, 
p>chi2=0.4447).  
 
 The heterogeneous effects of past bundle choice and whether the premium is 
subsidized are reported in two panels. It clearly shows that the past choice of bundle II 
has opposite effects in these two pairs of comparisons. In panel 1, those who purchased 
bundle II are 9.75 times more likely to choose the more complete bundles (bundle III and 
II) compared to those who purchased bundle I, while in panel 2 they are 0.18 times less 
likely to purchase the more complete bundle choice (bundle III only) compared with 
those who purchased bundle I in the past. The effect of past choice, bundle III, is found 
the same for the two comparisons: individuals who purchased bundle III in the past are 
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19.54 times more likely to choose the more complete bundle choice compared with those 
who purchased bundle I.  
 
 This discrepancy in past choices of bundle II actually makes intuitive sense. It 
shows consumers’ intention to stay with their past choices. The past bundle II customers 
tend to choose the more complete bundle when current choice of bundle II is grouped in a 
more complete bundle choice, while they tend to choose the less complete bundle when 
current bundle II is grouped in a less complete bundle choice. It seems that the choice of 
bundle II dominates.  However, the magnitude of odds ratios suggests that, after all, 
people would like to purchase a more complete bundle (OR=9.75 v. OR=0.18, chi-
sq=267.78, p<.001).    
 
 A one thousand dollars increase in enrollee premium decreases the odds of 
purchasing a more complete bundle choice by 28%. Consumers with a subsidized health 
insurance premium are more likely to buy a more complete coverage bundle. When 
bundle II is included in the more complete bundle choice, individuals are more likely to 
purchase a more complete coverage bundle compared to bundle III only (OR=1.76 v. 
OR=1.32, chi-sq=7.78, p=0.005). This indicates that bundle II is more attractive than 
bundle III to consumers when making a decision to purchase the more complete coverage 
bundle. It might be because bundle II is more cost efficient even though bundle III is the 
most prevalent choice (53%).       
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 Table IV.7 also shows that individuals who are employed are 1.35 times more 
likely to purchase a more complete coverage bundle compared with those who are not 
employed (OR=1.35, 95% CI=[1.12 – 1.62]). It is obvious that the coverage options are 
more available and more affordable for the employed. 
 
 Having dependents is one of the most important reasons for consumers to buy 
health insurance and is directly related to the choice of coverage options. The results 
indicate that those who have any dependent are 1.30 times more likely to buy a more 
complete coverage bundle compared with those who do not have any dependents 
(OR=1.30, 95% CI [1.11 – 1.53], p=0.001). 
 
 Studies show that income has been the most important financial indicator for 
consumer purchasing behaviors. After controlling for other covariates, consumers who 
have higher income are more likely to purchase more complete coverage bundles 
compared with low-income consumers. It is interesting to note that, in this study, the 
middle-income individuals are even a little more likely to buy more the complete 
coverage bundle compared with the high-income individuals (OR=1.36 v. OR=1.19). 
This may be because the high-income individuals would rather buy relatively more 
expensive but independent dental or vision insurance not offered by their major health 
plans controlling for other plan and individual characteristics.  
 
 The results show that plan premium is also associated with coverage bundle 
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choices (OR=0.72, 95% CI=[0.52 – 1.02], p=0.066); a one thousand dollar increase in 
enrollee premium will decrease the odds of choosing the more complete coverage bundle 
by 28%. However, the effect is significant only at the 10% confidence level. The bundle 
choice does not seem related to plan type (OR=0.98, 95% CI=[0.86 – 1.11], p=0.725). 
This is consistent with the hypotheses that the coverage bundle choice within a plan is not 
price sensitive but more sensitive to individual valuations.  
 
 Above all, we can conclude that, first, individuals making choice of health plans 
and making choice of coverage bundles within the enrolled plans are two distinct sets of 
decision-making, and that consumers make the decisions with different strategies. Once 
enrolled in a plan, plan price and plan type do not appear relevant to coverage bundle 
choice, whereas contemporaneous employment status, income levels, premium subsidy, 
and dependents play more important roles. Plan ratings as perceived plan quality play a 
persistently significant role in explaining consumers’ coverage bundle choice. The effects 
of past bundle choice indicate strong evidence of inertia.     
 
IV.5.8 Changes of Bundle Choice in Response to Changes in Perception  
 
 The analyses in section 4.7 show that consumer satisfaction influences 
consumers’ decision of coverage bundle choice. Consumers also experienced substantial 
inertia with their choices. To better understand the effect of consumer perception on their 
  
 
161
choice decision, it is necessary to examine the changes in bundle choices in response to 
the changes in ratings, adjusting for the same set of covariates.  
 
 Since the individuals in this study sample were followed for two years, I am able 
to observe the changes in consumers’ choices over two years. The advantage of capturing 
the changes in choice decisions is that I could differentiate out unobserved factors that 
may be correlated with time, leaving out the changes in consumer satisfaction without 
concern for whether it is present or past. So differencing equation (1) between the 2 years 
yields  
 
 
 
where denotes the change from  (past) to  (present); denotes the change in plan 
characteristics (e.g., plan type); is still the individual characteristics; plus an 
idiosyncratic error . In this scenario, the individuals choose to change their coverage 
bundle choices to maximize their utilities. Given the X’s, the probability  that an 
individual  chooses plan  is  
 
 
 
In this analysis, the outcome is a binary variable indicating any change in bundle choices.  
 
 Table IV.8 presents the logistic regression results for the change in bundle choices 
Uij = Xij ′β + wij ′γ + S j ′λ + eij, i =1,..., N; j =1,..., J (12)
X t −1 t S
w
e
dij
i j
dij = prob(Uij >Uik )
= prob[(eij − eik ) > ′β (Xik − Xij )+ ′γ (wik − wij + ′λ (Sk − S j )], (13)
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in response to the change in plan ratings for all consumers (Model A) and for those who 
did not change plan (Model B). “Changes” is coded a 1 if any change occurred, and 0 
otherwise.  
 
 Model A regresses the changes in bundle choices on the changes in plan ratings, 
adjusting for the changes in plan types and the changes in employment status. It shows 
that any changes in plan ratings increase the odds of changing bundle choices by 20% 
(p=0.01, OR=1.21, 95% CI [1.05 – 1.38]); a change of plan type makes a person 7.95 
times more likely to change bundle choice, indicating bundle choice is strongly 
associated with plan type (p<.001, OR=7.95, 95% CI [6.78 – 9.31]); and having a 
dependent reduces the odds of changing bundle choice by 19% (p=0.02, OR=0.81, 95% 
CI [0.69 – 0.97]). Except for changes in plan rating, changes in plan type, and whether 
there is a dependent, all other factors do not appear to be significantly associated with the 
change in bundle choice. When it comes to the decision to change bundle choice, 
consumers do not respond to income level.  
 
 Given that consumers who change plans are very likely to change bundle choice 
(OR=7.95), it’s interesting to further examine consumer’s behavior if they did not change 
their plan. Model B in table IV.8 shows results of a similar analysis for those who did not 
change their plan over the two years. The results show that, adjusting for current 
employment status and plan type, change in plan ratings becomes the single most 
significant factor associated with changes in bundle choices. Consumers who perceived 
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plan quality change are 1.33 times more likely to change bundle choices compared with 
those who did not perceive any change in plan quality (p=0.001, OR=1.33, 95% CI [1.13 
– 1.56]). For those who did not change their plan, changes in plan ratings show stronger 
significance in association with changes in bundle choices (OR=1.33, p=0.001 v. 
OR=1.02, p=0.01). Except for changes in plan ratings, none of the other factors show 
association with change in bundle choice. This finding indicates that, when consumers 
did not change plan, the changes of bundle choice is more likely to be motivated by the 
changes in their perceived plan quality. 
 
 The results in table IV.8 show that consumer perception is not just statistically 
associated with bundle choice. The effect of consumer perception overrides the effects of 
other factors because plan rating was strongly associated with consumers’ purchasing 
decisions in any circumstance. These findings indicate that changing bundle choice is 
need (value) based rather than price based. Consumers may be price-sensitive when 
making the plan choice decision but rely more on their own perceptions when making the 
bundle choice decision for the enrolled plan.  
 
IV.5.9 Coverage Bundle Choice Movement in Response to Rating Movement  
 
 The effect of plan rating on coverage bundle choice stands out from all associated 
factors. One further question is in what direction bundle choices respond to plan rating 
change. For example, do consumers necessarily choose a more complete bundle choice if 
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consumers rated the plan higher than they rated in the past? To further understand the 
relationship between consumer perception and the consumer purchasing decision, it is 
worth taking a close look at the movement of ratings and the association with bundle 
choices.     
 
  “Movement” means the direction of change. A movement is defined as “rating 
up” when consumers rated their plan higher than they rated in the past, and vice versa. 
The movement of “moving up” indicates the consumer chose a more complete bundle 
from the less complete bundle choice, such as moving from bundle I to bundle II/III, or 
from bundle II to bundle III. “Moving down” indicates movement from bundle II to 
bundle I, or from bundle III to II/I.  
 
 Table IV.9.1 describes the distributions of rating movements across bundle 
choices. 59% of the sample population did not change their plan ratings over the two 
years; 21% rated their plans higher; and 19% rated their plans lower. For those who rated 
plans up, 48% chose bundle III, 31% chose bundle II, and 21% chose bundle I in the 
second year. Similar patterns can be found for “static” and “rating down.” For each 
direction of rating movements, around 47% bought bundle III, about 34% bought bundle 
II, and 19% bought bundle I. The majority of the study population always chose the more 
complete coverage bundle.  
  
 Table IV.9.2 is a contingency table showing the movements of ratings and 
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coverage bundles. There is no doubt that the majority retains their choices over the two 
consecutive years (more than 85%). Among the 59% of consumers who did not change 
plan ratings, 89% did not change bundle choices; about 6% chose more complete bundle 
choices; and about 5% chose less complete bundle choices. Among the 21% of 
consumers who rated up their plans, 86% did not change bundle choices; about 7% chose 
more complete bundle choices; and about 6% chose less complete bundle choices. 
Among the 19% of consumers who rated their plan down, 86% did not change bundle 
choices; about 7% chose more complete bundle choices; and about 7% chose less 
complete bundle choices. 
  
 The results of table IV.9.2 indicate that, first, no matter how individuals change 
plan ratings (static, rating up, or rating down) their bundle choices primarily remain the 
same; second, the movement patterns of bundle choices do not appear different in either 
direction of rating movement.  
 
Table IV.10 presents the generalized ordered logit regression results for bundle choices 
and bundle movements in response to the rating movements respectively.  
 
 In the model of bundle choice, panel 1 presents the regression results of bundles II 
and III compared to bundle I; panel 2 presents the regression results of bundle III 
compared with bundles I and II. In panel 1, rating movements are negatively associated 
with bundle choices. Consumers who rated up their plans are 0.82 times less likely to 
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choose more complete bundles (bundles II and III) (OR=0.82, 95% CI [0.73 – 0.93], 
p<.001). The effect of rating down is similar to rating up with the odds ratio of 0.89 
(OR=0.89, 95% CI [0.78 – 1.01], p<.001). In panel 2, rating movements are still 
negatively associated with bundle choices; however, the associations are statistically 
insignificant. Table IV.9.1 can help to explain this. In table IV.9.1, the distribution of 
bundle choices is similar for each type of rating movement. For example, the proportions 
of bundle III are 48%, 47%, and 47% for rating up, static, and rating down, respectively. 
There is a slightly larger variation for bundle II: 31%, 35%, and 35% for rating up, static, 
and rating down, respectively. Apparently, consumers’ choice of bundle II is more 
responsive to rating movements. This might be because bundle II consumers have more 
room to rate up or rate down their plans, thus bundle choice including bundle II is more 
responsive to rating movements. However the direction and magnitude of the effects of 
rating up and rating down are close, indicating a gap between consumer perception and 
consumer behavior. Consumers may not respond to rating movement rationally.  
 
 In the bundle movement model, panel 1 presents the regression results of bundle 
move up and static compared to bundle move down; panel 2 presents the regression 
results of bundle move up compared with bundles move down and static. In both panels, 
rating movements are consistently and significantly associated with bundle movements. 
Consumers rated up/down plans are 0.8 times less likely to choose a more complete 
bundle choice (OR=0.75, 95% CI [0.65 – 0.87], p<0.001; OR=0.76, 95% CI [0.65 – 
0.89], p=0.001), indicating rating movements are responsible for bundle choice 
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movements but the directions of rating movements do not matter. This indicates that 
consumers perceive changes in plan but may not necessarily make choices accordingly.    
  
 The results of the bundle choice model also show that all the other plan and 
consumer characteristics, including OOP, whether the premium is subsidized, having 
dependents, and income, are all significantly associated with bundle choice except 
employment status and plan type, whereas none of these indicators show significant 
effects in the bundle movement model except having dependents.  
 
 In the bundle choice model, as expected, OOP is negatively associated with 
bundle choice (in panel 1: p<.001, OR=0.60, 95% CI [0.47 – 0.78]; in panel 2: p<.001, 
OR=0.39, 95% CI [0.31 – 0.50]); “whether the premium is subsidized” significantly 
increases the odds of choosing a more complete bundle choice (panel 1: p<.001, 
OR=2.45, 95% CI [2.14 – 1.48]; panel 2: p<.001, OR=1.77, 95% CI [1.57 – 2.01]); 
“having dependent” increases the odds of purchasing a more complete bundle choice by 
35% (panel 1 and panel 2: p<.001, OR=1.35, 95% CI [1.24 – 1.48]); consumers with 
middle income are 1.50 times more likely to purchase a more complete bundle choice 
(p<.001, OR=1.50, 95% CI [1.33 – 1.70]), “high income” consumers are even more 
likely to purchase a more complete bundle choice (panel 1: p<.001, OR=1.87, 95% CI 
[1.64 – 2.14]; panel 2: p<.001, OR=1.67, 95% CI [1.48 – 1.89]).  
 
 The generalized ordered logit regression results report the odds ratios for two 
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pairs of outcome comparisons in panel 1 and panel 2 respectively. When the proportional 
odds assumption is not violated, the magnitude and direction of the effects in two panels 
should be consistent. Because the generalized ordered logit overcomes the violation and 
still reports the odds ratios when the proportional odds assumption is violated, the odds 
ratios are different in two panels, and it can tell how specifically the effects are different 
from each other. For example, the unit increase in OOP is associated with the decrease in 
likelihood of choosing the more complete bundles for both comparisons, namely “Bundle 
II and III combined versus Bundle I” and “Bundle III versus Bundle II and I combined.” 
But in the comparison of “Bundle III” versus “Bundle II and I combined,” the effect of 
OOP is smaller than its effect when comparing “Bundle II and III combined” versus 
“Bundle I” (OR=0.39 v. OR=0.60). This result shows that the effect of OOP is smaller 
when Bundle II is not included in the more complete bundle choice group, indicating that 
consumers weight Bundle II more when considering the plan price.  
 
 Similar results can also be found for “whether the premium is subsidized” and 
“high income.” This finding indicates that when consumers make their decision to 
purchase the more complete bundle choices, they weight Bundle II more regarding the 
financial conditions.  
     
 In the bundle movement model, panel 1 and panel 2 report the same odds ratios 
with expected signs except “middle income”. In panel 1, middle-income consumers are 
less likely to upgrade (move up or static) bundle choice, while they are more likely to 
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upgrade (move up) bundle choice in panel 2. However, the effects are not found to be 
significantly associated with bundle movement.   
 
 In summary, the results in table IV.10 suggest again that the choice decision on 
coverage bundle is distinct from the decision of changing bundle choices. There are three 
main findings with regard to these two decision-making processes. First, rating 
movement is statistically significantly associated with both bundle choice and bundle 
movement. Second, the bundle choice model presents more discrepancies in response to 
rating movement, OOP, premium subsidy, and high-income level in panel analyses. 
When bundle II is included in the more complete bundle choice (panel 1), the magnitude 
of the effects is greater, indicating that bundle II consumers are more responsive in 
bundle choice decision-making. Third, the bundle choice decision-making process is 
associated with financial status, whereas bundle movement decision-making does not rely 
on financial conditions. Instead, the significant effect of “whether have dependent” 
indicates that changes in bundle choice may be due to the needs of family members 
(“whether have dependent”) rather than consideration of financial conditions. It seems 
that consumers may change plan ratings when they perceive quality change; however, 
they do not appear to make rational choices in response to how they rated plans. It might 
be because the importance of family members’ needs overrides the willingness to choose 
the more complete bundle choice or upgrade to the more complete bundle choice, 
although the latter is thought to be a better choice from the researcher’s perspective.  
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 The persistently significant effect of consumer satisfaction along with other 
factors in relation to coverage bundle choices reveals that “more” does not necessarily 
mean “better” in personal decision-making process. Consumers’ purchasing decision 
basically follows their perceptions. However, the changes in their perceptions indicate a 
more comprehensive valuation where financial status and family member’s needs jointly 
influence the decision of bundle choice.  It makes the direction of perception changes less 
trackable. 
 
IV.5.10 Robustness Check  
   
 In social sciences, the rating scale is a set of categories designed to elicit 
information about a quantitative or a qualitative attribute. The rating scale for a product is 
considered to reflect the perceived quality of the product. The MEPS collects data on 
consumer satisfaction in rating scales from 0–10. For this study, the rating scales are 
further classified into interval levels indicating the perceived quality. To test the 
robustness of the findings, it is necessary to check whether different categorizations of 
rating scales impact the choice of coverage bundle. Thus I compare three groups of plan 
rating levels and their effects to the choice of coverage bundles.  
 
 The column in the middle is the scale used for this study. Scores above 5 indicate 
plan performance is “Good/Fair.” Scores under 5 indicate plan performance is “Poor” and 
Scores above 8 indicate plan performance is “Excellent.” Table IV.11 shows that slight 
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adjustments to the scale categories do not impact the effects of ratings except when 
“Good/Poor” is scaled between 4 and 6. It seems that the rating score of 7 is a threshold. 
Including “7” in the level of “Good/Poor” makes the rating levels significantly different 
from “Poor.” Also, including “7” in the “Excellent” level does not make “Excellent” 
more significantly different from other levels. Therefore, score of 7 in the level of 
“Good/Poor” is crucial for the rating level schemes and can be reasonably considered in 
the “Good/Poor” level.  
 
 IV.6. Conclusions  
 
 Studies of consumer behavior in health insurance markets mainly focus on the 
effect of price and quality on the choice of health plan. The main goal of studying health 
plan choice is to promote a competitive strategy to contain health care costs and improve 
health care quality. However, choosing the appropriate measure of quality becomes the 
central problem that impedes the study of health plan choice making. Quality varies 
substantially across or within the products, and is not readily observed. Report cards were 
developed to assist consumers in making optimal choices of health plans. Unfortunately, 
the uptake rate of report cards and other quality metrics is low and the effects on plan 
choice are ambiguous. There have been very few efforts to assess the effects of subjective 
quality measures (Wedig and Tai-Seale, 2002). Feldman et al. (1989) found that 
subjectively reported waiting times influenced plan choice in the Twin Cities. Chernew 
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and Scanlon (1998) did not find a significant effect of subjective plan measure on plan 
choice.  
 
 Behavioral economics stresses consumer valuation and its role in consumer 
behavior. In the spirit of behavioral economics, this paper attempts to study consumer 
perception or personal valuation in the consumer decision-making process. I examine the 
relationship between consumer perception and consumer decision-making in three 
innovative ways. First, instead of making health plan choices, consumers making choices 
among coverage bundles offered by the enrolled plan is studied. Second, the choice set of 
coverage bundles is not discrete but ordinal. Third, the main effect of plan quality is 
consumer reported plan ratings instead of the publicized quality measures.  
 
 The main findings of this study are summarized as follows. First, the higher 
consumers rated their plans the more likely they were to choose a more complete 
coverage bundle compared with consumers who rated their plans low. Plan ratings as 
perceived plan quality play a persistently significant role in predicting consumer’s 
purchasing behavior in choosing insurance coverage bundles. Second, the significant 
effect of past plan ratings as perceived plan quality in determining the present bundle 
choice indicates learning from the past is crucial in the process of decision-making. 
However, third, the past bundle choice has no impact on either current or past plan rating; 
this indicates there is likely no reverse causal effect of plan rating on the bundle choice. 
Fourth, purchasing health insurance plans and purchasing coverage bundles are two sets 
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of decision-making processes. In the latter decision-making process where individuals 
were already enrolled in the plans, plan price and individual income level do not appear 
to impact individual decisions on coverage bundle choice. Fifth, consumers change 
coverage bundle choices in response to plan rating changes; however, the changes of 
bundle choices and ratings may not necessarily be concordant. This indicates a more 
comprehensive valuation where financial status and family member’s needs jointly 
influence the decision of changing bundle choice.  
 
 The data and results are also subject to some limitations. First, as a major flaw the 
constructed coverage bundle choices may deviate from the true choice options. MEPS 
data do not provide specific information about plan type and the available coverage 
options offered by the enrolled plan. In this study sample of the privately insured 
individuals, about 96% took prescription drug coverage, 71% took dental care, 60% took 
vision care22. In this study sample of privately insured individuals, over 80 percent of 
them obtained employer-sponsored health insurance. Consumers’ choices of coverage 
may have been well defined and offered in bundles by employers. For those individuals 
who did not take the listed coverage options, I am not able to identify whether it was due 
to individual preference or because the coverage options were just simply not offered. 
Given the available information I have to make the assumptions that everyone faced 
equal opportunities to choose health plans and all health plans offered the same menu of 
                                                        
22 The U.S. Bureau of Statistics22 reported take-up rates of prescription drug coverage, dental care 
and vision care are at 74%, 79% and 79% respectively. Health care benefits: Access, 
participation, and take-up rates, civilian workers, National Compensation Survey, March 2014 
http://www.bls.gov/ncs/ebs/benefits/2014/ebbl0055.pdf 
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coverage options including prescription drug, dental and vision care. It may bias the 
study results by overestimating the effect of individual preference. Also, consumers have 
different motivations to take different coverage options including not to take. The 
coverage bundle design that combing coverage options may mask individual risk 
preference towards different coverage options. To identify individual’s preference to 
specific health risks, future studies should focus on each single coverage option. 
 
 The ACA health insurance marketplaces (also known as exchanges) are estimated 
to provide up to 29 million people with affordable health insurance by 201923. Under the 
implementation of Affordable Care Act, each state will have an operating Health 
Insurance Exchange where individuals, families and small business can purchase 
standardized health insurance plans. The exchanges provide affordable premium and cost 
sharing subsidies for the eligible consumers, especially those without employer based 
health coverage options and those making less than 400% of the Federal Poverty Level 
(FPL). Meanwhile, some workers previously insured by their employers' plans may also 
switch to publicly subsidized plans that are cheaper or provide more comprehensive 
benefits. These consumers’ choice decisions of optional coverage will then be more 
likely preference driven. Understanding consumer perceptions with each coverage option 
will have more specific policy implications for ACA implementation to engage 
enrollment while providing appropriate cost assistance.  
                                                        
23 ObamaCare facts: http://obamacarefacts.com/obamacare-health-insurance-exchange/ 
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 Second, some may suggests that cross-sectional analysis is not ideal for studies of 
health insurance purchasing behavior. The MEPS data only are collected over five rounds 
of in-person interviews that cover a consecutive two-year period. It provides data for 
examining person level changes in selected variables such as expenditures, health 
insurance coverage, and health status in two full calendar years. However consumers’ 
choices of health insurance coverage are often associated with jobs. Two years’ follow up 
does not provide enough information on consumer’s switching behaviors. Therefore it is 
hard to identify consumers’ switching behavior associated with perceptions from jobs.  A 
panel data over a longer period may provide more sound study results. 
 
 Third, in the MEPS data, the regional variations of choices were limited to 
“Northeast, Midwest, South, and West.” The characteristics of insurance markets and 
consumer behaviors vary largely even within each of these regions. Obtaining county 
level data, which is possible by traveling to the data center, may help to identify the 
regional effect.  
 
 Lastly, I attempt to discover the association between consumer perception and 
consumer coverage bundle choice for those who enrolled in the plans. The findings of 
this study do not answer the question of how coverage bundle choice is associated with 
plan choice. To have further policy implications for plan management, efforts should be 
made to explain the relationship between bundle choice and health plans. 
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 While constraining costs and promoting health outcome, this study may 
contribute to the debate concerning optimizing health plan management and providing 
high quality care to enhance consumer engagement.  Future work can be done to evaluate 
the choice association between coverage and health plan and to reveal the role of 
consumer perception in a decision chain within a personal valuation system.  
 
  
  
 
177
References 
Beaulieu, N. D. (2002). Quality information and consumer health plan choices. J Health 
Econ, 21(1), 43–63. doi: Doi 10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00126-6 
 
Buchmueller, T. C., and Feldstein, P. J. (1996). Consumers' sensitivity to health plan  
premiums: Evidence from a natural experiment in California. Health Affairs, 15(1), 143–
151. doi: Doi 10.1377/Hlthaff.15.1.143 
 
Chernew, M., Gowrisankaran, G., and Scanlon, D. P. (2008). Learning and the value of  
information: Evidence from health plan report cards. Journal of Econometrics, 144(1),  
156–174. doi: Doi 10.1016/J.Jeconom.2008.01.001 
 
Chernew, M., Scanlon, D. (1998). Health plan report cards and insurance choice. Inquiry,  
35, 9–22.  
 
Edgman-Levitan, S., Cleary, P. (1996). What information do consumers want and need?  
Health Affairs, 15, 42–56.  
 
Farley, D., Short, P., Elliot, M.N., Kanouse, D.E., Brown, J.A., Hays, R.D. (2002).  
Effects of CAHPS health plan performance information on plan choices by New Jersey 
Medicaid beneficiaries. Health Services Research, 37(4), 985–1007.  
 
Farley, D. O., Short, P. F., Elliott, M. N., Kanouse, D. E., Brown, J. A., and Hays, R. D.  
(2002). Effects of CAHPS health plan performance information on plan choices by New  
Jersey Medicaid beneficiaries. Health Services Research, 37, 985–1007.  
 
Feldman, R., Finch, M., Dowd, B., and Cassou, S. (1989). The Demand for Employment- 
Based Health-Insurance Plans. Journal of Human Resources, 24(1), 115–142. doi: Doi  
10.2307/145935 
 
Foster, M. M., Earl, P. E., Haines, T. P., and Mitchell, G. K. (2010). Unravelling the  
concept of consumer preference: Implications for health policy and optimal planning in  
primary care. Health Policy, 97(2–3), 105–112. doi: 10.1016/J.Healthpol.2010.04.005 
Gruber, J., & Madrian, B. C. . (2002). Health Insurance, Labor Supply, and Job Mobility:  
A Critical Review of the Literature. National Bureau of Economic Research, No. w8817.  
 
Harris, K., Schultz, J., and Feldman, R. (2002). Measuring consumer perceptions of  
quality differences among competing health benefit plans. J Health Econ, 21(1), 1–17.  
doi: Doi 10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00098-4 
 
Harris, K. M., and Keane, M. P. (1999). A model of health plan choice: Inferring  
preferences and perceptions from a combination of revealed preference and attitudinal  
data. Journal of Econometrics, 89(1–2), 131–157.  
  
 
178
Hibbard, J. H., and Jewett, J. J. (1996). What type of quality information do consumers  
want in a health care report card? Medical Care Research and Review, 53(1), 28–47.  
 
Hibbard, J. H., and Jewett, J. J. (1997). Will quality report cards help consumers? Health  
Affairs, 16(3), 218–228. doi: Doi 10.1377/Hlthaff.16.3.218 
 
Juba, D., Lave, J., and Shaddy, J. (1980). An analysis of the choice of health benefits  
plans. Inquiry, 17, 62–71.  
 
Long, S. H., Settle, R. F., and Wrightson, C. W. (1988). Employee Premiums,  
Availability of Alternative Plans, and Hmo Disenrollment. Medical Care, 26(10), 927– 
938. doi: Doi 10.1097/00005650-198810000-00001 
 
Mcguire, T. G. (1981). Price and Membership in a Prepaid Group Medical-Practice.  
Medical Care, 19(2), 172–183. doi: Doi 10.1097/00005650-198102000-00005 
 
Rosenthale, M. E. (1994). Cleveland health quality choice: a model for collaborative  
community-based outcomes assessment. The Joint Commission Journal on Quality  
Improvement, 20(8), 425–442.  
 
Sainfort, F., and Booske, B. C. (1996). Role of information in consumer selection of  
health plans. Health Care Financ Rev, 18(1), 31–54.  
 
Scanlon, D. P., and Chernew, M. (1999). HEDIS measures and managed care enrollment.  
Medical Care Research and Review, 56, 60–84.  
 
Scanlon, D. P., Chernew, M., and Lave, J. R. (1997). Consumer health plan choice:  
current knowledge and future directions. Annu Rev Public Health, 18, 507–528. doi:  
10.1146/annurev.publhealth.18.1.507 
 
Scanlon, D. P., Chernew, M., McLaughlin, C., and Solon, G. (2002). The impact of  
health plan report cards on managed care enrollment. J Health Econ, 21(1), 19–41. doi:  
Doi 10.1016/S0167-6296(01)00111-4 
 
Schultz, J., Call, K. T., Feldman, R., and Christianson, J. (2001). Do employees use  
report cards to assess health care provider systems? Health Serv Res, 36(3), 509–530.  
 
Short, P. F., and Taylor, A. K. (1989). Premiums, Benefits, and Employee Choice of  
Health-Insurance Options. J Health Econ, 8(3), 293–311. doi: Doi 10.1016/0167- 
6296(89)90023-4 
 
Spranca, M., Kanouse, D. E., Elliott, M., Short, P. F., Farley, D. O., and Hays, R. D.  
(2000). Do consumer reports of health plan quality affect health plan selection? Health  
Serv Res, 35(5 Pt 1), 933–947.  
  
 
179
Tumlinson, A., Bottigheimer, H., Mahoney, P., Stone, E. M., and Hendricks, A. (1997).  
Choosing a health plan: What information will consumers use? Health Affairs, 16(3),  
229–238. doi: Doi 10.1377/Hlthaff.16.3.229 
 
Wedig, G. J., and Tai-Seale, M. (2002). The effect of report cards on consumer choice in  
the health insurance market. J Health Econ, 21(6), 1031–1048. doi: Pii S0167- 
6296(02)00075-9 Doi 10.1016/S0167-6296(02)00075-9 
 
Welch, W. P. (1986). The Elasticity of Demand for Health Maintenance Organizations.  
Journal of Human Resources, 21(2), 252–266. doi: Doi 10.2307/145801 
 
Williams, R. (2006). Generalized ordered logit/partial proportional odds models for  
ordinal dependent variables. Stata Journal, 6(1), 58–82.  
 
Zeithaml. (1988). Consumer Perceptions of Price, Quality, and Value: A Means-End  
Model and Synthesis of Evidence. Journal of  Marketing 52(3), 2–22.  
 
 
  
  
 
180
Table IV.1. Coverage bundle choice (%)(N=10,492) 
 Coverage Bundle Choice† 
  I II III 
Coverage options§ (N= 2,050) (N= 2,891) (N= 5,551) 
Prescription (96%) 18.25 27.42 54.32 
Dental (71%) 1.82 24.95 73.20 
Vision (63%) 0.7 16.27 83.01  
Notes: §. The percentages for coverage options are out of the total sample population  
(N=10,492).  †. The percentages for coverage bundle choices are the row percentages. 
  
Table IV.2. Plan Ratings and coverage bundle choice (%)(N= 10,492) 
 Coverage Bundle Choice† 
  I II III 
Plan Rating§ (N= 2,050) (N= 2,891) (N= 5,551) 
Poor (11.48%) 26.00 29.07 44.93 
Fair/good (50.62%) 19.43 27.68 52.89 
Excellent  (37.91%) 17.73 26.93 55.34 
Notes: §. The percentages for coverage options are out of the total sample population  
(N=10,492).  †. The percentages for coverage bundle choices are the row percentages. 
 
 
 
Table IV.3. Plan characteristics among coverage bundle choices (N= 10,492) 
 Coverage Bundle Choice 
 I II III 
 (N= 2,050) (N= 2,891) (N= 5,551) 
HMO 33.37% 40.99% 41.33% 
Monthly OOP§ ($) 156.04 140.76 112.37 
Premium subsidized 75.41% 87.24% 90.79% 
Notes: §. The mean OOP for each coverage bundle choice in U.S. dollars is reported.  
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Table IV.4. Individual  characteristics by coverage bundle choices (N= 10,492) 
 Coverage Bundle Choice (%) 
 I II III 
 (N= 2,050) (N= 2,891) (N= 5,551) 
Age§ (years) 45.61 44.71 44.00 
Male 43.95 42.20 42.55 
White 82.54 80.98 73.48 
Married 73.56 69.84 68.02 
Degree beyond college 30.24 34.24 31.85 
Has dependent 24.63 29.61 31.18 
Income 
    Middle 32.93 30.68 30.97 
    High 47.85 56.14 58.76 
Region    
    Northeast     13.51 15.53 16.05 
    Midwest 22.78 24.70 21.85 
    South 44.98 39.43 34.41 
    West 18.73 20.34 27.69 
Notes: §. The mean age is reported.  
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Table IV.5.1 Plan rating in response to optional coverage choice§  
 Plan Ratings (1–3) 
 A p-value* B p-value C p-value 
Bundle (t)       
    2       
    3       
Bundle (t-1)       
    2   0.92 [0.52 – 1.63]† <.001*** 1.28 [0.76 – 2.16] 0.35 
    3   52.18 [29.20 – 93.22] <.001*** 68.74 [40.50 – 116.68] <.001*** 
Rating (t)       
    Fair 1.30 [1.15 – 1.46] <.001*** 1.17 [1.02 – 1.48] 0.03**   
    Excellent 1.43 [1.26 – 1.62] <.001*** 1.18 [0.97 – 1.44] 0.10    
Rating (t-1)       
    Fair   1.20 [1.00 – 1.43] 0.05** 1.26 [1.02 – 1.65] 0.01*** 
    Excellent   1.22 [1.00 – 1.48] 0.05 ** 1.46 [1.16 – 1.83] 0.01*** 
Note: §. The ordered logit regression model controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, employment status, plan type, OOP, subsidy, dependent, 
income, region, urban, and the risk-adjustment score MEPS DxCG .*. P-values indicate the statistical significance at the 95% significance 
level (*: <0.1; **:<.05; ***:<.001). †. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table IV.5.2 Plan rating in response to optional coverage choice§  
 Plan Ratings (1–3) 
 A p-value* B p-value C p-value 
Bundle (t)       
    2 1.14 [1.02 – 1.28] † 0.02** 1.01 [0.83 – 1.22] 0.92   
    3 1.29 [1.16 – 1.43] <.001*** 1.07 [0.88 – 1.30] 0.52   
Bundle (t-1)       
    2   0.72 [0.44 – 1.18] 0.86 0.77 [0.49 – 1.24] 0.28 
    3   0.74 [0.45 – 1.22] 0.69 0.84 [0.53 – 1.33] 0.45 
Rating (t)       
    Fair       
    Excellent       
Rating (t-1)       
    Fair   3.25 [2.94 – 3.82] <.001*** 3.31 [2.91– 3.77] <.001*** 
    Excellent   13.87 [12.03 – 15.99] <.001*** 13.62 [11.82 – 15.69] <.001*** 
Note: §. The ordered logit regression model controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, employment status, plan type, OOP, subsidy, dependent, 
income, region, urban, and the risk-adjustment score MEPS DxCG .*. P-values indicate the statistical significance at the 95% significance 
level (*: <0.1; **:<.05; ***:<.001). †. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in the parentheses.  
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Notes: §.The approximate likelihood-ratio test of 
proportionality of odds across response categories will be 
reported by Brant test. A significant test statistic provides 
evidence that the parallel regression assumption has been 
violated. .*. P-values indicate the statistical significance at the 
95% significance level (*: <0.1; **:<.05; ***:<.001). 
 
 
  
Table IV.6. Brant test of proportional odds assumption§ 
 Chi2 p>chi2* 
Bundle (t-1)   
    II 267.78 0.000*** 
    III 0.01 0.919 
Rating (t-1)   
    Fair 2.97 0.085 
    Excellent 2.54 0.111 
Employ (t) 0.58 0.445 
Plan (t) 5.11 0.024** 
OOP 1.91 0.167 
Premium Subsidy 7.78 0.005*** 
Dependent 0.21 0.644 
Income   
    Middle 0.21 0.649 
    High 0.10 0.755 
  
 
185
 
 
 
Note: §. The generalized ordered logit regression model controls for age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, employment status, plan type, OOP, subsidy, dependent, 
income, region, urban, and the risk-adjustment score MEPS DxCG .*. P-values 
indicate the statistical significance at the 95% significance level (*: <0.1; 
**:<.05; ***:<.001). †. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in the 
parentheses.  
 
  
Table IV.7. The generalized ordered logit regression of bundle choices§ 
 OR 95% CI p-value* 
Panel 1: (Bundle II and Bundle III) v. Bundle I 
Coverage (t-1)    
    2 9.75 [6.32 – 15.04]† <.001*** 
    3 19.54 [12.89 – 29.62] <.001*** 
Rating (t-1)    
    Fair 1.33 [1.10 – 1.62] 0.004*** 
    Excellent 1.38 [1.13 – 1.70] 0.002*** 
Employ (t) 1.35 [1.12 – 1.62] 0.001*** 
Plan (t) 0.98 [0.86 – 1.11] 0.725 
OOP 0.72 [0.52 – 1.02] 0.066* 
Premium Subsidy 1.76 [1.41 – 2.19] 0.000***  
Dependent 1.30 [1.11 – 1.53] 0.001*** 
Income    
    Middle 1.36 [1.11 – 1.68] 0.003*** 
    High 1.19 [0.97 – 1.45] 0.096* 
Panel 2: Bundle III v. (Bundle I and Bundle II) 
Coverage (t-1)    
    2 0.18 [0.12 – 0.28] <.001*** 
    3 19.54 [12.89 – 29.62] <.001*** 
Rating (t-1)    
    Fair 1.33 [1.10 – 1.62] 0.004*** 
    Excellent 1.38 [1.13 – 1.70] 0.002*** 
Employ (t) 1.35 [1.12 – 1.62] 0.001*** 
Plan (t) 0.98 [0.86 – 1.11] 0.725 
OOP 0.72 [0.52 – 1.02] 0.066* 
Premium Subsidy 1.32 [1.07 – 1.63] 0.010***  
Dependent 1.30 [1.11 – 1.53] 0.001*** 
Income    
    Middle 1.36 [1.11 – 1.68] 0.003*** 
    High 1.19 [0.97 – 1.45] 0.096* 
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Table IV.8. The logistic regression of Δ coverage bundle§ 
 Δ coverage bundle 
 A  B 
 N= 10,492  N=9,400 
 OR p-value*  OR p-value 
Δ Rating 1.20 [1.05 – 1.38]† 0.01***  1.33 [1.13 – 1.56] 0.001*** 
Employ / /  1.13 [0.88 – 1.45] 0.35 
Δ Employ  1.14 [0.85 – 1.53] 0.39  / / 
Plan / /  0.89 [0.75 – 1.05] 0.16 
Δ Plan 7.95 [6.78 – 9.31] <0.001***  / / 
OOP 0.84 [0.55 – 1.28] 0.42  1.04 [0.65 – 1.67] 0.86 
Premium 
Subsidy 1.03 [0.83 – 1.27] 0.81  1.02 [0.79 – 1.31] 0.90 
Dependent 0.81 [0.69 – 0.97]  0.02**  0.84 [0.68 – 1.03] 0.10 
Income      
    Middle 0.98 [0.77 – 1.25] 0.88  0.96 [0.73 – 1.27] 0.79 
    High 1.12 [0.89 – 1.40] 0.34  1.03 [0.79 – 1.35] 0.80 
Note: §. The logistic regression model controls for age, sex, race/ethnicity, employment status, 
plan type, OOP, subsidy, dependent, income, region, urban, and the risk-adjustment score MEPS 
DxCG .*. P-values indicate the statistical significance at the 95% significance level (*: <0.1; 
**:<.05; ***:<.001). †. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table IV.9.1 Coverage bundle and rating movement (N=10,492) 
 Coverage Bundle Choice† 
  I II III 
Rating movement§  (N= 2,050) (N= 2,891) (N= 5,551) 
Rating up (21.29%)  21.07 30.99 47.93 
Static (59.44%)  18.15 34.97 46.88 
Rating down 
(19.27%)  17.54 35.07 47.39 
Notes: §. The percentages for coverage options are out of the total sample population (N=10,492).  
†. The percentages for coverage bundle choices are the row percentages. 
 
 
 
 
 
Table IV.9.2 Coverage bundle movement and rating movement (%) (N=10,492) 
 Coverage Bundle Movement† 
Rating movement§ Move down Static Move up   
Rating up (21.29%) 6.49 85.90 7.07  
Static (59.44%) 4.92 89.08 5.53  
Rating down (19.27%) 6.82 86.40 6.53   
Notes: §. The percentages for coverage options are out of the total sample population (N=10,492).  
†. The percentages for coverage bundle choices are the row percentages. 
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Table IV.10. The coverage bundle choice v. movements in response to rating movements§ 
 Coverage Bundle Choice   Bundle Movement  
 OR p-value*   OR p-value 
Panel 1 Bundles II and III v. Bundle I  Move up and static v. move down 
Δ Rating      
    Rating up 0.82 [0.73 – 0 .93]† <.001***  0.75 [0.65 – 0.87] <.001*** 
    Rating down 0.89 [0.78 – 1.01] 0.06**  0.76 [0.65 – 0.89] 0.001*** 
Employ / /  0.83 [0.68 – 1.00] 0.06* 
Δ Employ  1.08 [0.92 – 1.27] 0.37  / / 
Plan / /  1.11 [0.98 – 1.26] 0.10 
Δ Plan 0.96 [0.84 – 1.10] 0.53  / / 
OOP 0.60 [0.47 – 0.78] <.001***  0.94 [0.67 – 1.33] 0.73 
Premium Subsidy 2.45 [2.14 – 2.79] <.001***  1.06 [0.88 – 11.28] 0.53 
Dependent 1.35 [1.24 – 1.48] <.001***  1.18 [1.01 – 1.38] 0.04** 
Income      
    Middle 1.50 [1.33 – 1.70] <.001***  0.85 [0.67 – 1.08] 0.18 
    High 1.87 [1.64 – 2.14] <.001***  1.01 [0.82 – 1.23] 0.95 
Panel 2 Bundles III v. Bundle I and II  Move up v. Static and move down 
Δ Rating      
    Rating up 0.98 [0.89 – 1.08] 0.70  0.75 [0.65 – 0.87] <.001*** 
    Rating down 1.02 [0.92 – 1.13] 0.68  0.76 [0.65 – 0.89] 0.001*** 
Employ / /  0.83 [0.68 – 1.00] 0.06* 
Δ Employ  1.08 [0.92 – 1.27]  0.37  / / 
Plan / /  1.11 [0.98 – 1.26] 0.10 
Δ Plan 0.96 [0.84 – 1.10] 0.53  / / 
OOP 0.39 [0.31 – 0.50] <.001***  0.94 [0.67 – 1.33] 0.73 
Premium Subsidy 1.77 [1.57 – 2.01] <.001***  1.06 [0.88 – 11.28] 0.53 
Dependent 1.35 [1.24 – 1.48] <.001***  1.18 [1.01 – 1.38] 0.04** 
Income      
    Middle 1.50 [1.33 – 1.70] <.001***  1.02 [0.82 – 1.26] 0.87 
    High 1.67 [1.48 – 1.89] <.001***  1.01 [0.82 – 1.23] 0.95 
Note: §. The generalized ordered logit regression model controls for age, sex, 
race/ethnicity, employment status, plan type, OOP, subsidy, dependent, income, 
region, urban, and the risk-adjustment score MEPS DxCG .*. P-values indicate the 
statistical significance at the 95% significance level (*: <0.1; **:<.05; ***:<.001). 
†. The 95% confidence intervals are reported in the parentheses.  
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Table IV.11. Comparing the effects of different rating level schemes§.   
 Scale OR† p-value*  Scale OR p-value  Scale OR p-value 
    Poor (0 – 3) Ref.   (0 – 4) Ref.   (0 – 5) Ref.  
    Good/Fair (4 – 6) 1.18 [0.85 – 1.66] 0.325  (5 – 7) 1.33 [1.10 – 1.62] 0.004***  (6 – 8) 1.26 [1.06 – 1.50] 0.008*** 
    Excellent (7 – 10) 1.37 [1.00 – 1.88] 0.049**   (8 – 10) 1.38 [1.13 – 1.70] 0.002***   (9 – 10) 1.29 [1.08 – 1.55] 0.006*** 
Note: §. The results are generated by the generalized ordered logit regression, controlling for age, sex, race/ethnicity, employment status, 
plan type, OOP, subsidy, dependent, income, region, urban, and the risk-adjustment score MEPS DxCG .*. P-values indicate the statistical 
significance at the 95% significance level (*: <0.1; **:<.05; ***:<.001). †. The 95% confidence intervals for odds ratios are reported in 
the parentheses. 
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CHAPTER FIVE 
 
Conclusions  
 
 
 
 Based on previous findings about asymmetric information, in this dissertation 
research, I attempt to explore a direction of inquiry individual subjective valuation in 
health insurance decision-making, justify the role of individual subjective valuation in the 
demand of health insurance, and opportunities to enrich the precision of demand 
functions for health insurance in the ACA’s new marketplace. While showing how 
individual valuation and health risks affect consumer’s insurance purchasing behavior, I 
provide important policy implications for managing health insurance and engaging 
enrollees.  
 
 First, I introduce a conceptual framework of consumer perception to examine 
private information of consumers and its role in health insurance decision-making. Under 
this conceptual framework, I extend the conceptual impact of consumer private 
information to consumer perceptions in multiple dimensions: consumer perceived health 
status, consumer attitudes towards health insurance, and consumer personal experience 
with health insurance.  
 
 Then I investigate the associations between private information and health 
insurance decisions, as well as the correlations between the multiple dimensions of 
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private information. The research findings not only support the role of multidimensional 
private information in health insurance decision-making but also provide the evidence of 
a pathway among the private information components in making health insurance 
decisions. 
 
 Furthermore, I extend the evaluation of health insurance decisions to health 
insurance coverage bundle decisions to facilitate the study of valuations of alternative 
insurance options for consumers in the complicated decision-making environment. In this 
design, health insurance coverage is organized in rival bundles. Insurance decisions by 
consumers involve forming expectations about rival bundles based on consumer 
valuation of the insurance coverage types.  
 
 This dissertation research contains five chapters: 
Chapter I. An introduction of consumer perceptions and health Insurance decisions 
Chapter II. The joint role of consumer preference and risk status in health insurance 
decision-making 
Chapter III. Does attitude influence behavior? Exploring the role of consumer attitude in 
the demand for private health insurance  
Chapter IV. Consumer satisfaction and health insurance coverage bundle choices 
Chapter V. Conclusions 
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 In Chapter I, I introduce the concept of consumer perceptions and their 
applications in analyzing health insurance markets. I also give an overview of sample 
populations, study design, study methods, and variables included for each study in 
Chapter I.  
 
 In Chapter II, I examine the joint role of individual preference and health risk in 
insurance decision-making. Two types of insurance decisions are measured:  the 
probability of being insured and the probability of employment-based insurance decisions 
among the insured. The study method used in this analysis is logistic regression. This 
study finds that (1) consumer preferences show persistent and significant associations 
with insurance decisions; (2) the healthier and wealthier consumers are more positively 
disposed towards health insurance and are more likely to purchase insurance; (3) the 
effects of health risk measures vary significantly in insurance decisions conditional on 
different preference measures and preference levels; (4) price sensitivity varies largely 
conditional on preference measures. 
 
 In Chapter III, I adapt the approach developed by Lokshin and Ravallion (2005) 
and investigate consumer’s purchasing decisions for health insurance coverage bundles 
with multi-dimensional private information in an artificially created setting that is similar 
to the ACA environment. I conduct logistic regression modeling to estimate the reduced 
forms for coverage bundle choice and consumer attitude respectively. Then I compare the 
predicted linear indices for consumer attitude and coverage bundle choice. I find that, in 
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health insurance decision-making, consumer attitude plays a direct and significant role 
whereas health risks are only associated with consumer attitude. This result indicates that 
risk preferences may internalize health risks and take effects on insurance purchasing 
decisions. 
 
 In Chapter IV, I evaluate the relationship between consumer perceived plan 
quality and health insurance coverage bundle choice decisions. The choice set of 
coverage bundles is constructed in an order from the least complete to the most complete. 
The main effect of interest is a subjective assessment of plan rating. I use the generalized 
ordered logit model for this analysis. The study results suggest that (1) although health 
plan and coverage type are correlated, purchasing health plans and purchasing coverage 
bundles are two sets of insurance decisions; (2) coverage bundle choices are value-based 
and need-based; (3) plan ratings as perceived plan quality play a persistently significant 
role in predicting purchasing decisions by consumers.  
 
 The findings in this dissertation research also have policy implications. In an 
insurance marketplace with mandates, medical underwriting is not allowed to establish 
premiums. While all applicants are insurable regardless of health status, individual risk 
preference becomes more important in insurance decision-making.   
 
 First, health insurance as a “merit good” stresses the provision of health care or 
health insurance benefits based on consumer valuations and perceptions. Health 
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insurance mandates under the Affordable Care Act requiring consumers with 
heterogeneous preferences for health insurance to purchase coverage or pay a penalty 
invokes potential concerns regarding economic efficiency and the distributional 
consequences of welfare. Understanding the joint role of consumer preferences and 
health risks for health insurance mandates can help policymakers and insurers to make 
arrangements regarding health plans and coverage types accordingly and reduce welfare 
losses. Current study findings suggest that feedback on valued benefits from consumers 
should be solicited to facilitate insurance management. In designing health plans and 
educating consumers, searching costs for appropriate insurance and time costs to access 
health services should also be accounted and largely limited. 
 
 Second, when insurers are not allowed to select consumers based on price and risk 
status, consumers could be self-selected based on risk preferences with which insurance 
purchasing decisions are associated. In the new ACA marketplace, educational efforts are 
suggested to engage in insurance enrollment.  More generic health insurance information 
should be provided to consumers, especially to the low-income and minorities who had 
lower educational level and had limited access to healthcare. 
 
 Third, I study consumer perceptions and the associations with different types of 
insurance decisions including general health insurance decisions, health plan choice 
decisions and the coverage bundle choice decisions. These insurance decisions are 
correlated amongst each other, however, distinct from each other. Consumers have 
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different motivations to make different insurance decisions under different circumstances. 
Future work should be done to evaluate the linkages among these insurance decisions in 
order to provide more sound explanations for the role of consumer perceptions in health 
insurance decision-making. It is equally important to identify individual’s preference in 
different insurance decision-making for specific health risks in the future.  
 
 Lastly, while in an environment of promoting value by constraining costs and 
promoting health outcomes, this study may contribute to the debate concerning 
optimizing health plan management and providing high quality care to enhance consumer 
engagement. The study findings suggests that there is a large number of insured 
individuals did not value health insurance enough, indicating the health care and services 
consumers received through health insurance did not meet their needs. Therefore, 
healthcare quality improvement is the ultimate way to attract consumers and achieve 
health insurance coverage expansion.  
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APPENDIX 
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Appendix A. Sample regression results for Table II.3. 
Table II.3 The relationships between consumer preference and insurance decisions.   
 I   II   III 
 OR 95% CI 
p-
value 
OR 95% CI 
p-
value 
OR 95% CI 
p-
value 
Preference    
    Agree Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
    Uncertain 0.96 [0.86 – 1.08] 0.49 0.81 [0.74 – 0.89] <.001 *** 1.02 [0.93 – 1.11] 0.695 
    Disagree 1.77 [1.62 – 1.92] <.001 *** 1.66 [1.56 – 1.78] <.001 *** 1.47 [1.38 – 1.57] <.001 *** 
Age    
    <30 Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    30–39 0.97 [0.89 – 1.05] 0.46 1.02 [0.94 – 1.10] 0.70 1.00 [0.92 – 1.09] 0.97 
    40–49 0.92 [0.84 – 1.01] 0.10 0.97 [0.89 – 1.07] 0.37 0.96 [0.87 – 1.05] 0.37 
    >49 0.97 [0.88 – 1.07] 0.57 1.02 [0.93 – 1.13] 0.64 1.02 [0.92 – 1.12] 0.72 
Sex    
    Male Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Female 1.22 [1.17 – 1.28] <.001 *** 1.25 [1.19 – 1.31] 0.74 1.22 [1.17 – 1.28] <.001 *** 
Race    
    White Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Black 0.95 [0.88 – 1.03] 0.19 0.94 [0.93 – 1.09] 0.79 0.97 [0.89 – 1.04] 0.39 
    Other 1.04 [0.93 – 1.17] 0.49 1.03 [0.91 – 1.16] 0.04 ** 1.02 [0.90 –1.15] 0.77 
Region    
    Northeast Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
    Midwest 1.32 [1.17 – 1.48] <.001 *** 1.30 [1.16 – 1.46] <.001 *** 1.30 [1.16 – 1.46] <.001 *** 
    South 0.93 [0.84 – 1.04] 0.21 0.92 [0.83 – 1.02] 0.13 0.92 [0.82 – 1.02] 0.11 
    West 0.83 [0.74 – 0.94] 0.00 *** 0.82 [0.73 – 0.92] <.001 *** 0.82 [0.73 – 0.93] 0.00 
Employed    
    No Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Yes 2.56 [2.41 – 2.72] <.001 *** 2.54 [2.39 – 2.70] <.001 *** 2.53 [2.38 – 2.68] <.001 *** 
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Never married 
    No Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Yes 0.58 [0.58 – 0.63] <.001 *** 0.58 [0.54 – 0.62] <.001 *** 0.58 [0.54 – 0.63] <.001 *** 
Degree below college    
    No Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
    Yes 0.43 [0.40 – 0.47] <.001 *** 0.44 [0.40 – 0.48] <.001 *** 0.43 [0.40 – 0.47] <.001 *** 
Income    
    < 200% FPL Ref.  Ref.    
    200%–400% FPL 3.94 [3.68 – 4.23] <.001 *** 3.90 [3.64 – 4.18] <.001 *** 3.91 [3.66 – 4.19] <.001 *** 
    >400% FPL 10.07 [9.25 – 10.97] <.001 *** 9.75 [8.94 – 10.62] <.001 *** 10.03 [9.21 – 10.93] <.001 *** 
Currently smoke    
    Yes Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    No 1.64 [1.54 – 1.74] <.001 *** 1.62 [1.52 – 1.73] <.001 *** 1.59 [1.49 – 1.69] <.001 *** 
Goodness-of-fit 
test‡ F=306.89, p-value < 0.0001 F=308.25, p-value < 0.0001 F=300.74, p-value<0.0001 
 
Notes: 1.* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 2. Models I, II and III take responses to 
statements "Do not need health insurance," "Health insurance is not worth the money it costs," and "More likely to take risks" as 
preference measures respectively. 3. ‡: P-value<0.0001 suggests no evidence of lack of fit.
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Table II.3 The relationships between consumer preference and the employment-based insurance decisions.   
 I   II   III  
 OR 95% CI 
p-
value OR 95% CI p-value OR 95% CI p-value 
Preference     
    Agree Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
    Uncertain 1.16 [0.96 – 1.40] 0.131 1.36 [1.20 – 1.56] <.01 *** 1.18 [1.04 – 1.34] 0.01 *** 
    Disagree 1.57 [1.38 – 1.78] <.01 *** 1.77 [1.62 – 1.94] <.01 *** 1.33 [1.21 – 1.47] <.01 *** 
Age    
    <30 Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    30–39 1.06 [0.93 – 1.21] 0.39 1.11 [0.97 – 1.27] 0.11 1.09 [0.95 – 1.24] 0.22 
    40–49 1.05 [0.91 – 1.22] 0.48 1.10 [0.95 – 1.28] 0.20 1.07 [0.93 – 1.24] 0.36 
    >49 0.90 [0.78 – 1.03] 0.14 0.93 [0.81 – 1.07] 0.33 0.93 [0.81 – 1.07] 0.32 
Sex    
    Male Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Female 1.06 [0.99 – 1.14] 0.099 1.07 [1.00 – 1.15] 0.06 1.05 [0.98 – 1.13] 0.18 
Race    
    White Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Black 1.35 [1.19  – 1.54] <.01 *** 1.36 [1.19 – 1.55] <.01 *** 1.37 [1.20 – 1.56] <.01 
    Other 0.90 [0.77 – 1.04] 0.15 0.88 [0.76 – 1.03] 0.10 ** 0.87 [0.75 –1.01] 0.08 
Region    
    Northeast Ref.   Ref.   Ref.    
    Midwest 0.83 [1.17 – 1.48] 0.02 ** 0.81 [0.69 – 0.95] 0.01 *** 0.82 [0.70 – 0.95] 0.01 *** 
    South 0.83 [0.84 – 1.04] 0.01 *** 0.82 [0.70 – 0.95] 0.01 *** 0.81 [0.70 – 0.95] 0.01 
    West 0.68 [0.74 – 0.94] <.01 *** 0.67 [0.57 – 0.79] <.001 *** 0.67 [0.57 – 0.79] <.001 *** 
Employed    
    No Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Yes 1.92 [1.76 – 2.10] <.01 *** 1.95 [1.79 – 2.13] <.001 *** 1.93 [1.76 – 2.10] <.001 *** 
Never married    
    No Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    Yes 0.72 [0.64 – 0.81] <.01 *** 0.70 [0.63 – 0.79] <.001 *** 0.72 [0.64 – 0.81] <.001 *** 
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Degree below college 
    No Ref.   Ref.   Ref.   
    Yes 1.21 [1.10 – 1.34] <.01 *** 1.23 [1.11 – 1.36] <.001 *** 1.21 [1.10 – 1.34] <.001 *** 
Income    
    < 200% FPL Ref.  Ref.    
    200%–400% 
FPL 2.01 [1.79 – 2.26] <.01 *** 2.01 [1.79 – 2.26] <.001 *** 2.01 [1.79 – 2.26] <.001 *** 
    >400% FPL 2.99 [2.63 – 3.41] <.01 *** 2.91 [2.56 – 3.31] <.001 *** 3.01 [2.64 – 3.43] <.001 *** 
Monthly OOP 0.62 [0.45 – 0.85] <.01 *** 0.65 [0.47 – 0.89] 0.01 0.62 [0.45 – 0.86] <.001 *** 
Currently smoke    
    Yes Ref.  Ref.   Ref.  
    No 1.01 [0.91 – 1.13] 0.823   0.99 [0.89 – 1.10] 0.84   0.99 [0.88 – 1.10] 0.791 
Goodness-of-fit 
test‡ F=31.06, p-value<0.0001 F=33.01, p-value<0.0001 F=29.70, p-value<0.0001 
Notes: 1.* significant at 10 percent; ** significant at 5 percent; *** significant at 1 percent. 2. Models I, II and III take responses to 
statements "Do not need health insurance," "Health insurance is not worth the money it costs," and "More likely to take risks" as 
preference measures respectively. 3. ‡: P-value<0.0001 suggests no evidence of lack of fit. 
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Appendix B. Regression results for Table III.3 
Table III.3 The correlation between consumer attitude and coverage bundle choice with 
different components 
  Coverage bundle1 p-value 
Consumer 
attitude2 
p-value 
Correlation 
coefficient3 
p-value 
All variables Mixed4 Mixed 0.1086 <0.01*** 
Demographics   –0.5223 <0.01*** 
    Age 1.00 [0.99–1.00] 0.148 0.99 [0.99–1.00] 0.097  
    Sex 0.78 [0.31–1.97] 0.605 0.63 [0.32–1.26] 0.195  
    Race/Ethnicity    
        White Ref. Ref.   
        Black 1.52 [1.36–1.70] <0.01*** 1.16 [1.05–1.29] <0.01***  
        Others 1.26 [1.09–1.44] <0.01*** 1.12 [0.97–1.28] 0.112  
Geography   0.1156 <0.01*** 
        Northeast Ref. Ref.  
        Midwest 0.97 [0.85–1.11] 0.646 1.00 [0.89–1.12] 0.951  
        South 0.85 [0.76–0.96] <0.01*** 1.07 [0.96–1.19] 0.213  
        West 1.47 [1.29–1.67] <0.01*** 1.05 [0.94–1.18] 0.388  
Income   0.7225 <0.01*** 
        Low Ref. Ref.  
        Middle 1.37 [1.23–1.53] <0.01*** 0.89 [0.80–1.00] 0.044  
        High 1.47 [1.32–1.64] <0.01*** 0.69 [0.62–0.76] <0.01***  
Employment 1.16 [1.05–1.29] <0.01*** 1.34 [1.20–1.50] <0.01*** 0.0231 <0.01*** 
Degree 1.03 [0.95–1.11] 0.484 1.25 [1.15–1.36] <0.01*** 0.0629 <0.01*** 
Perceived health status  0.1285 <0.01*** 
        Excellent Ref. Ref.  
        Good/Fair 0.99 [0.91–1.07] 0.744 1.07 [0.99–1.15] 0.096  
        Poor 0.84 [0.74–0.95] <0.01*** 0.94 [0.83–1.05] 0.269  
Conditions 0.99 [0.92–1.06] 0.728 0.76 [0.71–0.82] <0.01*** 0.1292 <0.01*** 
Current Smoker 1.01 [0.92–1.11] 0.863 0.86 [0.78–0.94] <0.01*** 0.2729 <0.01*** 
Risk taker 1.06 [0.97–1.16] 0.184 2.15 [1.97–2.34] <0.01*** –0.1765 <0.01*** 
Total medical 
expenditure 
0.85 [0.52–1.39] 0.520 0.08 [0.04–0.16] <0.01*** 0.1793 <0.01*** 
   Notes: 1. This column reports the odds ratios between the coverage bundle choice and each 
component. 2. This column reports the odds ratios between consumer attitude and each 
component. 3. The correlation coefficients are calculated using the 4. “Mixed” denotes the 
significance of associations are mixed when include all variables. 
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Table III.3 The goodness-of-fit for correlations of coverage bundle choice and 
consumer attitude with different components (N=16,101) 
 
Coverage 
bundle1  
Consumer 
attitude2  
 F-test p-value Pseudo R2 p-value 
All variables 17.63 <.001 0.043 <.001 
Demographics 9.37 <.001 0.009 <.001 
Geography 10.40 <.001 0.003 <.001 
Income 6.95 <.001 0.007 <.001 
Employment 3.05 0.002 0.003 <.001 
Education 2.16 0.024 0.004 <.001 
Perceived health status 2.82 0.002 0.002 <.001 
Long-term conditions 2.07 0.031 0.004 <.001 
Current Smoker 2.18 0.022 0.002 <.001 
More likely to take risk 1.93 0.039 0.028 <.001 
Total healthcare 
expenditure 1.11 0.356 0.006 <.001 
Notes: 1. This column reports the goodness-of-fit test reported as F-test statistics. 2. This column 
reports the goodness-of-fit for consumer attitude with each component. Consumer attitude is an 
ordinal variable, therefore the Pseudo R2 is reported.  
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